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This study examines the presidential campaign communication of American 
sitting and former vice presidents.  In recent history, four sitting U.S. vice presidents have 
run for president with only one (George H. W. Bush) succeeding.  Three, Richard Nixon 
in 1960, Hubert Humphrey in 1968, and Albert Gore in 2000, lost close elections, with 
Nixon and Gore losing in very close and controversial contests.  In the two cases of 
former vice presidents who ran for president, Nixon prevailed in 1968, whereas Walter 
Mondale failed in 1984.  All of these candidates faced similar rhetorical problems 
attributable to their vice presidential status, particularly in defining their relationship with 
the president and their role in the administration.  This study is a content analysis and 
historical analysis of campaign speeches, statements made during debates, and television 
advertisements by sitting and former vice presidents in the elections of 1960, 1968, 1984, 
1988, and 2000.  The purpose is to understand each vice president’s discourse regarding 
both the president and the administration in which he served; and better appreciate how 
the inherent rhetorical situation that accompanies a superior-subordinate relationship is 
illustrated in these types of campaigns.  Results showed that some vice presidents (e.g. 
 
Richard Nixon) chose to discuss their president/administration more often, while others 
chose to almost never discuss their president/administration (e.g. Al Gore).  This analysis 
shows that when a vice president seeks election to the presidency, he has tended to pursue 
one or more of the following strategies: run on the administration’s record; minimize the 
record and argue that if elected, he will produce better results; emphasize their own 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
A political cartoon published one month before Election Day in 1960 depicted 
Richard Nixon, the incumbent vice president and a former naval officer, leaning over the 
side of a ship as he talks to a man.  The ship, named U.S. World Position, is banged up, 
with cracks in the windows and floors, and cobwebs abound.  Nixon, dressed in an 
officer’s uniform says, “She’s in great shape and I’m the guy to repair her” (“She’s in 
great,” 1960).   
If it’s in great shape, then why would it need fixing?   
The cartoon appears to suggest that Nixon had been making conflicting 
statements in the 1960 presidential campaign.  Nixon hailed the progress of the 
Eisenhower-Nixon years, implying by association that he deserved some credit.  He 
argued that the U.S. standing in the world had not declined during the Eisenhower-Nixon 
years, a charge made by his opponent John F. Kennedy.  Nixon, however, went on to 
discuss ways in which U.S. standing could be strengthened. 
The somewhat contradictory stance speaks to the conflicting roles that Nixon and 
other vice presidents have to contend with in their presidential bids.  Not only must vice 
presidents contend with an opponent, but their relationship with the president and their 
association with the presidential administration, play a complex role in their ability to 
create a positive public image and ultimately a winning electoral coalition.    
This dissertation will (1) discuss why the presidential campaigns of sitting and 
former vice presidents are worthy of study, reviewing the literature on vice presidents; (2) 
offer new research questions, discuss the texts to be studied and the research 




presidents studied here; (4) report the results of the study; and (5) discuss the results and 
conclusions of the study. 
 
Study Rationale 
In recent history, political parties have often turned to sitting or former vice 
presidents to be their standard bearer in presidential elections.  This had not always been 
the case.  After the Constitution was amended in 18041, and prior to 1960, there were 
only two instances when a sitting or former vice president received a party nomination 
for president: Martin Van Buren (1836), and John C. Breckenridge (1860), with Van 
Buren successfully being elected president.  During this time period, the vice presidency 
was never considered a stepping stone to being elected president.  In fact, a vice president 
stood a much greater chance of ascending to the presidency because of the death of a 
president (Waugh, 1956).  John Nance Garner, vice president under Franklin Roosevelt, 
summarized the futility of the vice presidency, reportedly saying that the office “is not 
worth a bucket of warm spit” (Cox, 2013, pg# 1).   
Since 1960, however, there have been four instances when a sitting vice president 
has received his party’s nomination for President: Richard Nixon in 1960, Hubert 
Humphrey in 1968, George H. W. Bush in 1988, and Al Gore in 2000; and two instances 
when a former vice president has done so: Richard Nixon in 1968, and Walter Mondale 
in 1984.2  When one compares this success rate to the time period between 1804 and 
1 Elections prior to 1804, thus prior to the 12th Constitutional amendment, are not considered because a 
different voting method was used to elect the president and vice president.  Under that method, a person 
became vice president if he received the second most votes for president. 
 
2 I am excluding elections in which a former vice president was a sitting president at the time of their 
presidential campaign such as Lyndon Johnson (1964), Richard Nixon (1972), Gerald Ford (1976), and 
George H. W. Bush (1992).  This exclusion is made because once each person became president, he was 
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1956, it’s clear that the modern vice president is a much more competitive candidate for 
president.   
A thorough study is needed to explain the unique presidential campaign situation 
of a sitting or former vice president.  First, the trend of nominating vice presidents will 
likely continue, and a thorough examination will help us understand and explain these 
elections.  Even if vice presidents are not nominated in the future, this examination can 
help us understand the challenges that current or former members of the incumbent 
administration would have if they run for president.  The challenges they would face are 
likely to be similar to those faced by a vice president.  Second, on a wider level, an 
analysis of these campaigns will give us a better understanding of a rhetorical situation 
that inherently exists in life and is played out in the dilemmas that vice presidents face in 
their presidential campaigns.   
Political parties will likely continue to nominate sitting vice presidents for 
presidential contests in the future.  Nelson (2001) noted the vice presidency is now the 
“primary stepping stone to a presidential nomination” (p. 55).  This is because the vice 
presidential office has evolved, most strikingly since the middle of the 20th century, in a 
way that better positions the occupant to be their party's standard bearer for president.  
Williams (1954) noted that the increased quality of the candidates tapped for vice 
president has heightened the prestige of the office, leading to vice presidents being seen 
as more credible. 
likely perceived differently by the public.  The presidential primary campaigns of Hubert Humphrey in 
1972 and 1976, and Dan Quayle in 2000 account for the only other instances when a former vice president 
has run for president since 1960.  Because Humphrey (in 1972 and 1976) and Quayle did not receive their 
party’s nominations for president, their campaigns are also excluded from this analysis. 
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In addition, the responsibilities of vice presidents have increased in more recent 
times, thus further contributing to their credibility.  Prior to Nixon, the vice presidency 
afforded few opportunities for real responsibility.  A vice president’s main duty was to 
serve as president of the Senate, whose only real power was in the rare cases of having to 
cast a tie breaking vote.  America’s first vice president, John Adams said that the vice 
presidency was “the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or 
his imagination conceived” (Waugh, 1956, p. 38).  In fact, Vice President Theodore 
Roosevelt took law courses at night, because his duties were so sparse.  And when Harry 
Truman was first approached to be Franklin Roosevelt’s running mate in 1944, he 
objected, saying that all the vice presidents in history “were about as useful as a cow’s 
fifth teat” (Waugh, 1956, p.166). 
The expansion of the federal government and the presidency during the New Deal 
years, including the greater role the U.S. played in international affairs, however, started 
to create a larger and more prominent role for future vice presidents (Goldstein, 1982).  
Also, in the nuclear era, it was realized that the vice president must be kept more 
informed.  So in 1949, vice presidents were given a seat on the National Security Council 
(Goldstein, 1982).   
Nixon’s vice presidency (1953-1961) was considered revolutionary in that unlike 
previous officeholders, he played a major role in foreign policy and presided over cabinet 
and National Security Council meetings (Kengor, 2000).  Subsequent vice presidents 
such as Walter Mondale, George H. W. Bush and Al Gore were reported to have played 
even bigger roles than Nixon, thus further expanding the prestige, responsibility, and 




A third reason accounting for greater presidential viability involves the way in 
which the vice president is now selected.  Baumgartner (2006) and Goldstein (1982) 
noted that because contemporary presidential nominees can pick their own running 
mates, these vice presidents are more likely to receive substantive assignments and 
become trusted advisors.  Previously, presidential nominees had to accept the running 
mate chosen by party leaders or bosses.  Often this choice was made to achieve 
geographical or ideological balance on the ticket, or provide a “consolation prize” to 
someone who lost out on the presidential nomination but had a large voting constituency 
(Waugh, 1956).     
Fourth, the televised age has ushered in a kind of celebrity factor that benefits the 
vice president simply because he is a notable officeholder, regardless of his activities.  
Goldstein (1982) noted that “with the exception of the president, presidential candidates, 
and an occasional cabinet member, senator, congressman or governor, vice presidents and 
vice-presidential candidates receive greater media attention than other public figures (p. 
11-12).”  This attention contributes to the perception of vice presidents as serious 
candidates and often frontrunners for the presidential nomination.  Also, because the 22nd 
amendment, enacted in 1951, limits a president to two terms, vice presidents are able to 
plan their presidential bids and try to position themselves for the nomination, albeit 
within the constraints imposed by their office. 
These reasons have substantially improved the sitting vice president’s public 
visibility as well as their support among party officials.  Public visibility is a huge asset in 




members caucus or cast votes in primaries, in contrast to a previous era when nominees 
were selected by party leaders or bosses.   
But while modern vice presidents are nominated for president more often than 
their predecessors, their success rate in the general election has been poor.  Of the four 
sitting vice presidents nominated since 1960, three of four lost in the general election.  In 
fact, since 1804, only two sitting vice presidents have ever been elected president: Martin 
Van Buren in 1836 and George H. W. Bush in 1988.  Running as a former vice president, 
Nixon prevailed in 1968, while Mondale lost in 1984.  This study will give us a better 
understanding of the previous and future presidential campaigns waged by sitting and 
former vice presidents. 
 This study will also provide a better understanding and appreciation of the 
rhetorical situation that inherently exists in life and is played out in these campaigns – the 
situation when one person is a subordinate figure in a relationship with a superior figure.  
Such is the case with the vice president who serves with, and under, the president.  The 
vice president running for the presidency faces a significant challenge when discussing 
his partnership with the president, and negotiating between his dual role of vice president 
and presidential nominee.     
The next section will discuss this rhetorical situation on three levels: an inherent 
level, through the insight of academic scholars, and finally on a media-constructed level. 
 
Rhetorical Situation: The Inherent Level 
Bitzer (1968) defines a rhetorical situation as “…the nature of those contexts in 




What are their characteristics?  Why and how do they result in the creation of rhetoric?” 
(p.1).  Bitzer argues that this context includes an exigence, which he defines as “an 
imperfection marked by urgency [that is] capable of positive modification” (p.6-7).  In 
simpler terms, this means that someone is faced with a challenging situation in which 
certain acts of communication can be employed to bring about a solution.  
There is an inherent rhetorical situation that exists in life, which is played out in 
the presidential campaign of a vice president.  This rhetorical situation focuses on how a 
subordinate, within a superior-subordinate pairing, is able to use communication to rise to 
the level of a superior.  In this case, the vice president is the subordinate to the president.  
When vice presidents run for president, they are seeking to establish the kind of positive 
image that will enable them to become the “superior” figure.  This requires vice 
presidents to contend with an exigence that includes the many negative perceptions and 
conflicts that come from being a subordinate vice president.   
The nature of this rhetorical situation is seen in numerous social relationships 
outside of politics, including familial relationships.  For instance, the relationship 
between parent and child mirrors the relationship between president and vice president.  
Children are dependent on the parent, until they are able to be self-sufficient.  Just as 
children lack independence and maturity, the vice president is thought to be lacking 
“presidential” character traits such as independence and leadership ability (Kincade, 
2000; Nelson 2002).  And just as children are to be seen and not heard, the vice president 
must be seen and not heard (or heard in only limited and tightly controlled situations).  
FDR’s first vice president, John Nance Garner said that “the way to survive this job is to 




Several observers have described the relationship between the president and vice 
president in parent-child terms.  Turque (2000) remarked that “the vice presidency makes 
dutiful sons of nearly all who hold it” (p. 356).  Democratic political strategist Bob 
Shrum (2002) said that, “All vice presidents have this problem with ‘infantilization,’ that 
is, they stand behind the guy and they look like a kid” (p. 46).  In fact, Gore political 
advisor Carter Eskew said that to the public, Gore was “known by his paternity” (Eskew, 
2001).  In other words, the public knew about him only through his association with Bill 
Clinton.   
Vice presidents and vice presidential running mates have often been referred to as 
children.  In 1952, when Eisenhower weighed dumping Nixon from the ticket after the 
press reported on accusations that Nixon accepted secret money from California 
businessmen, Nixon said, “I must admit that it made me feel like the little boy caught 
with jam on his face” (Nixon quoted in Barber, 1972, p. 367).  After Nixon delivered the 
“Checkers Speech” in response to these allegations, Eisenhower reportedly told him 
“you’re my boy” (Summers, 2000, p. 121).  Then at the start of the Eisenhower 
administration, Nixon was dubbed “Ike’s errand boy,” (Summer, 2000, p. 145; Barber, 
1972, p. 368).  And Hubert Humphrey even summarized his own elevation to the vice 
presidency by saying: “Hell, I was just little Hubert from South Dakota.  Now just think, 
I occupy the second highest office in the land” (Goldman, 1969, p. 262). 
Freud’s oedipal theory, which provides insight into the parent and child dynamic, 
further supports this point.  According to Freud, young boys secretly wish to kill their 




desire for the mother, identifies with the father, and eventually becomes an adult who can 
have a relationship with an appropriate adult female.   
Using this Freudian lens, one might see that a vice president may harbor the 
desire to possess their “father’s” (president’s) bride – the country.  However, for fear of 
“castration,” (i.e. being cut off from the policy and governing process) the vice president 
refrains from expressing any overtures toward the “bride,” and does not oppose the 
president.  This is consistent with Barber’s (1972) description of Nixon’s approach after 
Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in 1955: “Nixon scrupulously avoided moves which 
might be interpreted as reaching for power; for example, he presided over the Cabinet 
from his own chair, not the president’s” (p. 370).  Barber (1972) described Nixon’s 
autobiographical discussion of his own activities during that time period as constantly 
needing to “avoid the appearance of a power grab” (p. 371).     
This theory may suggest an additional reason for why a vice president seeking the 
presidency may have a hard time distancing himself from the president.  For example, 
this may be why Hubert Humphrey was so reluctant to break from Lyndon Johnson 
during his 1968 presidential campaign.  Humphrey was reportedly “heartbroken” when 
supporters urged him to publicly oppose Johnson’s Vietnam policy, and reportedly said 
he would prefer to lose the election rather than allow the appearance that he was turning 
against President Johnson (Goldstein, 1997).   
In fact, the story of King Oedipus includes the role of the “spear carrier,” another 
role of subordinate status played by the vice president.  Upon becoming vice president, 
Dan Quayle said, “I am the spear carrier for one person and that person is George Bush” 




Eventually, the vice president who runs for president must be “his own man,” 
because as Kincade (2000) says, vice presidents are seen as lacking the independence and 
character required to be president.  But again, at what point should the “son” become his 
“own man?”  A vice president who runs for president must strike an effective balance 
between playing a subordinate and being independent.  For instance, does he do it before, 
during, or after the nominating convention?  At all of these times, the incumbent 
president is still in office, and has the power to help or hurt the vice president.  
Meanwhile, additional questions arise, such as whether the vice president can “cut the 
umbilical cord” and “stand on his own two feet?”  Or will his presidential campaign be 
seen as a “failure to launch?”  Is the association with their respective president “wind at 
their back,” or maybe “ice on their wings?”  Some degree of both?  
The relationship between president and vice president also mirrors the 
relationship between husband and wife during a previous era in which wives were 
considered a subordinate, or supportive figure.  Bostdorff (1991) described vice 
presidential discourse as feminine and comedic.  Bostdorff likened vice presidents to 
being the presidents’ “wives,” because they wait for the “call” to be the running mate, 
and then are expected to be loyal, supporting figures that perform only the roles that the 
president allows them to perform.3   
Many observers have described vice presidents this way.  Recalling when he was 
selected to be the vice presidential running mate, Hubert Humphrey said President 
3 The vice president does have some specific duties as authorized in the Constitution.  These duties include 
presiding over the Senate, breaking ties in the Senate, and succeeding the president if he dies, resigns or is 
otherwise unable to discharge the duties of President (Gillon, 1997; Waugh, 1956).  The vice president also 
has duties established by statute, such as serving as a member of the National Security Council, a policy 




                                                 
 
Johnson told him, “this is a marriage for which there is no divorce, and that I had to be 
brought in to harness so to speak with the administration” (Caouette, 2011, p. 22).  
Former Vice President Dan Quayle even referred to the relationship between president 
and vice president as a “marriage of convenience” (Quayle, 1997, p. 117).  During the 
1988 election, journalist Mark Shields (1988) also invoked this analogy when he said that 
George Bush was Reagan’s “faithful co-pilot,” and that his conduct resembled the late 
Lurleen Wallace, who ran as a surrogate for her husband George Wallace in the 1966 
Alabama Governor’s race (p. A23).  On his television show, political commentator Sean 
Hannity (2008) even likened the process of selecting a vice presidential running mate to 
“asking your wife to marry you.”  
In another similarity, families are traditionally referred to by the husband’s name 
(e.g. “The Smith Family”).  While a presidential administration may include the vice 
president’s name as in the “Johnson-Humphrey administration,” it is more often known 
by the president’s name, the “Johnson administration.”  
This relationship is also husband-wife like in that just as the role and position held 
by husbands and wives have become more equal in the U.S., the relationship between 
president and vice president has become somewhat more equal.  In fact, by 1977, Carter 
was referring to his vice president, Walter Mondale, as his “equal partner” (Barnes, 2001, 
p, 814).  Interestingly, the rise of Second Wave feminism4 in the mid 20th century, which 
symbolized a move toward greater equality between the sexes, corresponds with the 
4 Vice President Nixon’s 1960 campaign is considered to have occurred in a new era in which vice 
presidents are now seen as presidential contenders.  The early 1960’s is also thought to be the time that 




                                                 
 
increased responsibilities and prestige of the vice president, and the perception of vice 
presidents as being “presidential material.” 
When a divorce occurs, there are expectations about the male and female roles.  
There are similar elements that are played out in the “divorce” between the president and 
vice president.  If a woman decides, for example, to be independent, and seek a divorce, 
some may vilify her for not standing by her man.  Others may criticize her for staying in 
a marriage that she no longer finds satisfying.  Others may be concerned about the 
woman’s well being – “Can she survive on her own?”  These same criticisms and 
questions are often put forward when the sitting vice president runs for president.  Should 
he remain loyal, or break from the president?  To put it a little differently, do you “dance 
with the one that brought you?”  If he chooses to break, when is the right time?  Is he 
capable of running without the assistance of the president?  Will the president fundraise 
for the vice president?   
In both of these relationships, husband-wife and parent-child, the subordinate has 
to determine when to stay loyal, and serve as a subordinate, and when to establish their 
independence.  Both choices entail consequences.   
 
Rhetorical Situation: Academic Scholars’ Observations 
This rhetorical situation has also been observed by academic scholars.  Kincade 
(2000) discussed the "vice-presidential dilemma" which includes the numerous conflicts 
and negative image perceptions that vice presidents experience when they run for 
president, and are linked to their relationship with the president.  For instance, a vice 




demonstrate independence and articulate his own vision for the country.  Vice presidents 
cannot, however, openly challenge their president.  To do so may incur a rebuke from the 
president, and might raise questions about the vice president’s judgment and integrity, 
because he chose to be the president’s running mate in the first place.   
Consistent with Kincade, Natoli (1985) asserted that the vice president must 
“simultaneously strike an independent note and not alienate the president under whom he 
has served.  That president still wields power that can help or hurt the heir apparent” (p. 
104).  To illustrate these difficulties, Goldstein (1997) pointed to the case of Hubert 
Humphrey: 
Humphrey’s problems running for president are instructive.  An incumbent vice 
president must negotiate between the desire to establish an independent identity 
and the likely need to avoid offending the chief executive by criticizing his 
policies.  Future vice presidents may hope they encounter circumstances less 
difficult and presidents more forgiving than did Humphrey. (p. 120)   
The last sentence of Goldstein’s quote suggests that both the prevailing conditions in the 
nation as well as the relationship between president and vice president are important 
factors that affect a vice president’s presidential bid.  All presidential candidates deal 
with the former, but only vice presidents, and arguably other administration officials, face 
the latter circumstance as well. 
How does this affect the public’s perception of vice presidents?  Nelson (2002) 
noted that “the public that values loyalty in a vice president disdains that quality as soon 




Kincade also noted that vice presidents must avoid the taint of any scandals of the 
president or the administration, but also demonstrate their active participation in the 
administration to support claims of their experience and capability.  Again, it is a 
challenging task to accomplish both goals.  For instance, the claims of robust 
involvement by vice presidents George H. W. Bush and Al Gore in their respective 
administrations seemed inconsistent with statements made by each one that they were 
unaware of unethical or illegal actions taking place such as the Iran-Contra affair (Bush) 
and the Buddhist Temple fundraising scandal (Gore).  These statements are consistent 
with a point made by Bostdorff (1991) that vice presidents are oriented to the Burkean 
pentadic term of scene, in that they are caught up in activities swirling around them, 
which they were unaware of, and therefore can’t be held accountable.  These are not 
exactly the kinds of passive behaviors we expect to hear from a leader. 
Finally, Kincade noted that vice presidents are often seen as lacking the 
independence and character to become president.  Certainly this perception is shaped in 
part by the vice president being in the shadow of the president, being seen and not heard 
(or only heard in limited and controlled ways), being loyal and not publicly questioning 
the president.  For example, early in his 1988 presidential campaign, George H. W. Bush 
suffered from the perception that he was a “wimp” and Reagan’s “lap dog” (Sperling, 
1987, p. 16).   
These negative perceptions of them start to form as soon as they are tapped as 
running mates.  Goldstein (1982) noted vice presidential candidates have to toe the line of 
the presidential campaign which often requires them to abandon their own public policy 




he had to abandon his support for the Equal Rights Amendment and abortion rights, and 
embrace supply-side economic policies that he once dismissed as “voodoo economics.”  
In changing positions, however, vice presidents run the risk of establishing the image of a 
“flip-flopper.”   
Goldstein (1982) also notes that vice presidents/vice presidential running mates 
often diminish their own credibility with intelligent voters when they make laudatory 
remarks about their president/presidential candidate.  Perhaps this is because many of 
these statements sound inauthentic – we suspect they’re saying it because they are bound 
by loyalty to say it.  For example, in 1964, running mate Humphrey said that Johnson 
was “a giant of a man” (Mazo, 1964, p. 1).  In 1976, running mate Mondale said that 
Carter was “this marvelous man who’s from the soil himself” (Charlton, 1976, p. 32).  In 
1980, running mate George H. W. Bush said that Reagan was a “decent, compassionate 
man” who “cares deeply” (Sulzberger, 1980, p. 9).  In a 1984 interview with The New 
York Times Magazine, Bush made what could have been one of the biggest statements in 
fealty ever made: “I’m for Mr. Reagan—blindly” (Rothenberg, 2000, p. 29).  Perhaps this 
was why Bush felt challenged by the “vision thing,” when he started his 1988 presidential 
campaign. 
Another way in which vice presidents/vice presidential candidates cultivate a 
negative image is by playing the role of a partisan attacker, so as to allow the 
president/presidential candidate to remain above the fray (Goldstein, 1982).  For 
example, Richard Nixon detailed his role as the attack dog when he was Dwight 
Eisenhower’s running mate in 1952: “The plan was for General Eisenhower to stress the 




away at our opponents on the record of the Truman Administration…” (Nixon, 1962, 
p.77).  While being the “attack dog” or “hatchet man” may help the ticket win, vice 
presidents/vice presidential candidates run the risk of tarnishing their own character and 
likability, and in the process, negatively affect their own presidential bid in the future.     
Pomper (2001) also discussed two challenges for sitting vice presidents who run 
for president, both of which center around the sitting president.  He noted that, “Vice 
presidents always labor under a burden of appearing less capable than the sitting chief 
executive, and there is a normal inclination on the part of the electorate to seek a change” 
(p. 210).  Pomper’s observation suggests at least two things.  First, it underscores the 
point made earlier by Goldstein that both the prevailing national conditions and the vice 
president’s relationship with the president come together to affect a vice president’s 
presidential bid.  Second, the “less capable appearance” resembles that of the dutiful son 
or wife, because of their traditional role as subordinate figures, and raises the issue of 
competence, as an image trait that the vice president must establish when they run for 
president. 
These challenges are significant because scholars have noted that the popularity 
and performance of the sitting president may be a significant factor in determining the 
outcome of the vice president’s presidential bid.  For instance, Cohen (2001) found that 
when the president is popular, his vice president is also popular.  But when the president 
is unpopular, the vice president is unpopular as well.  DeCell and Lichtman (1990) 
argued that the incumbent party’s ability to maintain control of the presidency is based 




keys can be used to predict success or failure.5  They argue that if a candidate from the 
incumbent party has five or more keys turned against him, he will not be successful.  
DeCell and Lichtman’s theory suggests that the vice president’s success is to a large 
extent, dependent on the success of the president and the administration.     
In addition, scholars have noted that a President’s discourse may affect the vice 
president’s presidential bid.  Winkler (1991) found that image repair discourse by 
incumbent presidents often created rhetorical constraints for the vice president’s 
presidential bid.  For example, Johnson’s decision not to run for reelection in 1968, and 
focus on achieving peace in Vietnam may be considered a good example.  Even though 
discussing what he would do about Vietnam may have benefited his presidential 
campaign, Humphrey was compelled to stay quiet because it could undercut Johnson’s 
peace negotiation efforts.   
Also, Murphy and Stuckey (2002) noted that even when presidents try to 
rhetorically assist the presidential bids of their vice presidents, they "almost invariably 
cast vice presidents as subordinates, diminishing the[ir] perceived capacity…” (p. 47).  
An example when this occurred may include a remark made by Bill Clinton, five days 
before Election Day in 2000, on a nationwide broadcast of the Tom Joyner radio show.  
He said that electing Al Gore president would be the “next best thing” to a third Clinton 
5 These keys are: (1) the incumbent party has gained seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 
midterm election than they had in the previous election, (2) the incumbent party’s nomination is not 
seriously contested, (3) the president is running for reelection as the incumbent party’s candidate, (4) a 
significant third-party or independent candidate is not present, (5) there is no economic recession during the 
campaign, (6) real per capita economic growth has at least equaled the mean growth during the previous 
two fiscal terms, (7) the current administration has conducted major national policy changes, (8) no 
sustained social unrest has occurred, (9), the current administration has avoided major scandal, (10) the 
current administration has suffered no major setback in foreign or military affairs, (11) the current 
administration has made major accomplishments in foreign or military affairs, (12) the candidate of the 
incumbent party has charisma or is a national hero, and (13) the candidate of the challenging party lacks 
charisma and is not a national hero. 
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term and that "someone has to be there if this [Republican] crowd stays" in the majority 
in Congress, to “stop their extremist action.” (“Campaign for,” 2002, p. 262; Sanger, 
2000, p. 24).  This comment could hardly be considered a ringing endorsement of Gore.  
Also, in a separate instance, Clinton jokingly told people to vote for Gore, because 
there’s a 22nd amendment.  In other words, Clinton is saying “vote for my vice president, 
because I’m not allowed to run for another term.”  
This section has thus far discussed the inherent rhetorical situation of a 
subordinate who seeks to reach the level of a superior, and how this is applicable to the 
presidential campaigns of vice presidents.  This section has also discussed scholars’ 
insight into this rhetorical situation, and the dilemmas and difficulties faced by vice 
presidents as they contend with this situation.  One can begin to envision a range of 
nuanced explanations of the factors contributing to the outcome of a vice president’s 
presidential bid.  For instance, an unpopular president who strongly supported his vice 
president’s presidential campaign would probably be a liability.  Also, a popular 
president, who demonstrated a lack of support, or lukewarm support, for the vice 
president’s presidential campaign, would probably also be a detriment.  This is further 
complicated by a situation where a president’s job approval may be high, but his personal 
popularity might be low, or vice versa.  How might these unique circumstances 
advantage or constrain a vice president who is running for president? 









Rhetorical Situation: Media-Constructed Dilemma 
 
 
Vatz (1973) contends that the rhetorical situation is itself created by rhetoric.  He 
says, “No situation can have a nature independent of the perception of its interpreter or 
independent of the rhetoric with which he chooses to characterize it” (p.154).  He 
continues that, “meaning is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors.  As soon 
as one communicates an event or situation he is using evocative language” (p. 157).  This 
view differs from Bitzer (1968) who believed that situations are objectively located in 
reality, observed by those involved, and invite fitting rhetorical response.  In the context 
of this study, Vatz’s (1973) argument suggests that the rhetorical situation that affects 
vice presidents when they run for president is one that is not merely observed, but rather 
constructed by the rhetors involved, including the media.   
Media coverage can shape the public’s perception of the vice president’s 
campaign by making salient certain candidate image issues, and by employing certain 
news frames.  This section will look at some of the themes that the media focuses on in 
their coverage of vice presidents who run for president. 
McCombs and Shaw (1972) advanced the theory that the mass media performs an 
agenda setting function, in that they determine which election issues and topics the public 
thinks are important.  The theory suggests that while the media may not tell us what to 
think, they do tell us what to think about.  In elections in which a vice president runs for 
president, the media tends to focus on the relationship between the president and vice 
president, and how the vice president must negotiate their role in the administration 




Whereas agenda setting focuses more on which issues and topics are covered, 
framing focuses more on how they are covered (Weaver, 2007).  Entman (1993) says that 
“to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a 
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described” (p. 52, italics in original). 
In coverage of U.S. political news, the media often employs a conflict frame, in 
which there is an emphasis placed on the disagreements between conflicting parties, 
including organizations or individuals (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese, Peter, and 
Semetko, 2001).  While we would expect the media to highlight the conflict between 
competing candidates, the media also highlights any perceived conflicts, actual or 
suggested, between the president and vice president, in the latter’s bid for the presidency.  
This occurs because scholars have noted that the media has a melodramatic imperative 
(Nimmo and Combs, 1983, Hahn, 1998).  For instance, in 2000, CNN’s Talk Back Live 
devoted an hour-long episode to the question of whether President Bill Clinton was an 
asset or a liability for Vice President Al Gore (Ryan and Smith, 2000). 
In 1960, the media highlighted instances of perceived conflict between Nixon and 
Eisenhower.  For instance, during the first presidential debate, one of the reporters on the 
questioning panel asked Nixon about an embarrassing comment that President 
Eisenhower made about him: 
Mr. Vice President, since the question of executive leadership is a very important 
campaign issue, I’d like to follow Mr. Novins’ question.  Now  Republican 




week - say it's experience that counts - that's over a picture of yourself; sir uh - 
implying that you've had more governmental executive decision-making uh - 
experience than uh - your opponent. Now, in his news conference on August 
twenty-fourth, President Eisenhower was asked to give one example of a major 
idea of yours that he adopted.  His reply was, and I'm quoting; “If you give me a 
week I might think of one.  I don't remember."  Now that was a month ago, sir, 
and the President hasn't brought it up since, and I'm wondering, sir, if you can 
clarify which version is correct - the one put out by Republican campaign leaders 
or the one put out by President Eisenhower? (pg. #22) 
In this question, the panelist pointed to differing characterizations between Eisenhower 
and Nixon’s campaign, as to the latter’s involvement in the White House, and asked 
Nixon to determine which version is correct.  This question suggested a conflict existed 
between Nixon’s campaign and Eisenhower and cast doubt on Nixon’s claim that he was 
more qualified than Kennedy to be president because of his experience in the Eisenhower 
administration.  This puts Nixon in the position of having to decide whether to agree or 
disagree with President Eisenhower, or somehow explain that there is no conflict.   
 Similarly, in the third debate, Nixon was posed a question that invited him to 
either affirm or negate the Eisenhower record. 
Uh - Mr. Nixon uh - before the convention you and Governor Rockefeller said 
jointly that the nation's economic growth ought to be accelerated; and the 
Republican platform states that uh - the nation needs to quicken the pace of 




you feel that there has been insufficient economic growth during the past eight 
years; and if so, what would you do beyond uh - present Administration policies 
uh - to step it up? 
This question illustrates very clearly the loyalty versus independence dilemma for the 
vice president.  Should Nixon defend the Eisenhower economic record, or argue that it’s 
insufficient and that he is the man to fix it?  Or does he try to pull off a balancing act? 
 Second, the media shape the expectation that the vice president needs to break 
from the president and establish his independence.  As Entman said, framing can also 
include a treatment recommendation.  In recommending this treatment to the vice 
president, the media often bring up the example of Hubert Humphrey’s 1968 presidential 
campaign.  
For instance, during the 1984 election, an editorial by the Christian Science 
Monitor discussed Walter Mondale’s ability to separate himself from his past with Carter 
saying that “In 1968 Hubert Humphrey took too long to part with Lyndon Johnson over 
Vietnam; once free of that burden, he almost overtook Richard Nixon” (“Mondale's 
America,” 1984, p. 13). 
 Journalist Richard Benedetto (1999) discussed Humphrey in regard to Al Gore’s 
2000 campaign: 
Vice president Hubert Humphrey was in a similar box on Vietnam when he ran 
for president in 1968.  To break from Lyndon Johnson’s policies would have been 
disloyal.  Only at the end of the campaign did he outline his own Vietnam policy.  




Economist Robert Kuttner (2000) also used Humphrey as an example when 
offering advice to Gore:  
People of my generation (and youngsters who studied the ‘60s in college) will 
vividly remember that in 1968 the Democratic candidate, Vice President Hubert 
Humphrey, waited just too long to break with President Lyndon Johnson’s 
Vietnam bombing policy.  The delay cost Humphrey the election.  Maybe Gore 
should ‘do a Humphrey’ on Clinton’s China policy… (p. 4) 
Perhaps stories like this contributed to Gore’s decision to distance himself from Bill 
Clinton early in the campaign.   
Furthermore, CNN political analyst Bill Schneider advised Gore to use his 
nomination acceptance speech to establish independence from Clinton.  Instead of citing 
the cautionary tale of Humphrey, Schneider cited George H. W. Bush’s 1988 convention 
speech as a positive example of how Bush established his independence from Reagan.  
After showing a clip of Bush’s speech, Schneider said, “Advice to Gore: Make this the 
defining speech of your career where you show you're your own man” (CNN.com Inside 
Politics, pg# 60). 
But establishing independence from the president is no easy task for a vice 
president.  German (2001) conducted a study of news photos of Al Gore and his 
opponent, George W. Bush, and found an interesting difference that relates to the vice 
president’s dilemma.  German found that photos of Bush often showed him accompanied 
by his family.  Photos of Gore, however, often showed him accompanied by Clinton, or 
with Clinton on the same page.  These photos reinforce the vice president’s association 




including that it may serve to resubordinate Gore in the eyes of the public.  So while the 
media were calling on Gore to separate himself from Clinton, the media were also 
visually reinforcing their association with each other.  In this way, the media engaged in 
priming, in that they were encouraging the public to form certain opinions about the vice 
president.   
Journalist Michael Barone also discussed the difficulty for vice presidents to 
separate themselves from the president.  In an article titled The Vice President’s Problem, 
Barone aptly constructed George H. W. Bush’s rhetorical situation in 1988.  He said that 
Bush’s campaign was dealing with “a genuinely difficult problem not solved since 1836: 
How do you convert an incumbent vice president into a plausible president?” (p. C7).  
Barone used both Humphrey’s 1968 campaign and Richard Nixon’s 1960 campaign as 
cautionary tales:  
Bush needs to find some approach between the two extreme solutions to the vice-
presidential problem.  One is the slavish loyalty practiced by Hubert Humphrey, 
out of fear of Lyndon Johnson, until his Sept. 30 Salt Lake City speech differing, 
though only marginally, from Johnson’s Vietnam policy.  That helped him rise 
from 28 percent to 43 percent in the polls – almost enough to win a three-way 
race, though not nearly enough in a two-way contest . . . .Even as he avoids the 
Humphrey problem, Bush must avoid the opposite extreme, adopted by Richard 
Nixon in 1960, of accepting the opposition’s premises.  Though part of a popular 
and successful administration, Nixon embraced the views of President 
Eisenhower’s liberal critics.  In the “treaty of Fifth Avenue,” he surrendered to 




spending platform planks, though he could have won on the floor.  In the famous 
first debate, he accepted John Kennedy’s framing of the issue – we have to get 
America moving again – and said he differed only on means, not ends. (p. C7)   
Barone’s article suggests that vice presidents have to negotiate their relationship 
with the president carefully.  They can’t overdo it in either direction.  This is similar to 
the point that scholars Kincade and Natoli made.   
To summarize, the media coverage of a vice president’s presidential bid often 
tends to focus on the drama and conflict that may exist in the relationship between the 
president and vice president.  The media call on the vice president to disabuse us of the 
notion that there is discord in the administration (such as in the case of Nixon and 
Eisenhower), but also establishes the expectation that the vice president must break from 
the president or administration, and demonstrate that he is his “own man” (such as in the 
above examples of journalists giving advice to Mondale, Gore and G.H.W. Bush, and by 
referring to cases when Hubert Humphrey broke from Lyndon Johnson).  These media 
constructions create additional burdens for the vice president, who must now tread 
carefully in discussing their relationship with the president, and determining the timing 
and manner in which they will break from the president, and be their “own man.” 
The previous sections have looked at how a vice president who runs for president 
faces a rhetorical situation – they must use discourse to go from being a subordinate to a 
superior.  They must demonstrate that they are their “own man,” while maintaining 
loyalty to the president.  They must demonstrate competence by claiming credit for 
positive achievements within the administration, but avoid the taint of any administration 




dependent figures, to one in which they are seen as leaders, who are strong and 
independent.  In short, they must establish some of the ideal image qualities that voters 
believe a president should have.     
The next section will discuss some of the key image characteristics that voters 
expect to see in a president.  This section will help us better understand how the vice 
president’s relationship with the president/administration affects their ability to establish 
these key image characteristics.     
 
Rhetorical Situation: Image 
Benoit and McHale (2004) define image in political communication as “the 
impression of a candidate for office held by voters. . . . formed out of a myriad of 
messages – messages from the candidate, from opposing candidates, from the news 
media, and from friends and acquaintances” (p. 49).  Nimmo and Savage (1976) and 
Natchez and Bupp (1968) concluded that candidate image is the single most determining 
factor in voting behavior.  Stamm, Burgess, Jordan, and Lim (1985) also contended that 
candidate image trumps issues as a factor in voter decision making. 
A candidate’s image is in part a judgment of their personal character.  Aristotle 
said that in political speaking, it is particularly important that an orator’s character be 
perceived as good.  Aristotle argued that ethos, or a speaker’s credibility, may be their 
most effective means of persuasion.  He said, “Persuasion is achieved by the speaker’s 
personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him (sic) credible.  
We believe good men (sic) more fully and more readily than others” (p.153).  Aristotle 




impossible and opinions are divided” (p. 153).  Such is the case of U.S. presidential 
campaigns.  Aristotle cited three particular qualities an orator should demonstrate to 
inspire the confidence and trust of others in their character: “good sense, good moral 
character and goodwill” (p. 161).    
Contemporary research has found support for the personal attributes cited by 
Aristotle.  In a study conducted by Sigel (1966), subjects selected honesty, intelligence 
and independence, in that order, as the three most important personal characteristics a 
president should have.  Intelligence is akin to Aristotle’s label “good sense,” and honesty 
is consistent with Aristotle’s label of “good moral character.”   
Sigel’s finding that the public values independence in a president, helps us 
understand the push for why the vice president must be “his own man” when he runs for 
president, and helps us understand Nelson’s (2002) point that while the public values 
loyalty in a vice president, they disdain that same quality when the vice president seeks 
the presidency.  Sigel (1966) also found that the public wants the president to possess 
three other traits consistent with independence: be a strong figure, put forth their own 
ideas and have a resistance to pressure.  Supporting these findings, Nimmo and Savage 
(1976) found that the personal traits of perceived strength, integrity and empathy are 
important image factors for voters when forming candidate impressions.   
Akin to honesty, the traits of genuineness (Kjeldahl, Carmichael and Mertz, 1971) 
and sincerity (Benoit and McHale, 2004) were found to be important categories that 
voters used to judge candidates.  Nimmo and Mansfield (1985, cited in Hellweg, 2004) 
also found that voters believe an ideal presidential candidate should possess the traits of 




decision-making, reasoned statesmanship and leadership, firm issue stands, and a 
willingness to consult with others. 
Ideal candidate image traits have been found to be stable over time.  Trent, Short-
Thompson, Mongeau, Nusz, and Trent (2001) found that honesty, talking about the 
nation’s problems, and having high moral character were highly ranked categories by the 
public across the presidential elections of 1988 through 2000.  While the importance of 
these categories was stable across these elections, these scholars also found that 
contextual factors might influence image criteria in specific elections.  For instance, the 
image categories of having high moral character and faithfulness to one’s spouse were 
found to be increasingly important across these elections.  This finding may be a result of 
contextual factors such as the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, and Clinton’s impeachment 
during the 1990’s.  In a follow-up survey during the 2004 presidential election, Trent, 
Short-Thompson, Mongeau, Metzler and Trent (2005) found that voters continued to rank 
being honest, talking about the nation’s problems and having high moral character very 
high when assessing a presidential candidate.     
Some scholars have stressed the importance of competence as a candidate image 
trait.  McCroskey, Jensen, and Todd (1972, cited in Hellweg, 2004) found that 
competence was an important factor in public-figure credibility, along with the traits of 
character, composure, extroversion, and sociability.  Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk 
(1986, cited in Hellweg, 2004) also argued that competency, integrity, reliability, 
charisma and personal aspects (e.g. personal background and appearance) are important 




Other scholars have argued that likability is an important factor.  In the popular 
press, candidate likability is often summarized by the “Which candidate would you rather 
have a beer with?” or “Who would you rather see on the evening news for the next four 
years?” test.  In a study of the 1976 presidential campaign, Roberts (1981) concluded that 
voters first assess the likability of a candidate before considering their stand on the issues.  
Smith (1990) supported this contention, saying that “Elections pick people, not policies.  
Most voters seem to prefer candidates with whom they can identify.  Nasty, intense, 
unfriendly, secretive, or awkward candidates experience difficulty, even when their 
positions are compelling” (p. 111).  Also, the categories of extroversion, sociability, 
empathy, charisma and personal aspects – all mentioned by scholars in this section – are 
akin to likability, and support the claim that likability is an important factor for voters 
when they assess presidential candidates.   
Candidate image may be especially important as a factor in influencing the crucial 
middle-of-the-electorate voters who often determine the outcome of presidential 
elections.  Sigel (1964) found that independent voters, who lack strong partisan leanings, 
are more prone to being influenced by candidate’s attempts to shape their image.  
Natchez and Bupp (1968) drew a similar conclusion that voters whose votes switch back 
and forth between parties are more susceptible to candidate and campaign imagery.   
Some have made the point that image is assessed in comparison to others 
(Hellweg and Dionisopoulous, 1989, cited in Hellweg, 2004).  This finding may suggest 
that while a vice president’s image is assessed in comparison to their opponent, it may 




us understand the observation made by Pomper (2001) in an earlier section, that vice 
presidents are always seen as less capable than the president. 
One of the most powerful ways that presidential candidates can establish a 
positive image is through television ads.  West (1997) notes that “the visual aspect of 
campaign advertising is crucial because it is the one that is most remembered by viewers. 
. . .Pictures carry an emotional impact that is much more powerful than the spoken word” 
(p.5).  West (1997) asserts that production elements are used to craft a positive personal 
image for the candidate, and craft a negative personal image of the opponent.  For 
instance, politicians use images like the American flag and their family to create a 
positive perception for themselves, and use unfavorable images to describe their 
opponent (West, 1997).  Trent and Friedenberg (2004) also noted that: 
The importance of imagery is evidenced each time we see yet another television 
commercial of a candidate surrounded by family, talking earnestly with a senior 
citizen, walking through a peanut field, or standing in front of a sea of flags.  
Television commercials that present candidates in such situations are clearly 
designed to build or maintain certain perceptions of the candidate. (p. 70)   
Also, because ads can be voiced by other people than the candidates themselves 
(e.g. family members, celebrities, man in the street, professional narrators), they might be 
a more suitable medium than speeches or debates to cultivate a positive personal image 
about the candidate.  This is because when others make positive statements about the 
candidate, we give it more credibility than we would if the candidate made positive 




Similarly ads can enable a candidate to attack their opponent, by doing it in voices 
other than their own.  Attacks can be voiced by professional actors or narrators instead of 
the candidate, unlike with speeches and debates, where the vice president would have to 
do the attacking himself, which may compromise their likability and their ability to create 
the image of a leader6.     
In summary, research has determined that certain image traits are very important 
for a candidate when running for president.  These traits include: honesty, integrity, 
genuineness (or authenticity), character, intelligence, competence, independence and 
likability.  A vice president who runs for president must seek to establish a public image 
that includes these traits.   
The challenge for vice presidents is that their status as vice president, and their 
relationship with the president, colors voter’s perceptions of them.  In other words, the 
rhetorical exigence facing vice presidents is that they have to contend with image 
problems that come from being a subordinate in a superior-subordinate relationship.  As 
previously discussed, vice presidents are often seen as dependent, lacking in leadership 
ability, and creatures (or even victims) of circumstance.  While the public likes the fact 
that vice presidents are loyal, they disdain that quality once the vice president decides to 
run for president.   
Further complicating the situation is that vice presidents are somewhat 
constrained in their ability to modify their image.  As Kincade argued, vice presidents 
cannot establish their independence by openly questioning their president without 
running the risk of compromising their own credibility and authenticity.  Questions can 
6 All of the campaign ads examined in this study took place before candidates were required to approve ads 
in their own voice.     
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arise, by the media or their opponent, about why the vice president “stood by their man” 
for four or eight years, but now is trying to package themselves as somebody new.  “Will 
the real VP please stand up?”   
Also, as scholars Natoli and Goldstein pointed out, if vice presidents veer too far 
towards establishing their own independence, they could possibly incur the rebuke of the 
president, in a way that could be politically (or even financially) detrimental, or 
embarrassing.  For example, in an effort to strengthen his leadership and competence 
image in 1960, Nixon claimed he had acquired decision making experience as part of the 
Eisenhower administration.  But when asked about Nixon’s claims in a televised press 
conference, Eisenhower said he needed a week to think about of any contributions that 
Nixon made, and followed up by saying that “no one can make the decision except me” 
(Democratic National Committee, 1960).  Similarly, in 1968, Hubert Humphrey was 
repudiated after he sought to create distance from Johnson by suggesting that some troops 
could come from Vietnam soon.  Johnson responded by saying that, “no man could 
predict when troops are coming home” (Oberdorfer, 1968).  The historical contextual 
review will examine some of the more unique challenges that each vice president faced, 
resulting from the prevailing conditions at the time of their campaigns.   
Another challenge to image modification is that unlike many other candidates, 
vice presidents are typically already well known to the public.  Flanigan and Zingale 
(2002) noted that the images of well-known candidates cannot be modified as easily as 
the images of unknown candidates.  While being well known can be a benefit toward 




in that they may have to work harder during the general election to modify image 
deficiencies.              
  
 




Chapter 2: Research Questions and Method 
 
Research Questions 
The research questions for this study of six vice presidents or former vice 
presidents are as follows: 
 
1. How did Nixon in 1960 negotiate his association with Eisenhower or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, televised ads, and debates? 
2.  How did Humphrey in 1968 negotiate his association with Johnson or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, televised ads, and debates? 
3.  How did Nixon in 1968 negotiate his association with Eisenhower or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, televised ads, and debates? 
4.  How did Mondale in 1984 negotiate his association with Carter or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, televised ads, and debates? 
5.  How did Bush in 1988 negotiate his association with Reagan or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, televised ads, and debates? 
6.  How did Gore in 2000 negotiate his association with Clinton or the 
administration in his campaign speeches, ads, and debates?  
 
 These election years (1960, ’68, ’84, ’88, 2000) are examined because they 
represent all of the election years in the modern era (since 1960) in which a sitting or 
former vice president has received his party’s presidential nomination.  The presidential 




are excluded from this analysis, because they took place in a much earlier era, and 
therefore, useful comparisons with the more recent elections would be difficult to make.  
 The methods used to answer these questions will be a content analysis and a 
historical-contextual analysis.  Content analysis is a useful method to analyze a large 
number of texts and allows for systematic comparison between the three different types 
of texts and between the six campaigns studied here.  In conducting the content analysis, 
it is logical to categorize the vice president’s discussion or depiction of their 
president/administration in terms of instances when they praised, defended, criticized, 
minimized, discussed in neutral terms or declined to discuss the president.  These 
categories enable us to systematically identify each vice president’s choice to align with 
or distance himself from his president/administration.  If the vice president discusses or 
depicts the president/administration often, and mostly with praise or defense, this would 
suggest that he thought it politically beneficial to either demonstrate loyalty, run on the 
administration’s record, and/or associate with the president as a person.  If the vice 
president, however, criticizes, minimizes, or declines to discuss or depict the 
president/administration, this would suggest that he thought it politically beneficial to 
distance himself from the president/administration either to establish his independence, 
perhaps avoid or reduce the taint of any administration scandals, and/or suggest that his 
election to the presidency could deliver better results than the current administration.  
 The categories used for this analysis are conceptually similar to the ones 
developed by Benoit, Blaney, and Pier (1998) – attacks, acclaims and defenses – in their 




uniquely applied to reveal insight into how the vice president seeks to manage his 
relationship with the president or the administration, during a presidential run.   
 By providing a more systematic look at many communication instances across 
three different types of texts, over the course of the general election campaign, the 
content analysis can point us to trends in the vice president’s presidential campaign 
discourse that can be more fully understood through a historical or critical analysis.  For 
instance, if the content analysis revealed that vice presidents typically include similar 
rhetorical strategies in response to their rhetorical situation, this could point the critic to 
conduct a generic analysis.  Critics have used generic analysis to better understand 
presidential rhetoric.  Campbell and Jamieson (1990) note that presidents face recurring 
rhetorical situations in speeches like Inaugurals, State of the Unions, war messages, veto 
messages, farewell addresses, and others.  Presidents generally use similar themes each 
time a speech of this type is given.  Through a generic analysis, a critic can compare the 
rhetorical strategies of different presidents to see how well their discourse achieved the 
rhetorical end for a given kind of speech, and look for unique or exceptional examples of 
a given type that might change the genre of that speech.  A generic analysis can 
potentially be used to help us understand vice president’s presidential campaign rhetoric, 
if we find that all vice presidents employ similar rhetorical strategies in response to the 
rhetorical situation facing them in their presidential bid.   
 In order to conduct a historical analysis, this study will look at the historical and 
contextual factors that affected each of the six campaigns studied here.  These factors 
include the prevailing conditions at the time, including the national political climate, and 




actors at the time, including the president, the media, the vice president’s opponent, and 
even the vice president himself.  These factors serve to create opportunities and 
constraints that affect the vice president’s rhetorical choices during his presidential bid.  
This analysis will help give us a better understanding and appreciation for the rhetorical 
discourse used by these vice presidents when they run for president, and enable us to 
assess how well this discourse served to construct a positive presidential image.   
 
Texts   
I will examine the following texts: 
 
1.  Ten television ads sponsored by each sitting or former vice president’s campaign, or 
their nominating party.7 
2.  Five speeches by each sitting or former vice president including: the announcement 
and nomination acceptance speeches, a speech in September, a speech in October, and an 
election week final appeal. 
3.  The transcripts of all presidential debates in which a sitting or former vice president 
participated (1960, 1984, 1988, and 2000).8   
 In total, this study will examine 57 television ads, 30 speeches and 11 debates that 
aired or occurred during the general election (i.e. between the nominating convention and 
Election Day).  See appendix B for a full list of all texts used in this study.  These three 
7 Only eight ads by Nixon’s 1960 campaign, and only nine ads by Gore’s 2000 campaign are analyzed, 
because livingroomcandidate.org did not have 10 ads for these two campaigns.  
 




                                                 
 
types of discourse – television ads, speeches and debates – were selected because they are 
all important forms of presidential campaign communication, and they attract significant 
media attention.  Other types of presidential campaign communication are excluded so 
that the study can be kept to a manageable level. 
With the exception of announcement speeches, texts from the primaries are 
excluded because the rhetorical situation facing the vice president is not the same during 
the primaries as it is during the general election.  Primaries generally take place with 
voters of a specific party, and the vice president’s association with the president of their 
own party is far less problematic in the primaries than in the general election.  Therefore, 
the vice president would be likely to negotiate his relationship with the 
president/administration differently during the primaries than he would during the general 
election.  Also, drawing systematic conclusions across these six elections is easier to do 
by limiting the study to the texts in the general election phase.  The primaries varied 
significantly across these six elections because in some years primary contests were very 
limited, or took place under a different set of rules.  For instance, three of the six 
candidates studied here ran for president before the 1972 McGovern-Fraser Commission 
rules for primaries went into effect.  An exception is made for the announcement speech, 
which is included in this study.  This is because this speech attracts a lot of media 
coverage and is aimed at a more national audience, rather than a particular state’s primary 
or caucus.   
Televised Ads 
Televised political ads are an important form of presidential campaign 




devoted to producing and airing them (Just, Crigler, Alger, Cook, Kern, and West, 1996).  
Televised political ads have many functions including making a candidate more well-
known, image-making, targeting late or undecided voters, reinforcing a candidate’s 
supporters, and explaining the issues (Devlin, 1986).   
The ads analyzed in this study were sponsored by either the vice president’s 
presidential campaign or their political party, and aired during the general election phase 
of the campaign.  Ads produced and aired by advocacy groups (e.g. 1988’s Willie Horton 
ad, produced by the National Security PAC) are excluded from this study.  Because the 
study focuses on how each vice president attempted to negotiate his relationship with the 
president/administration, ads by advocacy groups would not be relevant. 
The televised ads examined in this study were viewed on 
livingroomcandidate.org, a website by the Museum of the Moving Image: The Living 
Room Candidate, Presidential Campaign Commercials, 1952-2012.  The museum curator 
chose certain ads to be included on the website because they were regarded by journalists 
and historians as being important ones of that presidential election.  These ads were 
chosen as texts because the website provided a common, easy-to-view site to conduct 
coding.  The vast majority of these ads were also included in The Annenberg/Pew 
Archive of Presidential Campaign Discourse compact disk.  
The following subquestions will be asked when examining the television ads: 
A.  In what percentage of the television ads did the sitting/former vice president, either 
through discussion or visual depiction, praise, defend, minimize, criticize, discuss 




B.  Does the answer to subquestion A differ from election to election?  This question 
allows us to consider how the context of the particular election may have influenced the 




Speeches are a key staple of campaign rhetoric dating back to the polis in ancient 
Greece.  This study will include an analysis of announcement speeches and nomination 
acceptance addresses because they attract heavy media coverage and discussion.  Trent 
and Friedenberg (2004) note that “the announcement address is the centerpiece of a 
rhetorical situation created by the candidate’s need to formally announce their candidacy 
to the public” (p. 229).  Candidates use announcement speeches to signal their intent to 
run, discourage competition, explain why they are running, suggest their likelihood of 
winning and to initiate major campaign themes (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004). 
The nomination acceptance speeches are particularly important because they are 
often described as a “legitimation ritual” where the candidate lays official claim to the 
nomination (Farrell, 1978; Ritter, 1980).  These speeches are also a defining moment 
when the nominee introduces him or herself to the general electorate.  For vice presidents 
who run for president, acceptance speeches may be a reintroduction because, as 
previously discussed, political observers often frame the convention speech as one in 
which they need to step out from the President’s shadow and establish their own vision 
for the country.  Through the acceptance address, the candidate attempts to assume the 




campaign (Trent and Friedenberg, 2004).  Hart (2000) argues that party conventions are 
an important way for the candidate to engage the voting public.  Conventions “inspire 
political imagination, to get the party faithful to envision a broader, brighter, grander set 
of possibilities” (Hart, 2000, p. 104).  Other than nationally televised presidential debates, 
nomination acceptance speeches usually garner the widest audience for the presidential 
campaign (Ritter, 1980), and unlike other speeches, it is usually broadcast in its entirely.      
The third speech examined will be one made in the final week before the election.  
Presumably, this final appeal would be what the candidate believed was his most 
effective campaign message.  The fourth and fifth speeches will be ones delivered in the 
September and October time frame of the election year.  Speeches four and five are 
included to increase the sample size and to have speeches that take place in the middle of 
the general election campaign, to balance out the ones in the beginning and the end.9   
The following subquestions will be asked when examining these speeches: 
A. In what percentage of speech units, did the sitting/former vice president praise, 
defend, minimize, criticize, discuss neutrally, or decline to discuss, his 
president/administration?    
B. Did the results of subquestion A differ from election to election?  This question 
allows us to consider how the context of a particular election may have influenced the 




9 Nixon’s 1960 campaign is the only one where the announcement speech could not be found.  To replace 
it, I selected an additional speech he delivered in the month of September, 1960.   
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Presidential Debates 
Presidential debates are highly-watched events, with viewership ranging from 40 
to 93 million people (Hartlaub, 2004; Carmody, 1992).  Debates help shape the 
electorate’s perceptions of each candidate’s image (Carlin, 1992) and character (Leon, 
1993, Hinck, 1993), help voters learn about issues (Jamieson and Adasiewicz, 2000), and 
reinforce voter preferences (Benoit, McKinney, and Holbert, 2001). 
Presidential debates also provide a unique feature not found with speeches or ads: the 
raising of issues by others, such as the questioners (e.g. moderators, panelists, audience 
members) or opponents.  In the case of vice presidents who run for president, they have 
to contend with the raising of issues about the president or the presidential administration, 
and they are prompted to make a response.  Debate texts were obtained from the 
Commission on Presidential Debates website: www.debates.org.   
The following subquestions will be asked for presidential debates: 
A. In each sitting/former vice president’s speaking turns, did they praise, defend, 
criticize, minimize, discuss neutrally, or decline to discuss, respectively, their 
president/administration? 
B.  Who initially prompted the topic of the president/administration: the questioner 
(moderator, panelist, or citizen), the opponent, both the questioner and the opponent, or 
the vice president himself? 
This question provides evidence about the vice president’s level of willingness to discuss 
the president or the administration.  For example, if the vice president discusses the 
president/administration often, when no one else in the debate has prompted it, or uses 




president/administration, then this may indicate a deliberate decision to align himself 
with the president/administration.  On the other hand, if the vice president does not 
discuss the president/administration despite numerous prompts by questioners or the 
opponent, this may indicate a deliberate strategy to distance himself from the 
president/administration.   
C. Are certain responses characteristic of certain prompts? 
D.  Do the answers to subquestions A, B, C differ election to election? 
Subquestion D allows us to consider how the context of the particular election may have 
influenced the vice president’s decisions to discuss the president and/or the 
administration in the debates. 
 
Coding 
Five coders including the author analyzed the texts to gather data.  Because this 
study had a predetermined category system to examine the vice president’s discourse, and 
was not looking at audience reception of the discourse, trained coders were preferable to 
lay coders.  Specifically, the training included a discussion of the kinds of triggers in the 
text that would indicate that the vice president was discussing or depicting the president 
or the administration.  These triggers included, but were not limited to: instances when 
the sitting or former vice president refers to the president by name, or says “The 
President,” or “he,” or refers to the administration with identifiers such as “our 
administration,” or “the last eight years,” or “we,” or refers to a part of the 
administration’s record, or in the case of ads, when the president is shown.  Coder 




are being used to refer to the president/administration.  Coders practiced by analyzing 
sample texts by candidates in other presidential elections than the ones studied here.   
To more accurately assess intercoder reliability, coded content was separated into 
two categories: manifest and latent (Holsti, 1969).  Manifest content includes the content 
in which coders had to identify instances when the vice presidents referred to the 
president/administration.  This process entailed using the triggers mentioned in the 
previous paragraph. 
 When coders identified such instances, they were then required to render a more 
interpretive judgment (i.e. a latent judgment) about whether it was predominately a 
statement of praise, defense, minimization, criticism, or one that is neutral.  These units 
of analysis represent the latent content.  Because the analysis involves making 
interpretive judgments about the predominant nature of the statements, coding must be 
done by humans, not computers.   
Judgments of manifest content are relatively easier to make because the coder is 
only required to determine if something is present or not.  Because latent content requires 
the coder to make more interpretive judgments, we expect to see a greater amount of 
disagreement between coders, and therefore, lower levels of interrater percent agreement 
for latent content than for manifest content. 
Percent agreement and other measures including Fleiss’ kappa and Cohen’s kappa 
will be used to measure inter-rater agreement.  Recal, a free web-based tool, available at 
http://dfreelon.org/utils/recalfront/ will be used to conduct calculations.  For percent 
agreement, an inter-coder reliability measure of >.80 will be acceptable, as this 




In practice coding, when interrater agreement reached a level of .90 or greater, the 
training ended, and the study began.  If at least .90 was not achieved, the training 
continued, and inter-coder disagreements were discussed and resolved.   
Each ad in its entirety was a unit to be coded.  In the debates, each speaking turn 
was coded, including those taken by the questioner, opponent and vice president.  
Because speeches are lengthy, each speech text was broken up into smaller topic units.  
This was done by looking for logical breaks when the speaker transitioned to a new topic 
within his speech.  For example, if a candidate shifted from the topic of jobs to the topic 
of education, this would qualify as a logical break.  Then if he shifted to a discussion on 
the Cold War, this would qualify as another logical break, and so on.  This method was 
also used for the opening and closing statements during the debates, as these statements 
are more like prepared speeches.  
 
Data 
This set of data will reveal whether each vice president chose to align or distance 
themselves from their president/administration, and allowed the researcher to compare 
how one vice president’s approach compared to the approach taken by others.  Also, this 
set of data will also enable us to see if vice presidents treated their 
president/administration differently across the three studied communication mediums 
(speeches, television ads, and debates), and therefore, help us gain a better understanding 
of how these mediums are used in presidential campaigns.  To the larger issue laid out 
earlier in this study, this set of data will provide greater insight into the rhetorical 




analysis may help us understand not only future elections in which a vice president runs 
for president, but also cases when a lieutenant governor runs for governor, or cases when 
a first lady, presidential cabinet members, or members of the president’s own party run 
for president.  
The next section will conduct a historical-contextual review of the five vice 
presidents whose communication texts are being analyzed in this study.  Specifically, I 
will look at the historical and contextual conditions that existed during their vice 
presidency.  This section will reveal that many of the problems identified in the previous 
section significantly affected each vice president.  In all cases, the vice president’s 
association with the president and the administration, created both opportunities and 




Chapter 3: Historical-Contextual Review 
 
Richard Nixon (1960, 1968) 
As vice president, Nixon’s activities would both assist him as a future presidential 
candidate, and also create certain challenges.  To his benefit, Nixon gained valuable 
experience and fame by performing assignments that were unprecedented for a vice 
president.  Kengor (2000) noted that Eisenhower wanted Nixon to be involved, and gave 
him a substantial role through which he could demonstrate leadership.  For instance, 
Nixon ran cabinet meetings when President Eisenhower was absent, and served as an 
effective liaison between the administration and Congress (Sidey, Cannon, Ferrell, 
Untermeyer, Apple Jr., and Neustadt, 1997).  Eisenhower also sought Nixon’s advice on 
a variety of issues including Cuba and Russia (Greenstein, cited in Kengor, 2000).  
In addition, Nixon took several high-profile foreign trips including his 1958 trip 
to Latin America, and his 1959 trip to Russia when he took part in the “kitchen debates” 
with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev (Sidey, Cannon, Ferrell, Untermeyer, Apple Jr., 
and Neustadt, 1997; Kengor, 2000).  Summers (2000) noted that “Nixon had traveled the 
world more than any American leader had done before, building up a breadth of 
knowledge on international affairs unequaled in his time” (p. 140).   
Following the Latin America trip, Nixon’s popularity rose to an all-time high 
(Kengor, 2000; Witcover, 1992), and pulled ahead of Kennedy in the polls for the 1960 
presidential election (Kengor, 2000).  Nixon also benefited from the popularity of 
President Eisenhower, who had won two landslide elections, served mostly during a time 




Performing substantive assignments, leading cabinet meetings, taking high-profile 
foreign trips, and being associated with a popular president were all advantages that 
helped Nixon receive his party’s nomination. 
Nixon had also proved to be an effective campaigner for the Eisenhower-Nixon 
ticket in 1952 and 1956, and for other Republican Party candidates.  For instance, in 
1952, he took on the role of the attack dog, when he criticized Democrats for being the 
party of “communism, Korea, and corruption” (Kengor, 2000, p. 52-53).  Historian 
Stephen Ambrose (1983) noted that Eisenhower appreciated that Nixon could do the 
mudslinging in campaigns, allowing him to assume the high ground.  
Taking the low road may have ingratiated Nixon with party officials and President 
Eisenhower, which certainly helped him earn his presidential nomination.  Yet he also 
ran the risk of being publicly disliked, and lacking the “presidential” qualities of 
leadership and statesmanship.   
Nixon’s 1960 presidential bid was also damaged by Eisenhower’s comment at the 
press briefing that if he had a week he might be able to think of a major idea of Nixon’s 
that he adopted (Kengor, 2000).  Kengor (2000) notes that Eisenhower made this 
comment out of frustration with the press, regretted it, and immediately apologized to 
Nixon.   
But the comment dogged Nixon.  It was used against him in an ad titled “Nixon’s 
Experience?” run by the Democratic National Committee in support of John F. Kennedy.  
In the ad, the narrator opens by saying: 
Every Republican politician wants you to believe that Richard Nixon is 




decisions in the White House.  But listen to the man who should know best, the 
president of the United States.  A reporter recently asked President Eisenhower 
this question about Mr. Nixon’s experience.   
Then a reporter is shown asking the President: “I just wondered if you could give us an 
example of a major idea of his that you had adopted in that role as the, as the decider and, 
and final—.”  Eisenhower replies: “If you give me a week I might think of one.  I don’t 
remember.”   
 The narrator continues: “At the same press conference, President Eisenhower 
said: ‘No one can make a decision except me.’”  This statement was a denunciation of the 
claim made by Nixon’s campaign that he had acquired executive decision-making 
experience in the Eisenhower administration.   
 The narrator continues by cuing up Ike’s damning line against Nixon again: “If 
you give me a week, I might think of one.  I don’t remember.”  The narrator concludes 
the ad by saying: “President Eisenhower could not remember, but the voters will 
remember.  For real leadership in the 60’s, help elect Senator John F. Kennedy president” 
(Democratic National Committee, 1960).  
Eisenhower’s comment was also widely quoted in the newspapers (Goldstein, 
1982), and it was referenced in a question for Nixon at the first presidential debate – a 
debate historically regarded as pivotal to the outcome of the election.  Nixon’s claims of 
experience may have been a way for him to demonstrate his leadership skills.  Had 
Eisenhower, given his credibility and popularity, been able to recall something for the 
reporters, it could have helped Nixon in a close election.  Instead, Ike’s comment may 




 In 1968, when Nixon ran for president a second time, his presidential campaign 
was strengthened by the public’s dissatisfaction with the Johnson administration and its 
handling of the Vietnam War and riots in many urban areas.  Joe McGinnis’ book, The 
Selling of the President discusses many ways in which Nixon’s 1968 campaign made use 
of advances in color television and editing to create powerful television spots.  Also, 
Nixon still benefited from strong name recognition and experience, and had, by this time, 
developed a somewhat more elder statesmanlike image.  This time, his opponent, Hubert 
Humphrey, experienced the problems of being a sitting vice president.   
   
 
Hubert Humphrey (1968) 
 
Goldstein (1997) described Humphrey’s vice presidential status as being a “mixed 
blessing” to his presidential prospects (p. 117).  Humphrey certainly benefited from high 
name recognition, and enjoyed the support of Johnson loyalist voters and party loyalists 
because of his partisan work (Goldstein, 1997). 
For many reasons, however, being vice president negatively affected Humphrey’s 
presidential fortunes.  For one thing, his support of Johnson’s Vietnam policy created a 
rift between him and the liberal constituency he had established during his lengthy 
political career.  Humphrey was known as a liberal champion of civil rights and social 
welfare.  In 1948, before the Democratic National Convention, he gave a stirring speech 
championing civil rights (Humphrey, foreword for Engelmayer and Wagman, 1978).  As 
a U.S. Senator, Humphrey was the original sponsor of the Medicare program, and guided 




President Johnson.  Humphrey was also a champion of other liberal causes including the 
Peace Corps, the Food for Peace program, and arms control efforts (Garrettson III, 1993).   
In February of 1965, shortly after taking his vice presidential office, Humphrey, 
in an internal memo to Johnson, expressed opposition to the U.S. military presence in 
Vietnam (Goldstein, 1982).  He was subsequently excluded from Johnson’s inner circle 
(Garrettson, 1993).  Only after Humphrey made several public statements in support of 
Johnson’s Vietnam policy, was he allowed back (Neustadt, 1997). 
But these supportive statements would negatively affect his presidential bid.  
Television had provided horrifying images of the war, including U.S. soldiers maimed 
and dead (Engelmayer and Wagman, 1978).  At the start of 1968, 17,000 Americans had 
been killed (Engelmayer and Wagman, 1978), and Johnson’s approval rating stood at 
36% by March (Goldman, 1969).  Johnson’s negative approval ratings could potentially 
hurt Humphrey’s poll ratings, because as previously noted by Cohen (2001), when the 
president is unpopular, the vice president is unpopular as well.  
While Humphrey’s support for the war demonstrated loyalty to Johnson, and 
ensured his continued access in the administration, he engendered great opposition from 
liberals and others who were opposed to the war.  Historian Michael Beschloss (1999) 
noted that by muffling his opposition to the Vietnam War, Humphrey invited voters to 
believe that he would continue the war effort.  
When Johnson declared he would not seek reelection in late March of 1968, 
Humphrey’s campaign got off to a late start. Then after formally launching his campaign, 
he was dealt another setback when Johnson forbade administration officials from taking 




decision to distance his administration from partisan politics when he publicly announced 
he would not seek reelection and would concentrate on ending the Vietnam War 
(Goldstein, 1997).  His refusal to assist Humphrey, however, may have been motivated 
by other more personal reasons as well.  Goldstein (1997) speculated that Johnson could 
not bear to see his staff support his longtime subordinate. 
Humphrey’s nomination acceptance speech at the Democratic National 
Convention in Chicago was marred by anti-war protests that would turn violent.  
Protestors held signs that read, “Stop the war! Stop the War!” and “Sieg Heil, Seig Heil” 
(White, 1969, p. 289).  The Chicago police engaged the protestors with tear gas, arrests 
and lethal weapons.  After Humphrey had received the nomination, Senator Eugene 
McCarthy, his rival in the primaries, declined to endorse him (White, 1969).  Humphrey 
had to find a way to win back the support of his liberal base.    
Johnson, however, constrained Humphrey by threatening to “dry up every 
Democratic dollar from Maine to California” if Humphrey spoke out against the war 
(Beschloss, 1999, pg#15).   
By September, the number of Americans killed in Vietnam reached 28,000 
(White, 1969).  With Johnson’s approval rating standing at 42% in late September 1968, 
Humphrey’s association with him was problematic (Gallup, 2011).  On September 27th, a 
Gallup poll showed him losing to Nixon by a margin of 43% to 28%.  Also, some 
disaffected blue collar Democrats were attracted to third party candidate George Wallace, 
who had gone from 9% in the national polls in May to an astonishing 21% in mid to late 




But Humphrey’s ability to separate himself from Johnson and an unpopular war 
was difficult   Goldstein (1997) summarized his dilemma:  
Distancing himself from the administration’s policies on Vietnam was not easy or 
without risk.  If Humphrey separated himself from Johnson’s policies, he exposed 
himself to the charge of being hypocritical and disloyal, and of undermining 
Johnson’s negotiating hand.  Moreover, Humphrey’s comments might prompt a 
public rebuke from Johnson. (p. 118) 
Johnson did, in fact, publicly rebuke Humphrey at one point.  In September, while 
speaking to reporters in Philadelphia, Humphrey said that in early 1969, or late 1968, 
some troops could start to come home regardless of the outcome of the peace talks 
(White, 1969).  In Denver, later that day, Humphrey said he would have been 
comfortable accepting the minority plank at the convention that called for an 
unconditional bombing halt.  Secretary of State Dean Rusk immediately repudiated these 
comments (White, 1969).  The next day, President Johnson announced in a speech to the 
American Legion that “no man could predict when troops would come home” 
(Oberdorfer, 1968).  The reference to “no man” could be interpreted as Johnson’s 
indirect, but not-so-subtle way of negating Humphrey’s comment, and reestablish 
Humphrey as his subordinate.  Also, because Johnson was trying to achieve a peace deal, 
he could not allow talk about the possible withdrawal of U.S. troops, because this may 
result in a loss of leverage in the peace talks.  But in rebuking Humphrey, Johnson 
undermined his presidential campaign and diminished his credibility.  Even late in the fall 




31st phone call not to “brag on this.  You have to give me credit” (Johnson, 1968).  
Humphrey agreed.    
Clearly, Humphrey faced numerous rhetorical constraints.  One was his personal 
loyalty to Johnson and the concern about the protection of U.S. troops in Vietnam, whose 
lives could be jeopardized if he spoke out too strongly against the war.  Humphrey was 
also reportedly concerned that if he broke too far away from his own administration’s 
stance, he would alienate Democratic hawks in key states like Texas (Nossiter, 1968). 
Humphrey’s problems certainly illustrate the parent-child dynamic discussed 
earlier.  In terms of the parent-child analogy, Humphrey had to be “seen and not heard” 
on the subject of Vietnam.  He was still Johnson’s boy, not his “own man.”  This 
constrained his ability to demonstrate his own independence and leadership capabilities 
to the American people.  At that time, his role as a supportive figure could also have been 
seen as wife-like in that era. 
 
 
Walter Mondale (1984) 
 
Humphrey had been a mentor to Walter Fritz Mondale (Lechelt, 2009).  In fact, 
Mondale was appointed to the U.S. Senate seat vacated by Humphrey upon his ascension 
to the vice presidency after the 1964 election.  Unlike Humphrey’s relationship with 
Johnson, however, Vice President Mondale was fortunate to have a very good 
relationship with President Carter. 
Mondale knew that for him to play an influential role, and better position himself 
to run for president in the future, he had to establish and maintain loyalty to Carter.  In a 




recognize that my personal and political success is totally tied to you and the 
achievements of your administration” (Barnett, cited in Lechelt, 2009, p. 39). 
    Carter did not fear political competition from Mondale, and thus took greater 
advantage of his talents.  Carter referred to Mondale as an “equal partner,” (Barnes, 2001, 
p, 814), which certainly contrasted with Eisenhower’s “you’re my boy” remark to Nixon 
in 1960.  According to Mondale’s chief of staff Richard Moe, Carter told his cabinet and 
staff that “if you get a request from Fritz, you treat it as if it were a request from me.” 
(Moe, cited in Lechelt, 2009, p. 41).   
Carter gave Mondale close access.  He was the first vice president to have an 
office in the West Wing (Quayle, 1997; Barnes, 2001).  Also, during Mondale’s tenure, 
the tradition of the private weekly lunch between the president and vice president began 
(Gillon, 1997; Kengor, 2000).  
Mondale avoided minor committee chairmanships, instead becoming a general 
advisor to the president.  He performed this role at a level that Goldstein (1982) described 
as “unprecedented for a vice president” (p. 173).  In this capacity, Mondale received 
access to briefings from intelligence agencies, including daily CIA briefings, and was 
encouraged to attend economic policy group discussions (Kengor, 2000).  Mondale also 
had his own staff including his own foreign policy advisors (Kengor, 2000), which meant 
that he wasn’t dependent on Carter’s staff or on any of the executive departments for 
information.   
Mondale played a significant role in the administration’s foreign policy.  One of 
his major areas of focus was on accomplishing the second round of the Strategic Arms 




helped craft the treaty, and build support for it, both with the public and in Congress 
(Lechelt, 2009).  Mondale also played a big role in securing the passage of the Panama 
Canal treaty in the Senate (Kengor, 2000).       
In addition, Mondale took several overseas trips to communicate the foreign 
policy priorities of the Carter administration.  His trips were more substantive than those 
made by his vice presidential predecessors (Lechelt, 2009).  He served as a diplomat to 
China and the Middle East (Lechelt, 2009).  In the summer of 1978, Mondale’s trips to 
Israel to meet with Prime Minister Menachem Begin, and trips to Egypt to meet with 
President Anwar Sadat, laid the groundwork for the 1979 Camp David Accords, Carter’s 
biggest foreign policy triumph (Gillon, 1992; Kengor, 2000).  During these negotiations, 
Mondale’s credibility with the Israelis enabled him to stress the Carter administration’s 
point to Begin about removing Israeli settlements in the Sinai (Lechelt (2009).   
Because of his unprecedented and robust role, Mondale is credited with 
institutionalizing the vice presidency as a key player in the presidential administration 
(Lechelt, 2009).  Close access to the president and the flow of information, serving as a 
general advisor and having his own staff, enabled Mondale to serve as an independent 
voice within the administration (Light, cited in Kengor, 2000).   
Publically, however, Mondale, like his vice presidential predecessors, did not 
have free reign.  For example, in June of 1977, Mondale wanted to deliver a speech to 
reassure Jewish voters about concerns over Carter’s Middle East policy, including 
announcing new administration goals that would satisfy Israel.  But administration 
officials compelled Mondale to simply reaffirm administration policy.  His speech 




administration to Humphrey’s need to support Johnson’s Vietnam policy, a policy which 
Humphrey disagreed with privately and which fostered alienation from his liberal base 
(Lewis, cited in Kengor, 2000).   
The Carter administration, however, was plagued by numerous problems 
including economic stagflation, high interest rates, gas shortages, and the taking of 
American hostages in Iran.  In their 1980 reelection bid, Mondale took on the role of 
“party unifier” after the primary challenge from Senator Edward Kennedy, and also the 
role of “administration cheer leader,” which included the difficult task of defending 
Carter’s economic record (Hunt, 1980, p. 30).  While Mondale attacked Reagan, Hunt 
(1980) observed that he refrained from too much “hatchet work.” (p. 30).  Hunt 
speculated that Mondale wanted to maintain a likeable image in preparation for a 1984 
presidential bid (p. 30).  At campaign’s end, Carter and Mondale failed in their reelection 
effort. 
Tying this back to the rhetorical situation, Mondale’s loyalty pledge to Carter in 
his early memo sowed the seeds of the dilemma faced by vice presidents who seek the 
presidency.  Mondale’s loyalty certainly put him in a position to receive more substantive 
assignments, and build on his professional record.  His loyalty, however, also may have 
created constraints for his ability to demonstrate his independence when he ran for 
president in the future.  Mondale’s decision to avoid too much “hatchet work” was an 
effort to preserve a positive, public image for a future presidential bid.         
In his 1984 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination, Mondale 
certainly did benefit from his superior name recognition and experience, benefits 




association with the failed Carter administration could only have been a drawback against 
popular incumbent Ronald Reagan.  In fact, drawing attention to Mondale’s connection to 




George H. W. Bush (1988) 
 
George Bush’s vice presidency also provided benefits and drawbacks for his 
presidential bid.  As vice president, Bush benefited from the way that Mondale expanded 
the role of the office.  He maintained close access to President Reagan, through weekly 
lunches, having an office in the West Wing, having access to the president’s papers and 
briefings, and serving as one of the President’s closest advisors, particularly in the area of 
foreign policy (Lechelt, 2009).   
Reagan allowed Bush to preside over National Security Council (NSC) meetings 
in his absence (Untermeyer, 1997).  Bush acted as a congressional liaison, and served as 
Reagan’s surrogate on several foreign trips, for instance meeting with Deng Xiaoping of 
China, and numerous Soviet leaders (Lechelt, 1989; Untermeyer, 1997).  Through his 
role as a foreign policy advisor, and his direct access to Reagan, Bush helped convince 
the president that Soviet Secretary General Mikhail Gorbachev was somebody with 
whom they could negotiate (Lechelt, 2009).   
Lechelt (2009) notes that Bush expanded the role of vice president, beyond what 
Mondale had, by not only serving as an advisor, but also accepting delegated tasks and 
responsibilities.  For instance, Bush chaired the Special Situations Group, an 




(Lechelt, 2009, Kengor, 2000).  In doing so, Bush became the first vice president in 
history to head up a major interagency foreign policy administrative committee (Kengor, 
2000).  Bush also chaired the administration’s Task Force on Regulatory Reform, and 
won the support of many conservatives who had been distrustful of him (Untermeyer, 
1997).  This distrust existed because he was considered a “Republican-establishment 
moderate” who had challenged Reagan in 1980 (Lechelt, 2009, p. 89).  In chairing the 
task force, however, Bush strengthened his ties with his party’s conservative base, unlike 
Hubert Humphrey, whose support of Johnson’s Vietnam policy had badly strained his 
ties with his liberal base. 
Given Reagan’s popularity and the public’s general satisfaction with the status 
quo, Bush stood to benefit politically from association with Reagan, as he started his 
campaign for the 1988 Republican presidential nomination.  Reagan left office with a 68 
percent overall approval rating and high ratings for his handling of both foreign (71%) 
and economic (62%) policy (Brummer, 1989).  Bush would have the ability to run on the 
administration’s accomplishments.  As Kincade pointed out, however, Bush had to 
balance loyalty to Reagan, and citing administration achievements, with the need to 
demonstrate his own independence and assert his own ideas.  Representative Jim Leach 
(R-Iowa) spoke to Bush’s rhetorical situation, saying that, "He's got to make it clear he's 
future-oriented, that he symbolizes something different than [Reagan] but in no sense be 
perceived as disloyal" (Hoffman, 1987, p.A4).   
The Iran-Contra scandal, however, created a potentially significant problem for 
Bush’s presidential campaign.  As discussed, Bush was a major player in Reagan 




Week, Bush spoke about his role, saying, “I’m in on everything.  If your policies aren’t 
working, I can’t say ‘Wait a minute, I’m not to blame.’” (Business Week, 1986, cited in 
Lechelt, 2009).  But after the scandal broke later that year, Bush said he was “out of the 
loop” and that he was “deliberately excluded” from key meetings when Iran-Contra 
dealings were discussed (Rothenberg, 1988, p. 29).  These statements created a 
contradiction for Bush, and a potential dilemma for his 1988 presidential bid.  His claims 
of experience and strong knowledge in foreign policy reduce the plausibility of his denial 
of knowledge about the Iran-Contra dealings.  As Kincade points out, vice presidents face 
the difficult task of trying to establish their gravitas through active participation in the 
administration, and yet somehow avoid the taint of any administration scandals.  Bush’s 
“out of the loop” and “deliberately excluded” comments are consistent with Bostdorrf’s 
analysis that vice presidents are oriented according to the Burkean term of “scene.”  In 
other words, they are caught up in the larger environment of events, rather than bearing 
responsibility for their actions.   
Another problem for Bush was the perception that he was a “wimp.”  In fact, the 
cover story for Newsweek’s October 19, 1987 issue was titled George Bush: Fighting the 
‘Wimp Factor’ (Solomon, 2011).  This perception is understandable because vice 
presidents serve in the shadow of the president, and as noted in a previous chapter by 
Pomper (2001), vice presidents always appear less capable than the president.  In Bush’s 
case, it may have been more pronounced because he served with a President who was 
perceived to be a very strong figure.   
The “wimp” perception of Bush is somewhat ironic, however, considering that he 




work for military training films during the war.  In fact, Bush had been the youngest pilot 
in the naval air corps in 1943.  He flew bombing missions against the Japanese over the 
Pacific, crash-landed twice, and won the Distinguished Flying Cross (Rothenberg, 1988).  
Yet the American public knew him as the mild-mannered, loyal vice president who 
served President Reagan.  The “wimp” perception could only negatively affect his ability 
to create the image of a strong leader during his bid for the presidency.  In the rhetorical 
situation faced by vice presidents, the public tends to, as noted by Kincade, view vice 
presidents as lacking in leadership ability.   
   
   
Al Gore (2000) 
 
Gore’s vice presidency also provided benefits and drawbacks to his presidential 
campaign.  At least until Gore ran for president in 2000, he had a good relationship with 
President Clinton.  He had weekly lunches with the president, was a top advisor to the 
president, and served as a congressional liaison.  Gore was instrumental in securing 
support for the Clinton administration’s effort to pass the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA).  Many political observers note that Gore performed very well in 
his televised debate about the North American Free Trade Agreement against vocal 
opponent and former presidential candidate Ross Perot.  (Lechelt, 2009).  Gore also had 
unprecedented authority in the foreign policy arena, chairing key commissions with 
leaders such as Russia’s Victor Chernomyrdin and South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki (Kengor, 
2000).   
Behind the scenes, Gore was disciplined and capable of making timely decisions, 




was also very assertive.  For instance, when Clinton vacillated over details of the 1993 
budget bill, Gore told him, “You can get with the God damn program!” (Nelson, 2001, 
p.59).  Clinton later credited this legislation with putting the economy back on the right 
track.   
Gore’s discipline, decision making abilities and assertiveness spoke to his 
leadership capabilities.  His role as vice president, however, precluded him from 
exhibiting these capabilities in public.  Ironically, while presidents often overshadow 
their vice presidents, Kengor (2000) noted that Gore had to be cautious not to 
overshadow Clinton.   
Kincade’s claim that vice presidents are perceived as lacking leadership ability 
appears to be true in Gore’s case.  A May 2000 poll showed that Gore was perceived to 
be a weaker leader than his opponent George W. Bush (Berke and Elder, 2000).  This 
finding seems somewhat ironic considering that Gore had the greater amount of executive 
and governmental experience. 
Gore’s loyalty to Clinton certainly enhanced his chances of becoming his party’s 
presidential nominee.  Clinton had made numerous statements praising Gore, for instance 
during his 2000 State of the Union address (Clinton, 2000).  This level of support was 
unprecedented, as presidents traditionally avoid endorsing candidates of their own party 
until after the primary season. 
But Gore’s association with Clinton and the administration also created problems 
for his presidential campaign.  Gore was embroiled in scandal due to allegations that he 
engaged in questionable campaign fundraising practices – including by hosting White 




participating in a fundraising effort at a Buddhist temple – to support the Clinton-Gore 
1996 reelection effort (Burger, 2000; Broder, 1999).  According to news reports, Gore 
claimed he wasn’t paying attention in meetings when these issues were being discussed, 
and took restroom breaks because he drank a lot of iced tea (“Memo says Gore,” 2000).  
Gore’s failure to recall details from these meetings were thought to be less than plausible, 
given that he had a reputation for being a master of detail.  Gore also suggested he 
couldn’t be held accountable anyway because there was “no controlling legal authority” 
(Burger, 2000, p. 6).  Like George H. W. Bush’s comments about Iran-Contra, Gore’s 
comments regarding the fundraising scandal are consistent with Bostdorrf’s analysis that 
vice presidents are often described using the Burkean term of “scene.”  In other words, 
they are caught up in the larger environment of events, rather than bearing responsibility 
for their actions.    
Then, after the 1999 House vote to impeach Clinton over issues surrounding the 
Lewinsky affair, Gore enthusiastically defended Clinton, saying that the impeachment 
was “a great disservice to a man I believe will be regarded in the history books as one of 
our greatest presidents” (Turque, 2000, p. 356).  Stanley (2001) noted that Gore’s remark 
“seemed more loyal than accurate” (p. 45).       
The impact of Gore’s comment on his presidential bid can be better understood by 
turning back to the discussion of the rhetorical situation facing vice presidents – 
specifically their ability to transform their image from one of a subordinate to that of a 
superior.  The insight provided by Kincade and Natoli is particularly relevant here – that 
vice presidents must remain loyal, but also establish their independence when they run 




support of President Clinton and Clinton supporters.  But the comment would later prove 
problematic, because it publicly portrayed Gore as subordinate, and lacking in leadership 
ability.  Recall the observation by Goldstein (1982) that vice presidents often diminish 
their own credibility with intelligent voters when they make over-the-top statements 
about their president.  Also, recall the assertion by Nelson (2002) that while the electorate 
appreciates loyalty in a vice president, they disdain that attribute in him once he runs for 
president.   
Six months after the impeachment trial, Gore tried to distance himself from the 
scandal.  In an episode of the ABC News program 20/20, Gore was asked about the 
Clinton-Lewinsky affair.  Regarding Clinton’s behavior, Gore said that “what he did was 
inexcusable, and particularly as a father, I felt that it was terribly wrong, obviously” 
(Seelye, 1999, p. A26).  Gore’s conflicting stances of loyalty, then distancing himself 
certainly didn’t enable him to cultivate the image of a leader.  He ran the risk of 
undermining his authenticity, and also ran the risk of running afoul of Clinton, whose 
support would be important at least in the primaries.  Following the 20/20 interview, 
news reports cited White House aides saying that Clinton was very upset about Gore’s 
statements (“Clinton upset,” 1999).  
Six months later, Gore took another step toward independence on the issue of 
whether six-year old Elian Gonzalez should be returned to Cuba.  The Clinton 
administration’s position was that the boy should be returned to his father in Cuba.  Gore, 
however, supported allowing the child’s case to be heard in family court (Chen, 2000; 
Chinni, 2000), consistent with prior statements he had made on the issue during the 




Cuban American community of Florida, a key battleground state (Benedetto, 2000).  
Stanley (2001) noted that Gore’s credibility as a leader was undermined.  Also, Gore’s 
ability to establish his independence was cast in a negative light by a media that chose to 
draw attention to the conflict between his position and that of Clinton’s. 
The public’s attitude toward Bill Clinton, as a president, and as a person, and the 
public’s level of satisfaction with the status quo also provided a mixed set of 
circumstances for Gore.  While Clinton’s job approval rating in the year 2000 was 
consistently around 60%, his personal approval rating was around 27% (Simon, 2001).  A 
poll in early November of 2000 showed that three fifths of likely voters in the major 
battleground states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Florida disliked Clinton as a person 
(Brownstein, 2000).  A poll asking people if they supported change or continuity revealed 
a 48-48 percentage split (Greenberg, 2001).   
These results certainly complicated the way that Gore would discuss his 
association with Clinton and the administration during his presidential campaign.  Page 
(2000) summed up the difficulty for Gore: 
More than any other factor, voters’ clashing views of Clinton’s competence and 
character have made this an election driven by desires for both continuity and 
change.  That’s complicated things for Gore, who wants a share of the credit for 
the Clinton administration achievements but not blame for the scandals. (p. 1A) 
Page’s summary suggests that for Gore, the great economy and positive 
achievements may have been “wind at his back,” but the scandals were “ice on his 




Gore’s dilemma reaffirms Kincade’s contention that when vice presidents run for 
president, they have to try and get credit for the administration’s achievements, but avoid 
the taint of any scandals.  Gore’s post-impeachment praise of Clinton publicly associated 
him with the Clinton scandal, and the taint that flowed from it.  But Gore found it 
difficult to get credit for the administration’s achievements.  Gore campaign strategist 
Carter Eskew (2001) noted that despite numerous attempts, Gore was unable to get credit 
for the prosperous economy during Clinton’s presidency.  As a result, Eskew said the 
campaign turned toward a message focusing on the future, rather than on past 
accomplishments. 
The Clinton scandals, including the Lewinsky affair, questionable campaign 
fundraising practices, Whitewater and others, all served to make the issue of honesty and 
integrity in the White House a much more salient issue.  Observers said that the country 
was experiencing a “Clinton Fatigue.”  Gore’s association with the Clinton 
administration, and more directly his praising of Clinton after impeachment, and his role 
in the questionable fundraising practices all created problems for his own presidential 
bid.   
Moreover, there was a perception that Gore had made numerous statements in 
recent years that were thought to be exaggerated or untrue.  These statements included 
saying he created the internet, claiming that as a child he sang a union song that hadn’t 
been written until after he became an adult, claiming he and his wife Tipper were the 
inspiration for the novel, Love Story, and using an analogy that his mother-in-law spent 
less on prescription drugs for her dog, than she paid for those prescriptions for herself.  




their main messages was that Gore reinvented himself at every turn and would say or do 
anything to get elected (Kurtz, 2000).  For instance, in his Republican convention speech, 
George W. Bush’s running mate Dick Cheney had put forth a set of attacks against 
Gore’s character, tying him to the Clinton administration scandals over the past eight 
years. 
Additional questions about Gore’s honesty were raised after the first two 
presidential debates.  After the first debate, the media scrutinized his frequent sighs, 
interruptions and exaggerated claims including that a high school girl was forced to stand 
in her classroom because there were not enough desks, and claiming that he accompanied 
FEMA director James Lee Witt down to Texas to assess wildfire damage (Jones, 2000; 
Hallow, 2000).  Then Gore’s more subdued tone in the second debate (in contrast to his 
more aggressive tone in the first debate) was criticized as an example of reinventing 
himself (Jones, 2000).  At this point in the campaign, according to a Washington Post-
ABC News poll, Gore found himself trailing Bush in the polls, 48% to 44%, with fewer 
than half of the voters saying he was honest and trustworthy, a substantial drop from the 
previous month when six in ten voters held that view (“What are you,” 2000; Balz & 
Morin, 2000).  After the third debate, however, polls showed that viewers thought Gore 
won the debate (Montgomery, 2000).  Certainly questions about his trustworthiness, 
exacerbated by his association with the scandal-plagued and veracity-challenged Clinton 
administration, and coupled with perceptions of rudeness in the first debate, could only 
negatively affect his ability to establish the public image of an ideal presidential 




In the end, Gore won the popular vote, but failed to secure the 270 electoral votes 
necessary to be elected president.  Controversy arose because of ballot problems in Palm 
Beach County where many voters had punched votes for both Al Gore and third party 
candidate Pat Buchanan.  Also, there was a belief that many people who voted for 
Buchanan may have intended to vote for Gore because the majority of Palm Beach voters 
were registered Democrats.  While Gore pursued a recount of all the ballots in Florida, 
the U.S. Supreme Court suspended the effort in the Bush v. Gore decision on December 
12, 2000.   
The previous sections of this paper have looked at how the vice presidency has 
both strengthened and weakened a candidate’s chances of becoming a presidential 
nominee.   Studying the presidential campaigns of vice presidents sheds light on how one 
deals with the rhetorical situations associated with being part of a superior-subordinate 
relationship.  This research may also help us understand other types of elections, 
involving the superior-subordinate relationship, such as when a Lieutenant Governor runs 
for Governor, a Deputy Mayor runs for Mayor, or campaigns in which a member of the 
President’s own party, or a member of the incumbent administration runs for president.  
For example, Senator John McCain, though he wasn’t George W. Bush’s vice president, 
experienced the challenges of being associated with him in the 2008 presidential election 
(Cafferty, 2008).  Similarly, Hillary Clinton’s role in Bill Clinton’s administration 
complicated her runs for the New York Senate in 2000 and for the Democratic 
presidential nomination in 2008, when she had to answer for her husband’s policy 
choices such as the controversial North American Free Trade Agreement.  If she runs for 




administrations.  During interviews for her book tour in the spring of 2014, Clinton has 
already faced questions about her failed health care policy efforts during her husband’s 
term, and her record as Obama’s Secretary of State. 
Through the historical and contextual analysis, one can see that certain factors 
affected the vice president’s bid for the presidency, including his relationship with the 
president, and the specific duties he was asked to perform.  In all instances, the vice 
president’s association with the president created both opportunities and difficulties for 
the vice president’s presidential campaign.  Because the vice president’s success is 
affected by his relationship with the president, it is useful to look at how they negotiate 




Chapter 4: Results 
 In this chapter I will report the data obtained from the content analysis.  This data 
will provide answers to the research questions and subquestions presented earlier, 
including whether vice presidents chose to align or distance themselves from their 




Interrater agreement was calculated for all coded items, and then separately for 
manifest and latent content.  Separate calculations were also made for each type of text: 
ads, speeches and debates.10  The percent interrater agreement for all coded items was 
86.698%.  For manifest content, percent agreement was 93.233%; and for latent content it 
was 60.203%.  Because manifest judgments are easier for coders to make, we would 
expect that interrater agreement would be higher.  Because latent judgments are more 
difficult for coders to make, we would expect that interrater agreement would be lower.     
For ads, total percent agreement between raters was 92.241%, with agreement on 
manifest content at 97.255% and on latent content at 55.714%.  For speeches, total 
percent agreement between raters was 89.434%, with agreement on manifest content at 
94.559% and on latent content at 65.402%.  For debates, total percent agreement between 
raters was 86.698%, with agreement on manifest content at 93.233% and on latent 
content at 60.203%.  See Table 1.   
 
10 Intercoder agreement calculations for the debates include the opening and closing statements. 
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Table 1: Percent interrater agreement for manifest, latent and all coded items for ads, 




Manifest Content Latent Content All Coded Items 
(Manifest + 
Latent) 
Ads 97.255% 55.714% 92.241% 
Speeches 94.559% 65.402% 89.434% 
Debates 92.227% 58.119% 84.920% 
Total 93.233% 60.203% 86.698% 
 
 
Other types of interrater agreement tests including Cohen’s kappa and Fleiss’ 
kappa were employed.  See Tables 2-3 in Appendix B.  These measures take into account 
the percent of agreement one could expect to get just by chance.  Scholars have noted, 
however, that using kappa as a measure of rater agreement can be problematic (Karelitz 
and Budescu, 2013; von Eye and von Eye, 2008).  Kappa measures are marginal-
dependent, meaning that these measures take into account the probabilities with which 
coders will select coding categories.  As noted by von Eye and von Eye (2008), “if 
[kappa] is used as a measure of the degree of agreement as suggested by some authors, it 
will fail to indicate that agreement is strong when a marginal distribution is uneven” (p. 







Analysis of Televised Ads 
A. In what percentage of the television ads did the sitting/former vice president, 
either through discussion or depiction, praise, defend, minimize, criticize, discuss 
neutrally, or neglect to mention, his president/administration?  
 
Nixon 1960 
 Of the eight ads studied, Nixon praised Eisenhower/administration in 62.5% of 
the ads, defended, minimized and criticized or used neutral terms in 0% of the ads, and 
did not mention Eisenhower/administration in 37.5% of the ads.  See Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Percentage of Television Ads that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
1960. 
 
Praised = 62.50% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None = 37.50% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Humphrey 1968 
 Of the ten ads studied, Humphrey praised Johnson in 10% of his ads, defended, 
minimized, criticized, or used neutral terms in 0%, and did not mention 





Table 5. Percentage of Television Ads that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration 
in 1968.   
 
Praised =  10% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =   90% 




 Nixon did not discuss or depict Eisenhower/administration in any of his ads.  See 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Percentage of Television Ads that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
1968. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 







 Mondale did not discuss or depict Carter/administration in any of his ads.  See 
Table 7. 
 
Table 7. Percentage of Television Ads that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in 
1984. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 




 Bush did not mention Reagan or the Reagan administration in 90% of his ads.  In 
one ad that showed a still shot of Bush and Gorbachev shaking hands, Reagan was seen 
standing with a warm effusive smile.  Coders determined Reagan was depicted in a 
“neutral” way in this ad.  One could argue that Reagan was depicted in a positive way, 





Table 8. Percentage of Television Ads that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
1988. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  90% 




 Gore did not discuss or depict Clinton or the Clinton administration in any of his 
2000 ads.  See Table 9.   
 
Table 9. Percentage of Television Ads that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
2000.    
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 






B. Does the answer to subquestion A differ election to election?  
This question helps us to make systematic comparisons between elections, and 
allows us to better understand how the circumstances of that particular election might 
have affected each vice president’s choices.  Nixon (1968), Mondale (1984) and Gore 
(2000) did not mention, discuss, or depict their respective president/administration in 
their respective television ads.  Neither of the two former vice presidents (Nixon ’68, 
Mondale ’84) mentioned their president in their ads.  Humphrey (1968) and H. W. Bush 
(1988) discussed or depicted their respective president/administration in only 10% of 
their respective television ads.  Humphrey praised Johnson/administration, while Bush 
depicted Reagan in a neutral, but arguably positive way.   
Nixon’s (1960) ads were the clear exception.  He discussed or depicted 
Eisenhower/administration in the majority of the ads studied here -- 62.5%.  In one 
particular ad titled, “Best Qualified,” Eisenhower was shown for the entire one-minute 
duration delivering a speech to a cheering crowd in which he made a strong endorsement 
of Nixon. 










Analysis of Speeches 
A. In what percentage of speech units, did the sitting/former vice president praise, 
defend, minimize, criticize, discuss neutrally, or neglect to mention, his 
president/administration?   
 
Nixon 1960 
 Nixon’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 77 speech units.  Across all 77 
units, Nixon praised Eisenhower/administration in 18.18% of the units, defended in 
6.49%, minimized in 2.60%, criticized in 0%, and used neutral terms in 2.60%.  Nixon 
did not mention Eisenhower/administration in 68.83% of the units, and 1.30% of the 
speech units were undeterminable.  See Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration 
across all five speeches.   
 
Praised =   18.18% 
Defended =   6.49% 
Minimized =   2.60% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   2.60% 
None =   68.83% 







 The results for each of Nixon’s speeches are as follows: 
 
Nixon Speech #1 – Nomination Acceptance Address, July 28, 1960 
This speech was broken up into 18 speech units.  In this speech, Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 22.22% of the coded units, defended 0%, minimized 
5.56%, criticized 5.56%, used neutral terms 0%, and did not mention 
Eisenhower/administration in 66.67% of the units, with 5.56% of the units 
undeterminable.  For the one speech unit that was “undeterminable,” four out of five 
coders determined that it was either “praise” or “defense” and therefore a positive 
statement of Eisenhower/administration.  Viewed this way, Nixon praised or defended 
Eisenhower in 27.78% of the speech units in this speech.  See Table 11. 
 
Table 11. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 Nomination Acceptance Address. 
 
Praised =  22.22% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  5.56% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  66.67% 







Nixon Speech #2 - “The Need for Leadership” – August 17, 1960 
 This speech was broken up into 19 speech units.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 10.53% of the units, defended in 5.26%, criticized in 0%, 
minimized in 5.26%, used neutral terms in 5.26%, and did not discuss 
Eisenhower/administration in 73.68% of the units.  See Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 “The Need for Leadership” speech. 
 
Praised =  10.53% 
Defended =  5.26% 
Minimized =  5.26% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  5.26% 
None =  73.68% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Nixon Speech #3 – Saginaw, MI speech, September 20, 1960 
 This speech was broken up into 11 speech units.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 9.09% of the units, defended in 9.09%, criticized, 
minimized and used neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration 








Table 13. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 “Saginaw, MI” speech.   
 
Praised =  9.09% 
Defended =  9.09% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  81.81% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Nixon Speech #4 - Hartford, CT speech, October 17, 1960 
 
 This speech was broken up into 23 speech units.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 8.70% of the units, defended in 13.04%, minimized, 
criticized and used neutral terms in 0%, and did not mention Eisenhower/administration 
in 78.26% of the units.  See Table 14. 
Table 14. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 Hartford, CT speech. 
 
Praised =  8.70% 
Defended =  13.04% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  78.26% 






Nixon Speech #5 - CBS TV Election Eve Broadcast, November 7, 1960 
 
 This speech was broken up into 6 speech units.  Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in 100% of these speech units.  He praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 83.33% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized in 0%, 
used neutral terms in 16.67%, and did not mention Eisenhower/administration in 0% of 
the units.  See Table 15.   
 
Table 15. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 CBS TV Election Eve Broadcast. 
 
Praised =  83.33% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  16.67% 
None =  0% 




 Humphrey’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 69 speech units.  Across all 
speech units, Humphrey praised Johnson/administration in 20.29% of the units, defended 




discuss Johnson/administration in 71.01% of the units, with 1.45% of the units 
undeterminable.  See Table 16. 
 
Table 16. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration 
across all five speeches. 
 
Praised =   20.29% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   1.45% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   5.80% 
None =   71.01% 
Undeterminable =   1.45% 
 
 
 The results for each of Humphrey’s speeches are as follows: 
 
Humphrey Speech #1 – Announcement Speech, April 27, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 10 speech units.  Humphrey praised 
Johnson/administration in 20% of the units, defended, minimized, and criticized in 0%, 
used neutral terms in 10%, and did not discuss Johnson/administration in 60% of the 








Table 17. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Announcement speech. 
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  60% 
Undeterminable =  10% 
 
Humphrey Speech #2 – Nomination Acceptance Address, August 29, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 13 speech units.  Humphrey praised 
Johnson/administration in 23.08% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized and used 
neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Johnson/administration in 76.92% of the units.  
See Table 18.   
Table 18. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Nomination acceptance address.   
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  76.92% 




Humphrey Speech #3 – Salt Lake City, Utah Address, September 30, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 12 speech units.  Humphrey praised 
Johnson/administration in 8.33% of the units, defended in 0%, minimized in 8.33%, 
criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 16.67%, and did not discuss 
Johnson/administration in 66.67% of the units.  See Table 19. 
 
Table 19. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Salt Lake City, UT Address.  
 
Praised =  8.33% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  8.33% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  16.67% 
None =  66.67% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Humphrey Speech #4 – NY Garment District Speech, October 30, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 12 speech units.  Humphrey praised 
Johnson/administration in 16.67% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized and used 
neutral terms in 0%, and did not mention Johnson/administration in 83.33% of the units.  






Table 20. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 NY Garment District speech.   
 
Praised =  16.67% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  83.33% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Humphrey Speech #5 – Houston Astrodome Speech, November 3, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 22 speech units.  Humphrey praised 
Johnson/administration in 27.27% of the units, the most in any of the five speeches 
studied here.  He defended, minimized and criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 4.55%, 



















Table 21. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Houston Astrodome speech.  
 
Praised =  27.27% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  4.55% 
None =  68.18% 





 Nixon’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 68 speech units.  Across all of 
these units, Nixon praised Eisenhower/administration in 10.29% of the units, defended, 
minimized, and criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 1.47%, and did not mention 
Eisenhower/administration in 86.76% of the units, with 1.47% of the units 
















Table 22. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration 
across all five speeches. 
 
Praised =   10.29% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   0% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   1.47% 
None =   86.76% 
Undeterminable =   1.47% 
 
 
 The results for each of Nixon’s speeches are as follows: 
 
Nixon Speech #1 – Announcement Speech, January 31, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 4 speech units.  Nixon did not mention 

















Table 23. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Announcement speech.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Nixon Speech #2 – Nomination Acceptance Address, August 8, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 29 speech units.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 10.34% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized, and 
used neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 86.21% of 
the units, with 3.45% of the units undeterminable.  See Table 24. 
Table 24. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Nomination Acceptance address. 
 
Praised =  10.34% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  86.21% 




Nixon Speech #3 – Washington, DC, Radio Address, September 19, 1968 
 This speech was broken up into 11 speech units.  Nixon did not discuss 
Eisenhower/administration in any of the units.  See Table 25.   
 
 
Table 25. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, Radio address, September 19. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 





Nixon Speech #4 – Washington DC, CBS Radio Address, October 24, 1968 
 
 This speech was broken up into 15 speech units.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 26.67% of the units, defended, minimized, or criticized in 
0%, used neutral terms in 6.67%; and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 










Table 26. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, CBS Radio address, October 24. 
 
 
Praised =  26.67% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  6.67% 
None =   66.67% 





Nixon Speech #5 – Washington DC, CBS Radio Address, October 30, 1968 
 
 This speech was broken up into 9 speech units.  Nixon did not mention 
Eisenhower/administration in any of the units.  See Table 27. 
 
Table 27. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, CBS Radio, October 30.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 





 Mondale’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 62 speech units.  Across all 
units, Mondale praised Carter/administration in 3.23% of the units, defended, minimized 
or criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 1.61%, and did not mention 
Carter/administration in 95.16% of the units.  See Table 28. 
 
Table 28. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   3.23% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   0% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms  =   1.61% 
None =   95.16% 
Undeterminable =   0% 
 
 
 The results for each of Mondale’s speeches are as follows: 
Mondale Speech #1 – Announcement Speech, February 21, 1983 
 This speech was broken up into 16 speech units.  Mondale praised 
Carter/administration in 6.25% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized and used 
neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Carter/administration in 93.75% of the units.  





Table 29. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Announcement address, February 21, 1983.   
 
Praised =  6.25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.75% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Mondale Speech #2 – Nomination Acceptance Address, July 19, 1984 
 This speech was broken up into 13 speech units.  Mondale praised 
Carter/administration in 7.69% of the units, defended, minimized, criticized or used 
neutral terms in 0%, and did not mention Carter/administration in 92.31% of the units.  
See Table 30. 
Table 30. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Nomination Acceptance address, July 19. 
 
Praised = 7.69% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.31% 





Mondale Speech #3 – Portland, Oregon Speech, September 5, 1984 
 This speech was broken up into 13 speech units.  Mondale did not discuss 
Carter/administration in any of these units.  See Table 31. 
Table 31. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Portland, OR speech, September 5. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 




Mondale Speech #4 – Stanford University Stump Speech, October 17, 1984 
 This speech was broken up into 16 speech units.  Mondale did not praise, defend, 
minimize or criticize Carter/administration.  He discussed Carter/administration in neutral 
terms in 6.25% of the units, and did not mention Carter/administration in 93.75% of the 








Table 32. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Stanford University stump speech, October 17. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  6.25% 
None =  93.75% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Mondale Speech #5 – Pershing Square speech, November 5, 1984 
 This speech was broken up into 4 speech units.  Mondale did not discuss 
Carter/administration in any of the units.  See Table 33.   
 
Table 33. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Pershing Square speech, November 5. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 







 Bush’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 108 speech units.  Across all 
units, Bush praised Reagan/administration in 16.67% of the units, defended in 0%, 
minimized in 1.85%, criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 3.70%, and did not discuss 
Reagan/administration in 77.78% of the units.  See Table 34.  
  
Table 34. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   16.67% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   1.85% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   3.70% 
None =   77.78% 
Undeterminable =   0% 
 
 The results for each of Bush’s speeches are as follows: 
Bush Speech #1 – Announcement Speech, October 12, 1987 
 This speech was broken up into 26 speech units.  Bush praised 
Reagan/administration in 15.38% of the units, defended in 0%, minimized in 3.85%, 
criticized in 0%, used neutral terms in 7.69%, and did not discuss Reagan/administration 




Table 35. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Announcement speech, October 12, 1987. 
  
Praised =  15.38% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 3.85% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  73.08% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
Bush Speech #2 – Nomination Acceptance Address, August 18, 1988 
 This speech was broken up into 32 speech units.  Bush praised 
Reagan/administration in 18.75% of the units, minimized in 3.13%, defended or 
criticized in 0%, discussed in neutral terms in 3.13%, and did not discuss 
Reagan/administration in 75% of the units.  See Table 36. 
Table 36. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Nomination Acceptance address, August 18.  
 
Praised =  18.75% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  3.13% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  3.13% 
None =  75% 




Bush Speech #3 - Gaddi Vasquez Campaign Breakfast Speech, September 14, 1988 
 This speech was broken up into 13 speech units.  Bush praised 
Reagan/administration in 23.08% of the units, defended, minimized or criticized in 0%, 
discussed in neutral terms in 7.69%, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 
69.23% of the units.  See Table 37. 
 
Table 37. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Gaddi Vasquez Campaign Breakfast speech, September 14. 
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  69.23% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Bush Speech #4 - Dearborn, MI Speech, October 19, 1988 
 This speech was broken up into 23 speech units.  Bush praised 
Reagan/administration 8.70%, defended, minimized, criticized, or discussed in neutral 








Table 38. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Dearborn, MI speech, October 19. 
 
Praised = 8.70% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  91.30% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Bush Speech #5 - Notre Dame Speech, November 1, 1988 
 This speech was broken up into 14 speech units.  Bush praised 
Reagan/administration in 21.43%, defended, minimized, criticized or discussed in neutral 
terms in 0%, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 78.57% of the units.  See 
Table 39. 
Table 39. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Notre Dame speech, November 1. 
 
Praised =  21.43% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  78.57% 






 Gore’s 5 speeches were broken up into a total of 114 speech units.  Across all 
units, Gore praised Clinton/administration in 2.63% of the units, defended in 0%, 
minimized in 3.51%, criticized or discussed in neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss 
Clinton/administration in 93.86%.  See Table 40.   
 
Table 40. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   2.63% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   3.51% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   0% 
None =   93.86 % 
Undeterminable =   0% 
 
 
 The results for each of Gore’s speeches are as follows: 
Gore Speech #1 – Announcement Speech, June 16, 1999 
 This speech was broken up into 27 speech units.  Gore praised 
Clinton/administration 3.70% of the units, minimized in 3.70%, and defended, criticized 
or discussed in neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Clinton/administration in 




Table 41. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Announcement speech, June 16, 1999. 
  
Praised =  3.70% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 3.70% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.59% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Gore Speech #2 – Nomination Acceptance Address, August 17, 2000 
 This speech was broken up into 35 speech units.  Gore praised 
Clinton/administration in 5.71% of the units, defended in 0%, minimized in 2.86%, 
criticized or discussed in neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Clinton/administration 
in 91.43% of the units.  See Table 42. 
Table 42. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Nomination Acceptance address, August 17. 
 
Praised = 5.71% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 2.86% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  91.43% 





Gore Speech #3 – Audobon Society Speech, September 29, 2000 
 This speech was broken up into 17 speech units.  Gore did not discuss 
Clinton/administration in any of the units.  See Table 43. 
 
Table 43. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Audobon Society speech, September 29. 
 
Praised = 0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 




Gore Speech #4 – Philadelphia, PA Speech, October 24, 2000 
 This speech was broken up into 15 speech units.  Gore did not praise, defend, 
criticize or discuss in neutral terms Clinton/administration.  He minimized 
Clinton/administration in 6.67% of the units, and did not discuss Clinton/administration 







Table 44. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Philadelphia, PA speech, October 24. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  6.67% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.33% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Gore Speech #5 – St. Louis, MO Speech, November 6, 2000 
 This speech was broken up into 20 speech units.  Gore did not praise, defend, 
criticize or discuss in neutral terms Clinton/administration.  He minimized in 5% of the 
units, and did not discuss Clinton/administration in 95% of the units.  See Table 45. 
Table 45. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his St. 
Louis, MO speech, November 6. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  5% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  95% 





B. Did the results of subquestion A differ from election to election? 
This question helps us to consider how the context of the particular election may 
have influenced the vice president’s decisions to discuss the president and/or the 
administration in their television ads.  The results showed that each vice president’s 
discussion of their respective president/administration varied both in quantity and quality.  
Nixon (1960), Humphrey (1968), and Bush (1988) all spoke about their respective 
president/administration frequently and often with praise, whereas Nixon (1968), 
Mondale (1984), and Gore (2000) rarely spoke about their respective 
presidents/administrations.   
On average, Nixon (1960) praised or defended Eisenhower/administration in 
roughly 25% of the speech units across all of his speeches.  In his election eve broadcast, 
Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 100% of the speech units, praising him in 
83.33% of these units.  This amount far exceeded any other vice president’s mentioning 
of their president/administration in their election week speech, or any other speech 
studied here.  
Humphrey (1968) praised or defended Johnson/administration in more than 20% 
of the speech units across all speeches studied here.   
Bush (1988) praised Reagan/administration in 16.67% of the speech units across 
all speeches studied here, and did so substantially in his election week speech (21.43% of 
the speech units).   
Looking at Nixon’s 1968 speeches, on average, he praised 




most speeches, he never mentioned Eisenhower/administration, except for his nomination 
acceptance speech (when he praised him in 10.34% of his speech units) and in his CBS 
radio address on October 24, when he praised him much more (26.67% of the speech 
units).  In the speeches studied here, Nixon’s discussion of Eisenhower/administration in 
1968 seems somewhat opposite of the approach he took in his 1960 campaign.  In 1960, 
Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in all of his speeches.  In 1968, he mostly 
avoided discussion of Eisenhower/administration, except for two speeches. 
Mondale (1984) made virtually no mention of Carter/administration.  He declined 
to discuss Carter/administration in 95.16% percent of his speech units across all speeches, 
praising in only 3.23%, and discussing in neutral terms in only 1.61%.   
Similar to Mondale (1984), Gore (2000) rarely mentioned his 
president/administration in his speeches.  He declined to discuss Clinton/administration 
in 93.86% of the speech units across all speeches, praising in only 2.63%, and 
minimizing in 3.51% of the units across all speeches. 
  Nixon (1960) and Gore (2000) did minimize their respective 
presidents/administrations more so than the other vice presidents.  Nixon (1960) 
minimized Eisenhower/administration in 2.60% of his speech units across all five 
speeches.  Gore minimized Clinton/administration in 3.51% of his speeches units across 
all five speeches.  In comparison, Bush minimized Reagan/administration in 1.85% of his 
speech units across all five speeches.  Bush minimized more so in his announcement and 






Analysis of Debates 
A.  In each sitting/former vice president’s speaking turns, did he praise, defend, 




Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #1 
 Nixon’s opening statement was broken up into 10 speech units11.  Nixon praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 20% of these units, defended in 20%, minimized in 10%, 
criticized or discussed in neutral times 0%, and did not discuss 
Eisenhower/administration in 50% of the units.  After the opening statement, Nixon had 
10 speaking turns in the first debate.  Nixon praised Eisenhower/administration in 20% of 
the turns, defended 10%, minimized 10%, did not criticize, discussed using neutral terms 
10%, and did not discuss at all in 40% of the units, with 10% of the units undeterminable.  
For the unit that coders found to be undeterminable, three out of five coders did judge it 
to be either “praise” or “defense,” and therefore, a positive statement of 
Eisenhower/administration.  Viewed this way, 40% of Nixon’s speaking turns were 
coded either as praise or defense of Eisenhower/administration.  Nixon’s closing 
statement was broken up into 4 speech units, and in this speech, he did not discuss 




11 Like the speeches, any opening and closing statements in debates were coded by breaking them up into 
more manageable speech units. 
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Table 46. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #1 opening statement.  
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended =  20% 
Minimized =  10% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  50% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Table 47. Percentage of his 10 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended =  10% 
Minimized =  10% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  40% 












Table 48. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement. 
   
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #2 
 Nixon had 13 speaking turns.  He praised Eisenhower/administration in 30.77% 
of the turns, defended in 15.38%, did not minimize or criticize, discussed in neutral terms 
in 7.69%, and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 46.15% of the turns.  There 
were no opening or closing statements in this debate.  See Table 49.   
Table 49. Percentage of his 13 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #2. 
  
Praised =  30.77% 
Defended =  15.38% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  46.15% 





Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #3 
 Nixon had 13 speaking turns.  He praised Eisenhower/administration in 23.08% 
of his turns, defended in 7.69%, minimized in 15.38%, criticized in 0%, discussed in 
neutral terms in 15.38%, and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 38.46% of his 
turns.  There were no opening or closing statements in this debate.  See Table 50. 
 
Table 50. Percentage of his 13 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #3. 
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  7.69% 
Minimized =  15.38% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  15.38% 
None =  38.46% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #4 
 Nixon’s opening statement was broken up into 8 speech units.  In this speech, 
Nixon praised Eisenhower/administration in 62.5% of the units, defended, minimized 
criticized and used neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 
37.5%.  After the opening statement, Nixon had 7 speaking turns.  He praised 




0%, discussed Eisenhower/administration in neutral terms in 14.29% of the turns, and did 
not discuss Eisenhower/administration in 28.57% of the turns, with 14.29% of the turns 
undeterminable.  For the unit that was “undeterminable,” three out of five coders judged 
it to be either “praise” or “defense,” and therefore, a positive statement of 
Eisenhower/administration.  Viewed this way, 57.15% of Nixon’s speaking turns 
included either praise or defense of Eisenhower/administration.  Nixon’s closing 
statement was broken up into 6 speech units, and in this speech, he praised 
Eisenhower/administration in 16.67% of the units, defended in 16.67%, minimized in 
16.67%, criticized or use neutral terms in 0%, and did not discuss 
Eisenhower/administration in 50% of the units.  See Tables 51-53.  
 
Table 51. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #4 opening statement. 
 
Praised =  62.5% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  37.5% 









Table 52. Percentage of his 7 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #4. 
 
Praised =  42.86% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  14.29% 
None =  28.57% 
Undeterminable = 14.29% 
 
Table 53. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
Debate #4 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  16.67% 
Defended =  16.67% 
Minimized =  16.67% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  50% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Mondale-Reagan 1984 Debate #1 
 Mondale had 24 speaking turns in this debate.  He did not praise, defend, 




Carter/administration in neutral terms in 4.16% of his turns, and did not discuss 
Carter/administration in 87.5% of his turns, with 8.33% of the turns undeterminable.  In 
one of the two cases that were undeterminable, 4 out of 5 coders determined that it was 
either “praise” or “defense” and therefore a positive statement of Carter/administration.  
Viewed this way, Mondale praised or defended Carter/administration in 4.17% of his 
speaking turns in Debate #1.  Mondale’s closing statement was broken up into 6 speech 
units, and in this statement, he did not discuss Carter/administration at all.  See Tables 
54-55.   
 
Table 54. Percentage of his 24 debate turns that Mondale discussed Carter/administration 
in Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  4.16% 
None =  87.5% 













Table 55. Percentage of his speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 










Mondale-Reagan 1984 Debate #2 
 Mondale had 22 speaking turns in this debate.  He did not discuss 
Carter/administration at all.  Mondale’s closing statement was broken up into 4 speech 





Table 56. Percentage of his 22 debate turns that Mondale discussed Carter/administration 
in Debate #2.  
  
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
Table 57. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
Debate #2 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 








H. W. Bush-Dukakis 1988 Debate #1 
 Bush had 23 speaking turns in this debate.  He praised Reagan/administration in 
21.74% of his turns, defended 8.70%, never minimized, criticized or discussed in neutral 
terms, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 69.57% of his turns.  Bush’s closing 
statement was broken up into 4 speech units, and in this statement, Bush praised 
Reagan/administration in 25% of the units, did not defend, minimize, criticize or discuss 
in neutral terms, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 75% of his turns.  See 
Tables 58-59. 
 
Table 58. Percentage of his 23 debate turns that H. W. Bush discussed 
Reagan/administration in Debate #1  
  
Praised =  21.74% 
Defended =  8.70% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  69.57% 











Table 59. Percentage of speech units that H. W. Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  75% 
Undeterminable = 0% 
 
 
H. W. Bush-Dukakis 1988 Debate #2 
 Bush had 23 speaking turns in this debate.  He used a majority of his turns to 
discuss Reagan/administration in either a positive or neutral way.  He praised Reagan in 
34.78% of his turns, defended 4.35%, did not minimize or criticize, used neutral terms in 
13.04% of the turns, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 47.83% of the turns.  
Bush’s closing statement was broken up into 4 speech units, and in this statement, Bush 
praised Reagan/administration in 25% of the units, did not defend, minimize, criticize or 
discuss in neutral terms, and did not discuss Reagan/administration in 75% of the units.  









Table 60. Percentage of his 23 debate turns that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
Debate #2. 
    
Praised =  34.78% 
Defended =  4.35% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  13.04% 
None =  47.83% 




Table 61. Percentage of speech units that H. W. Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
his Debate #2 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  75% 







Gore-Bush 2000 Debate #1 
 Gore had 41 speaking turns in this debate.  In 92.68% of the turns, he did not 
discuss Clinton/administration.  He minimized Clinton/administration in 2.44% of the 
turns, with 4.88% of the turns undeterminable.  In one of the two cases that were 
“undeterminable,” four out of five coders judged it to be either “praise” or “defense,” 
therefore indicating that it was a positive statement about Clinton/administration.  
Viewed this way, Gore praised or defended Clinton in 2.44% of his turns.  Gore’s closing 
statement was broken up into 3 speech units.  In these 3 units, Gore did not discuss 
Clinton/administration at all.  See Tables 62-63. 
 
 
Table 62. Percentage of his 41 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  2.44% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.68% 








Table 63. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #1 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 




Gore-Bush 2000 Debate #2 
 Gore had 47 speaking turns in this debate.  Gore defended Clinton/administration 
in 2.13% of his turns, but also criticized in 2.13% of his turns.  Gore did not praise, 
minimize, or discuss in neutral terms in any of his turns.  In 93.62% of the turns, Gore did 
not discuss Clinton/administration at all, with 2.13% of his turns undeterminable.  Gore’s 
closing statement was broken up into 4 speech units, and he did not discuss 











Table 64. Percentage of his 47 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #2.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  2.13% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  2.13% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.62% 
Undeterminable = 2.13% 
 
 
Table 65. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #2 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 








Gore-Bush 2000 Debate #3 
 Gore had 29 speaking turns in this debate.  He praised Clinton/administration in 
17.24% of the turns, and discussed in neutral terms in 3.45% of the turns.  He did not 
discuss Clinton/administration in 79.31% of the turns.  Gore’s closing statement was 
broken up into four speech units.  In this statement, Gore praised Clinton/administration 
in 25% of the units, and did not discuss Clinton/administration in 75% of the units.  See 
Tables 66-67. 
 
Table 66. Percentage of his 29 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #3. 
 
Praised =  17.24% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  3.45% 
None =  79.31% 













Table 67. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #3 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25%     
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0%   
None =  75% 




 B.  Who initially prompted the topic of the president/administration: the questioner 
(moderator, panelist, or citizen), the opponent, both the questioner and the 
opponent, or the vice president himself? 
 This question helps us understand how eager the vice president was to discuss 
their president/administration.  If a vice president is often the first one to discuss their 
president/administration, without the prompting of his opponent or the questioner, this 
suggests a choice to more closely link themselves to their president/administration.  If, on 
the other hand, a vice president refuses to discuss their president/administration, despite 
several prompts by their opponent or the questioner, this data would suggest that the vice 






Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #1:  
 This debate was broken up into 10 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Eisenhower/administration was brought up in 7 pairs, and was initially 
prompted by: the Questioner in 30% of the pairs, Kennedy in 20% of the pairs, and Nixon 
in 20% of the pairs.  In 30% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 68a and 68b.       
 
 
Table 68a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #1.    
 
Questioner                       =  30.00% 
Kennedy(Opponent)        =  20.00% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  20.00% 
























Table 68b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #1. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon Minimize 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Defend 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon Praise 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Undeterminable Kennedy None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
Nixon None Kennedy Minimize 
 
 
Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #2 
 This debate was broken up into 13 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Eisenhower/administration was brought up in 10 pairs, and was initially 




and Nixon in 30.77% of the pairs.  In 23.08% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See 
Tables 69a and 69b.  
 
Table 69a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #2. 
 
Questioner                       =  15.39% 
Kennedy (Opponent)       =  30.77% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  30.77% 






























Table 69b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Undeterminable Questioner Criticize 
Nixon Defend Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Neutral 
Nixon Defend Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 11 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon None 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Nixon Praise   






Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #3 
 This debate was broken up into 13 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Eisenhower/administration was brought up in 9 pairs, and was initially 
prompted by: the Questioner in 23.08% of the pairs, Kennedy in 23.08% of the pairs, and 
Nixon in 23.08% of the pairs.  In 30.77% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 
70a and 70b.  
 
Table 70a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #3. 
 
Questioner                       =  23.08% 
Kennedy(Opponent)        =  23.08% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  23.08% 



















Table 70b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #3. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon Minimize 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Minimize 
Nixon Defend Kennedy Criticize 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 11 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Kennedy None   







Nixon-Kennedy 1960 Debate #4 
 This debate was broken up into 7 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Eisenhower/administration was brought up in all 7 pairs, and was initially 
prompted by: the Questioner in 28.57% of the pairs, Kennedy in 28.57% of the pairs, and 
Nixon in 42.86% of the pairs.  See Tables 71a and 71b.    
 
Table 71a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #4. 
 
Questioner                       =  28.57% 
Kennedy (Opponent)       =  28.57% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  42.86% 






















Table 71b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #4. 
 
 PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Undeterminable Nixon None 
Kennedy Criticize Kennedy Neutral 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Kennedy Criticize 
Nixon Praise Nixon None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner Neutral 
Nixon Praise Nixon Praise 
Kennedy Criticize Kennedy Praise 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Kennedy None   




Mondale-Reagan 1984 Debate 1 
 This debate was broken up into 8 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Carter/administration was brought up in all 8 pairs, and was initially prompted 
by: the Questioner in 25% of the pairs, Reagan in 50% of the pairs, and Mondale in 25% 





Table 72a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Mondale-Reagan debate #1. 
 
Questioner                     =  25.00% 
Reagan (Opponent)       =  50.00% 
Mondale (VP)                =  25.00% 





Table 72b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Mondale-
Reagan debate #1. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner Criticize Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal Criticize Reagan-rebuttal None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Undeterminable 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan Criticize 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Neutral 






PR 3 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan Criticize 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Undeterminable 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Undeterminable 
Reagan-rebuttal Criticize Reagan-rebuttal None 
 
 
Mondale-Reagan 1984 Debate 2 
 This debate was broken up into 8 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Carter/administration was brought up in 5 pairs, and was initially prompted by: 
the Questioner in 37.5% of the pairs, Reagan in 25% of the pairs, and Mondale in 0% of 







Table 73a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Mondale-Reagan debate #2.   
 
Questioner                       =  37.50% 
Reagan (Opponent)         =  25.00% 
Mondale (VP)                  =  00.00% 




Table 73b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of vice president’s response to 
the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Mondale-Reagan 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Criticize 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal Undeterminable Reagan-rebuttal None 






PR 3 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 7  Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Reagan None Reagan Criticize 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Criticize 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Mondale None 
Questioner None   
Mondale None   
Questioner None   
Mondale None   
Reagan-rebuttal None   
Mondale-rebuttal None   
 
 
Bush-Dukakis 1988 Debate #1 
 This debate was broken up into 23 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Reagan/administration was brought up in 17 pairs, and was initially prompted 
by: the Questioner in 21.74% of the pairs, Dukakis in 43.48% of the pairs, and H. W. 
Bush in 8.70% of the pairs.  In 26.09% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 74a 





Table 74a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Bush-Dukakis debate #1. 
 
Questioner                       =  21.74% 
Dukakis (Opponent)        =  43.48% 
H. W. Bush (VP)             =  08.70% 
No One Brought It Up     =  26.09% 
 
 
Table 74b. The nature of the initial prompt and the vice president’s response to the initial 
prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Bush-Dukakis debate #1. 
    
PR 1 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 14 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis None 
Bush Defend Bush None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 15 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Neutral 
Bush None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush Praise Bush Praise 






PR 6 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 18 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Undeterminable Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush Defend 
  
  
PR 8  Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush None Bush  Praise 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 9  Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Dukakis None Dukakis None 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 23 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 12 Discussion of Reagan/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Bush None   







Bush-Dukakis 1988 Debate #2 
 This debate was broken up into 22 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Reagan/administration was brought up in 15 pairs, and was initially prompted 
by: the Questioner in 21.74% of the pairs, Dukakis in 17.39% of the pairs, and H. W. 
Bush in 26.09% of the pairs.  In 34.78% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 
75a and 75b. 
 
Table 75a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Bush-Dukakis debate #2.   
 
Questioner                       =  21.74% 
Dukakis (Opponent)        =  17.39% 
H. W. Bush (VP)             =  26.09% 





















Table 75b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Bush-Dukakis 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis None 
Bush None Bush Neutral 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Dukakis None 
Dukakis None Bush None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 14 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Criticize Questioner None 
Bush Defend Bush Praise 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 15 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Bush Praise 







PR 5 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Neutral Dukakis None 
Dukakis Neutral Bush None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 18 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush Praise Bush Praise 






PR 8 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Bush None 
Bush Praise Dukakis None 
  
  
PR 9 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Dukakis Criticize 
Dukakis None Bush None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Criticize 
Bush None Bush Neutral 




Gore-Bush 2000 Debate 1 
 This debate was broken up into 36 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Clinton/administration was brought up in 12 pairs, and was initially prompted 
by: the Questioner in 0% of the pairs, Bush in 30.56% of the pairs, and Gore in 2.78% of 










Table 76a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Gore-Bush debate #1. 
 
Questioner                       =  00.00% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  30.56% 
Gore (VP)                        =  02.78% 





































Table 76b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #1. 
    
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Neutral 
Bush Neutral   
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Neutral 





PR 3 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Criticize Bush None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush 2 Criticize   
Gore 2 None PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Bush 3 None Questioner None 
Gore 3 None Bush Criticize 
Bush 4 None   
Gore 4 None   
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush None Bush None 
Gore 2 None Gore2 None 
Bush 2 Criticize   
Gore 3 None PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Bush 3 None Questioner None 
Gore 4 None Bush None 











PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush Criticize Gore None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush Criticize Gore None 
Gore 2 None Bush2 None 
Bush 2 None Gore2 None 
  
  
PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush Criticize 
Gore None Gore Undeterminable 
Bush 2 None Bush2 Criticize 
  
Gore 2 Undeterminable 
  
Bush 3 None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 31 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
Bush None 
PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. Gore2 None 
Questioner None Bush2 None 








PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 32 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 33 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 34 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 35 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 36 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 





PR 18 Discussion of Clinton/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Bush None   
 
 
Gore-Bush 2000 Debate #2 
 This debate was broken up into 76 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 




by: the Questioner in 1.32% of the pairs, Bush in 15.79% of the pairs, and Gore in 1.32% 
of the pairs.  In 81.58% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 77a and 77b.    
 
Table 77a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Gore-Bush debate #2. 
 
Questioner                       =  01.32% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  15.79% 
Gore (VP)                        =  01.32% 




Table 77b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 40 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 41 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 







PR 3 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 42 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 








PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 43 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush Praise   
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 44 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 45 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 46 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 47 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 48 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Bush Criticize Bush None 
Gore Defend   
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 49 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 50 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 51 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 




Bush Praise Gore None 
Gore None   
Bush2 None   
  
  
PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 52 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 53 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 54 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 55 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 56 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 18 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 57 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Criticize 
  
  
PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 58 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 59 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 60 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 









PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 61 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush Criticize 
  
  
PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 62 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 63 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 64 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
  
PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 65 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Gore None 
  
  
PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 66 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore Criticize Bush None 
  
  
PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 67 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 68 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 69 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 








PR 31 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 70 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 32 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 71 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 33 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 72 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 34 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 73 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 35 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 74 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 36 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 75 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 37 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 76 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
Bush None 
PR 38 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. Gore2 None 
Questioner None Bush2 None 
Bush None Gore3 None 
  
  
PR 39 Discussion of Clinton/Admin.   
Questioner None   






Gore-Bush 2000 Debate #3 
 This debate was broken up into 30 prompt-response pairs.  Of these pairs, results 
show that Clinton/administration was brought up in 9 pairs, and was initially prompted 
by: the Questioner in 0% of the pairs, Bush in 13.33% of the pairs, and Gore in 16.67% 
of the pairs.  In 70% of the pairs, no one brought it up.  See Tables 78a and 78b.    
 
Table 78a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in the Gore-Bush debate #3. 
 
Questioner                       =  00.00% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  13.33% 
Gore (VP)                        =  16.67% 




Table 78b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #3. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore Praise 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 









Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None Bush Criticism 
Bush 2 None   
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush Criticize   
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 










PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Neutral Bush None 
Questioner2 Neutral Gore None 
Gore None   
Bush 2 None   
  
  
PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore Praise 
Gore Praise Bush Criticism 
Bush2 None   
Gore2 None   
Bush3 Criticism   
Gore3 None   
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Gore None 
Gore Neutral Bush None 
 
 
C.  Are certain responses characteristic of certain prompts?  
When the questioner or the opponent brings up the president/administration, they 
are prompting the vice president to discuss the subject.  This question can point us to 




For example, if the questioner or the opponent were to make a criticism, or even a critical 
inquiry, about the president/administration, we want to know if the vice president refutes 
it or ignores it.  If he refutes it, does he do it by praising, defending, minimizing or using 
neutral terms about the president/administration?  Or does the vice president 
acknowledge and accept the criticism? 
There were some discernable patterns in the vice president’s responses to 
prompts.  In 1960, when a questioner or Kennedy would prompt the topic of 
Eisenhower/administration, Nixon would almost always respond with a praise, defense or 
neutral statement.  In 1984, when Reagan would prompt the topic of 
Carter/administration, which he did often, Mondale would almost always ignore these 
prompts by not responding about Carter/administration.  Similarly, when the questioner 
would prompt the topic of Carter/administration, Mondale ignored these prompts as well.  
In both 1988 presidential debates, if the questioner made a neutral statement about 
Reagan/administration, George H. W. Bush would often respond by praising 
Reagan/administration, but often he would not respond to Dukakis’ criticisms of 
Reagan/administration.  In the first debate in 2000, George W. Bush used 9 of his 
speaking turns to criticize Clinton/administration.  In every case, Gore did not respond 
with a comment about Clinton/administration, except for one instance, which was 
“undeterminable” by coders.  In the second debate in 2000, George W. Bush praised 
Clinton/administration in 7 speaking turns, criticized Clinton/administration in 4 speaking 
turns, and used one of his speaking turns to make neutral comments about 




about Clinton/administration.  In the third debate, Gore responded to Bush’s criticisms 
more often. 
 
D.  Do the answers to subquestions A, B, and C differ election to election? 
 Yes, while Nixon (1960) and Bush (1988) often discussed their respective 
presidents/administrations in their debates, Mondale (1984) and Gore (2000) did so far 
more rarely.  In 1960, Nixon would often praise or defend Eisenhower/administration, 
and would bring it up on his own at least as often as the Questioner or Kennedy would 
prompt it, and in the fourth debate, brought it up more often than either the Questioner or 
Kennedy.  In 1988, George H.W. Bush would often praise Reagan/administration, but in 
the first debate, Dukakis was more often the initial prompter, whereas is the second 
debate, H. W. Bush was more often the initial prompter.  Mondale virtually never 
mentioned Carter/administration, even when the Questioner or Reagan would prompt it.  
In the first and second debate in 2000, Gore almost never mentioned 
Clinton/administration, even though his opponent George W. Bush prompted it most of 
the time.  Coders also determined that Gore criticized Clinton/administration in Debate 
#2, something no other vice president did across any of their ads, speeches and debate 
statements.  In the third debate, however, Gore began to discuss Clinton/administration 
much more often with praise, and was most often the initial prompter of the topic.  In 
fact, in the third debate, Gore even made a point of responding to a question Bush 
repeatedly asked in the first debate – “Why haven’t they done it?”  Gore also praised 





Chapter 5: Discussion 
 This study has looked at the unique rhetorical situation facing vice presidents who 
run for president.  I used a content analysis to systematically determine how each vice 
president negotiated their association with their president/administration.  This study will 
now turn to a discussion of the results. 
 
Finding #1: Nixon (1960) strongly aligned with Eisenhower/administration more 
than any other vice president. 
 Because Eisenhower was popular, we would expect Nixon to discuss him often in 
1960.  Nixon did so in all of the communication channels studied here – ads, speeches 
and debates.  In stark contrast to the other vice presidents, Nixon is the only one to devote 
a substantial number of ads to discussing his president/administration, doing so in five 
out of eight (62.5%) of his ads studied here.  That Nixon discussed and depicted 
Eisenhower/administration in most of his television ads may be a particularly strong sign 
of his desire to align himself with Eisenhower/administration.  This is because ads (like 
speeches, but unlike debates) are in the direct control of the candidate’s campaign, and 
therefore the content reflects a more conscious choice. 
 Nixon mentioned Eisenhower/administration often in his speeches, including 
doing so in 100% of the speech units in a televised speech he gave a day before Election 
Day.  Nixon’s heavy praising of Eisenhower/administration in this speech (83.33% of his 
speech units), suggests that he felt that reaffirming his association with 




presumably, a candidate would use what he thought were his most effective arguments in 
the final days of the campaign.   
During all four debates, Nixon often praised Eisenhower/administration, and often 
brought it up without being prompted by a questioner or Kennedy.  In fact, the results 
show that as the debates went on, Nixon was increasingly the one who would be the first 
to bring up Eisenhower/administration.  In the third debate, Nixon was just as often the 
first one to bring up Eisenhower/administration in the prompt-response pair, as was the 
questioner or Kennedy.  In the fourth debate, Nixon was most often the initial prompter, 
bringing up Eisenhower/administration in 42.86% of the prompt-response pairs.  This 
trend toward more initial prompting of Eisenhower/administration as the debates went on 
provides further support that Nixon chose to strongly align himself with 
Eisenhower/administration.   
Nixon may also have felt the need to strongly associate himself with the popular 
Eisenhower/administration to repair any perceived political damage resulting from 
Eisenhower’s remark at the press conference – “If you give me a week I might think of 
one.  I don't remember," – in response to a question about which of Nixon’s ideas he had 
adopted.  Nixon may have felt the need to counteract the negative effect of this statement, 
as it was used against him in a television ad for Kennedy, brought up in the first 
presidential debate by one of panelists, and widely quoted in the newspapers.  In fact, one 
of Nixon’s ads studied here titled Best Qualified – shows President Eisenhower giving a 
speech in front of a cheering crowd, with large pictures of Nixon and his running mate 
Henry Cabot Lodge hanging behind him.  Eisenhower provides a solid endorsement of 




popularity, his endorsement of Nixon, and praising of Nixon’s knowledge could help 
further Nixon’s image as a capable leader who is intelligent – a trait that Sigel (1966) and 
Nimmo and Mansfield (1985, cited in Hellweg, 2004) found to be important for a 
presidential candidate.    
History.com (2013) reports that this ad was designed to repair the damage done 
by Eisenhower’s comment at the press briefing.  Nixon may also have felt it necessary to 
stress his association with Eisenhower, in lieu of the president’s inability to campaign for 
him due to poor health.  Whatever his exact motivation, these results show that in trying 
to achieve a balance between loyalty and independence, Nixon tilted strongly toward 
loyalty.  By often citing the record of the Eisenhower administration in various ads, 
speeches and debates, Nixon may have helped himself by establishing the image of 
competence, a trait that image scholars McCroskey, Jensen, and Todd (1972, cited in 
Hellweg, 2004), and Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986, cited in Hellweg, 2004) 
found to be important for political candidates.  But Nixon’s strong reinforcement of his 
association to Eisenhower may also have worked to suggest that he couldn’t stand on his 
own.  This may have compromised his ability to establish the image traits of strength and 
independence – traits that scholars Sigel (1966) and Nimmo and Savage (1976) said the 
public values in a president.  
 
Finding #2: Nixon (1960) defended his president more than any other vice president. 
 Nixon defended his president/administration far more often than other vice 
presidents did theirs, doing so in the debates and in many of his speeches.  Because of the 
argumentative nature of debates, one might expect Nixon to defend 




and speech units in his opening and closing statements.  In doing so, Nixon was 
exhibiting the qualities of a good debater.  Yet, Nixon defended 
Eisenhower/administration in 6.49% of the units in his five speeches studied here.  To put 
this in comparative perspective, there was not a single instance in which any other vice 
president defended their president/administration in their speeches studied here.  In his 
speeches, Nixon would bring up an attack made by one of his critics about 
Eisenhower/administration and then refute it.  For example in one of the speeches studied 
here, Nixon brings up and refutes an attack made by Kennedy that America has not been 
progressing during the Eisenhower years:   
… some of you may have heard the stories that have been going around a great 
deal to the effect, particularly in speeches by our opponents, that America has 
been standing still for the last seven and a half years.  We haven't been moving.  
Oh we're not moving.  We've got to get going again and the way to get going 
again, they say give us the reins and we will cross the new frontiers. . . .Listen, 
anybody that says America has been standing still for the last seven years hasn't 
been traveling in America.  He's been traveling someplace else or he's got blinders 
on, one of the two.  I ask you to judge for yourself.  Travel around this country.  
Look at the new developments.  Look at the new schools, the new highways. 
(1960, Annenberg CD-ROM)    
While Nixon does refute his opponent’s charge, he also repeats the charge more than 
once, giving it salience.   
Nixon’s use of defense in his speeches was an unexpected finding, because in 




debates.  Nixon’s approach seems consistent with James David Barber’s (1972) 
description of his rhetorical style: “Nixon lives in a fighting world; his writing and 
speaking are full of the imagery of combat.  He sees himself as forever engaged in 
battles…” (p. 363). 
Nixon’s large use of defense may have created a problem for his campaign, as he 
may have spent too much time on his opponent’s ground.  Benoit and Airne (2005) note 
three drawbacks for a candidate when they employ defense: 
They make the candidate appear reactive rather than proactive.  Given that one 
usually is attacked over one's weaknesses, defenses are likely to take a candidate 
off-message. Furthermore, one must identify an attack to refute it.  This means 
that defending against an attack may remind or inform voters of an alleged 
weakness. (p. 227) 
Being reactive and being off message certainly runs counter to the image of a leader that 
is capable of articulating a positive future vision.  And reminding voters of alleged 
weaknesses can certainly cast doubt on Nixon’s competence, an important candidate 
image trait discussed by McCroskey, Jensen, and Todd (1972, cited in Hellweg, 2004) 
and Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986, cited in Hellweg, 2004).       
 
Finding #3: Humphrey praised Johnson/administration, even as he arguably had 
good reasons to disassociate himself.   
Because Johnson was unpopular in 1968, we would expect that Humphrey would 
not discuss him often.  Yet, Humphrey praised Johnson in 20.29% of his speech units 
across all five of his speeches.  Humphrey praised Johnson more (27.27% of his speech 




his other speeches studied here.  At the Houston event, Humphrey explicitly reaffirmed 
his loyalty, saying that: “I have been, at least I have tried to be, and I will continue to be 
for all the years to come, his faithful friend, and during these months of his presidency, 
his loyal vice president, and proud of it” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  Humphrey also 
said of Johnson, “Thank God for such leadership” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  
Statements like these serve to reinforce his image as that of the subordinate, dutiful son, 
or traditional wife.  Doing so, however, makes some sense because Johnson was present 
at the event, it was Johnson’s home state, and Humphrey needed Texas to win the 
election.  While it probably helped him win Texas, national media coverage of the event 
may have reinforced Humphrey’s connection to an unpopular president, and could have 
hurt him in other parts of the country.   
Humphrey’s choices to praise Johnson and reaffirm his association with the 
Johnson administration seems to have been affected by the rhetorical constraints he 
faced, including his fear of rebuke by Johnson, his concern that U.S. troops and the peace 
process could be put at risk if he spoke too strongly against Vietnam, and his personal 
feelings about Johnson.  Recall that he was reportedly “heartbroken” at the prospect of 
breaking from Johnson and said that he would rather lose the election than allow the 
appearance that he was turning against his president (Goldstein, 1997).  White (1969) 
aptly summarized Humphrey’s constraints: “[He] could not attack his own 
administration—nor did he dare defend the issue before the electorate and the divided 





In reinforcing his association with Johnson, Humphrey may have left himself 
open to the perception that he was weak, dependent on Johnson, and unable to take a firm 
stand on an important issue.  As a result, he compromises his ability to establish an image 
of someone who is strong, independent and capable of taking a firm stand – three traits 
that Sigel (1966), Nimmo and Savage (1976) and Nimmo and Mansfield (1985) say the 
public values in a president. 
 
Finding #4: Humphrey’s break from Johnson in his Salt Lake City speech may not 
have been as strong as some commentators might believe.   
Humphrey’s Salt Lake City address, delivered on September 30, 1968 has been 
judged by scholars and other political observers as the one when he distanced himself 
from Johnson’s policy on Vietnam.  For instance, scholar Bernard Brock (1969) asserted 
that in this speech, Humphrey “outlined his present stand on Vietnam, a policy that 
appeared to differ significantly from the administration’s” (p. 34).  Also, many other 
observers, including the previously cited Benedetto (1999), Kuttner (2000), and the July 
23, 1984 editorial by the Christian Science Monitor titled “Mondale’s America” made the 
same assertion, and followed it with the argument that had Humphrey broken from 
Johnson earlier in the campaign he would have won the election.  The results of this 
study show that these observations are perhaps over simplified to some extent.  
Humphrey did create more space between himself and the president by shedding 
his traditional vice-presidential seal, and introducing himself not as the vice president, but 
as a “citizen and as a candidate for president of the United States” (1968, Annenberg CD-




and a leader, two traits that presidential candidate image scholars note are important.  
Because vice presidents are seen as lacking the traits of independence and leadership, it 
was imperative that Humphrey do this.  He says that “For the past four years, I have 
spoken my mind about Vietnam, frankly and without reservation, in the cabinet and in the 
National Security Council--and directly to the president” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  
After saying that he would continue to support Johnson for the remainder of the 
president’s term, Humphrey signals a break from Johnson by saying “But 112 days from 
now, there will be a new president … a new administration and new advisers” (1968, 
Annenberg CD-ROM).  He says the new president will make a “complete reassessment” 
of the policy toward Vietnam, and that “As president, I would be willing to stop the 
bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe it could lead to 
success in the negotiations and a shorter war” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM). 
But in some ways, this speech can also be seen as a validation of Johnson’s 
Vietnam policy.  For one thing, Humphrey still made the point of praising Johnson in 
8.33% of the units in this speech.  Humphrey praised the accomplishments of Johnson’s 
Vietnam policy, saying that “other nations of Southeast Asia—given the time we have 
bought for them—have strengthened themselves” and that in South Vietnam, a 
“constitution has been written…elections have been stepped up…and the South 
Vietnamese Army has increased its size and capacity, and improved its equipment, 
training and performance” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  Humphrey concluded this 
section of the speech by saying that “in contrast to a few months ago—we see peace 
negotiations going on.  We see a stronger Southeast Asia.  We see a stronger South 




administration, Humphrey is making a case for the Johnson administration’s success.  In 
this sense, Humphrey appeared to be running on the record of the Johnson administration.     
Humphrey used these successes of the administration as the basis for what choices 
he would make, if elected president.  Humphrey called for a “de-Americanization of the 
war” and that this can be possible next year “if the South Vietnamese Army maintains its 
present rate of improvement” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  Humphrey implies that we 
are in a position to bring troops home, because of the “present rate of improvement,” 
which can be seen as an accomplishment of the administration’s Vietnam policy.  In 
addition, Johnson had already been working toward a “de-americanization of the war” as 
he had called for in his March 31 resignation speech (Solberg, 1984).  So Humphrey’s 
campaign for president can be seen as an effort to accomplish the unfinished business of 
the Johnson administration.  Johnson’s eventual bombing halt on October 31, 1968, to 
start the peace talks may have functioned as evidence to support the claims Humphrey 
made in this address about the administration’s accomplishments.  Some people may 
have gone to the polls in 1968 to vote for Humphrey because he would symbolize the 
fruition of Johnson’s efforts rather than the repudiation of these efforts. 
Second, Humphrey’s position can be seen as consistent with the Johnson 
administration’s position that a bombing halt can only occur if the North Vietnamese 
agree to a reciprocal military suspension.  At first, Humphrey appeared to be offering 
something new when he said: 
As president, I would stop the bombing of the North as an acceptable risk for 




shorten the war.  This would be the best protection for our troops. (1968, 
Annenberg CD-ROM) 
This sounded straightforward and became a signal for many anti-war Democrats to rally 
around Humphrey.  But Humphrey went on to suggest what could be interpreted as a 
conditional pledge to halt the bombing.  He said, 
In weighing that risk—and before taking action—I would place key importance 
on evidence—direct or indirect—by deed or word—of Communist willingness to 
restore the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam.  Now if the 
government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I would reserve the right to 
resume the bombing (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM). 
How was this different from the Johnson administration’s standard position?  By saying 
he “would place importance on key evidence…of Communist willingness,” he is 
imposing a condition of reciprocity onto North Vietnam, just as Johnson demanded 
reciprocity as a condition for halting the bombing as well.   
Also, Humphrey noted the penalty for non-compliance.  If Hanoi shows “bad 
faith” then the bombing will resume – consistent with Johnson’s resumptions of bombing 
on previous occasions.  Humphrey continued to call for reciprocity when he said, “We 
can bring our forces home from South Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese agree to bring 
theirs home at the same time” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  Thus, Humphrey continues 
to place conditions on the ending of the war.  Humphrey may have been deliberately 
ambiguous to send different messages to different audiences.  He may have intended to 
send one message to anti-war Democrats that he shared their views and would bring 




unswerving” loyalty pledge to Johnson and allow Johnson to have the maximum possible 
leverage during the Paris peace talks.   
Humphrey’s bombing halt proposal was consistent with Johnson’s policy during 
the past year.  For instance, in the summer of 1967, in a plan called the “San Antonio” 
formula, Johnson offered a limited bombing pause in exchange for peace talks.  Also, in 
March of 1968, according to Pentagon Paper #134, the administration announced a plan 
to remove a large portion of land in North Vietnam from the bombing campaign, and if 
North Vietnam reciprocated with a military reduction of their own, a full and total 
bombing halt might follow (Sheehan, 1971).  In both of these efforts, North Vietnam 
refused to accept the conditions of reciprocity.  Humphrey’s bombing halt proposal was 
similar in that it called for reciprocity from North Vietnam, and therefore is consistent 
with Johnson’s policy.               
Evidence from different sources suggested that the speech was not a significant 
break from Johnson.  First, North Vietnam said that Humphrey’s position was “nothing 
new” from the Johnson administration as he was calling for the same conditions of 
reciprocity, and dismissed it as a campaign maneuver (Smith, 1968, p. 1).  Second, 
Johnson administration officials had said privately that Humphrey had not made a 
significant break from administration policy (Gwertzman, 1968).  Johnson also privately 
told Senator Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois) in a phone call that Humphrey’s position was 
not a significant divergence from the administration.  Johnson said, “It interpreted, I 
think—a literal interpretation would show there's no great difference in our present 
policy. I think his intention is to try to do that without and still leave the impression that 




of balancing loyalty with independence was to stick closely to Johnson’s policy, but 
create the appearance that he was breaking from the policy.    
Third, when asked to clarify his position in post-speech interviews, Humphrey 
was ambiguous and evasive, saying: 
What I have said is my position.  I haven’t tried to equate positions with the 
Administration or with the critics.  If this happens to agree with some parts of 
Administration policy, well and good; if it disagrees, that’s the way it has to be.  
If it agrees with some position somebody else has taken, well and good; if it 
disagrees, so be it.  I can’t outguess the newspapers, the columnists, the 
Administration, and Hanoi—I just can’t outguess them. (Apple, 1968, p. 26)  
Humphrey’s rebuttal may have functioned to convey his independence from Johnson, his 
critics, and North Vietnam.  Again, he invites the audience to see him as an independent 
person.  In addition, his ambiguity both in the speech and in his rebuttal statement may 
have functioned to keep both hawks and doves unclear as to what his ultimate decisions 
would be on Vietnam. 
Fourth, Eugene McCarthy, whose youth and anti-war constituency was the 
support that Humphrey badly needed, did not think Humphrey’s position was a break 
from Johnson.  He said Humphrey’s remarks in the Salt Lake city speech were “good 
openers for twenty-five cent poker” and added that he did not consider it a “significant 
move from Johnson” (Eisele, 1972, p. 393).  Thus, while Humphrey's speech may have 
benefited him politically, by rallying the liberal base, and by helping establish the image 
traits of independence, leadership, and strength, his position on Vietnam was very much 





Finding #5: Nixon’s 1968 campaign contrasted with his 1960 campaign in how he 
discussed Eisenhower/administration.  
 In his 1968 campaign, Nixon seemed to take an opposite approach from his 1960 
campaign, in terms of how he negotiated his relationship with Eisenhower/administration.  
In his 1960 speeches, Nixon often discussed Eisenhower/administration.  In 1968, he 
rarely discussed Eisenhower/administration, except for a brief mention in his nomination 
acceptance address, and a lengthy mention in one particular speech: a Washington DC 
address on CBS radio in October, when he praised Eisenhower/administration often 
(26.67% of his speech units).   
Similarly, Nixon’s 1968 television ads were also fundamentally different from his 
1960 television ads.  Nixon often discussed or depicted Eisenhower in his 1960 television 
ads, but never did so in his 1968 television ads.  In 1968, as a former vice president, 
Nixon did not have to answer for the Eisenhower-Nixon administration.  Because of the 
high profile problems in the country, including the Vietnam War and rising crime and 
rioting in urban areas, Nixon may have decided that staying on the offensive and 
attacking his opponent’s record would be a better way to campaign.  This approach was 
in contrast to his more defensive style in 1960.  Having run as a sitting vice president 
himself only eight years prior, Nixon may have understood better than most what 
arguments might be most effective against incumbent vice president Humphrey.  Also, 
because presidential debates were not held in 1968, Nixon did not have to face direct 






Finding #6: Mondale hardly mentioned Carter/administration. 
In his 1984 campaign, Mondale never mentioned Carter/administration in the 
television ads studied here.  Of the five speeches studied here, Mondale discussed 
Carter/administration in three speeches, albeit minimally.  Two of the three speeches 
were the announcement and the nomination acceptance address, where mentioning 
Carter/administration makes some sense because these two speeches are at least 
somewhat more geared toward Democratic Party audiences.  
During the debates, Mondale made a neutral comment about Carter/administration 
in one of his turns in the first debate, but did not discuss Carter/administration at all in the 
second debate.  Even as Reagan criticized Carter/administration several times, Mondale 
never defended Carter.  Mondale’s refusal to discuss Carter/administration in the debates, 
even when the questioner or Reagan brought Carter/administration up (which they did 14 
times across both debates), indicates a strong desire on Mondale’s part to keep the focus 
off his own connection to Carter/administration.  His approach makes sense because of 
the unpopularity of the Carter administration.  Because Mondale was not a sitting vice 
president in 1984, he may have thought it unnecessary to be loyal to 
Carter/administration, and could instead concentrate his attacks on Reagan’s record.  In 
doing so, Mondale helps establish his independence, an important candidate image trait.  
Also, as competence and strength are important candidate image traits, Mondale also 
mitigates the perception of incompetence and weakness by directing attention away from 
his past association with the Carter administration.   




Finding #7: Bush demonstrated a more balanced approach than other vice 
presidents in terms of the way he negotiated his relationship with President Reagan.   
Like Nixon in 1960, George H. W. Bush discussed Reagan/administration often in 
1988.  Doing so made sense, because Reagan, like Eisenhower, was a popular president.  
H. W. Bush praised Reagan/administration fairly often in the speeches.  He heavily 
praised Reagan in his election week speech at Notre Dame University (in 21.43% of the 
speech units) suggesting that he thought aligning himself with Reagan/administration was 
one of his best arguments for his candidacy and/or because the speech was being given in 
Indiana, a conservative state where Reagan most certainly was popular.  H. W. Bush also 
praised Reagan/administration very often in the debates, and in the second debate, did so 
more often on his own, rather than when others prompted him, suggesting a strong 
willingness to align himself with Reagan/administration.       
Unlike Nixon in 1960, however, Bush did not discuss Reagan/administration in 
any of his television ads, and depicted him in only one television ad.   
We can speculate on some reasons why Bush chose not to use his ads to convey 
his association with his president/administration.  First, Bush had many advantages 
coming in to the 1988 election, including a strong economy and the unequivocal backing 
of a popular sitting president, and the administration’s foreign policy accomplishments, 
particularly with U.S.-Soviet relations.  These advantages may have given Bush 
flexibility in his rhetorical choices.  He could be more selective in determining how to 
use his speeches, ads and debates to craft a balance between associating himself with 
Reagan/administration and cultivating a more independent persona.  This balance has to 




cited scholars including Natoli (1985), Goldstein (1997), and Kincade (2000).  Also, as 
Sigel (1966) found, independence is among the top three traits that the public believes a 
president should possess.  Bush may have chosen to use his 30 and 60 second ads to 
cultivate a positive and independent image of himself (and cultivate a negative image of 
his opponent), and use his speeches and debates to discuss his association with 
Reagan/administration, as these formats would accord him more time.       
 Second, because ad production techniques had substantially improved since 1960, 
Bush had more options about how to use ads than Nixon did in 1960.  West (1997) points 
out that while ads in the 1950’s were rudimentary and often of the “talking head” style, 
more recent ads are much more visually exciting, using catchy visuals, color and sound.     
For instance, one of Bush’s ads titled, Family/Children, plays soft background 
music, and shows George Bush hugging and playing with his grandchildren.  The ad 
opens with one of the grandkids running in slow motion.  His wife, Barbara Bush talks 
about her husband, saying,  
I wish people could see him as I see him.  Thousands of people see him, and you 
know, I always loved the time someone said to George, ‘How can you run for 
president – you don’t have any constituency!’ and George said, ‘Well, you know, 
I’ve got a great big family, and thousands of friends,’ and that’s what he has!   
Then as pictures of Bush appear on screen – as a young WWII soldier, as U.N. 
ambassador, and as he takes the oath of office for vice president and in other settings – a 
male announcer says,  
For more than forty years, George Bush has met every challenge his country and 




Bush, the more you realize that perhaps no one in this century is better prepared to 
be President of the United States. 
Bush’s depiction of family in his ads helps him establish his likability, an image trait that 
Roberts (1981) and Smith (1990) argued is important for president candidates to possess.  
Also, recall that West (1997) and Trent and Friedenberg (2004) noted that images of 
family in television ads can help candidates establish a positive image because pictures 
carry a more powerful emotional weight than the spoken word.   
    Bush also used many of his ads to attack opponent Michael Dukakis.  One of the 
most famous of these is the Revolving Door ad, which was analyzed in this study.  This 
ad combined images of prisoners going through a revolving door and prison guards 
armed with guns, along with ominous sounds of clanging metal to create a “soft on 
crime” image of Dukakis.  By cultivating an image of Dukakis as weak, this ad may have 
serve to establish Bush’s strength in comparison, because as Hellweg and Dionisopoulous 
(1989) noted, a candidate’s image is assessed in comparison to others, like their 
opponent.  And as Sigel (1966) found, strength is an image trait that the public values in a 
candidate.   
In the one ad that includes a depiction of Reagan, Bush skillfully aligns himself 
with Reagan, while also establishing his independence, leadership and strength, three 
important image traits.  The ad titled, Gorbachev, opens showing Bush shaking hands 
with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, with Reagan standing to the side smiling.  All 
three men are standing in front of the south side of the White House.  Then the camera 
zooms in on Bush and Gorbachev, excluding Reagan from the frame.  This ad allows 




positive feelings from Reagan – including perceptions of his image as a leader -- onto 
Bush.  Also, by showcasing Bush with the Soviet leader, Bush elevates his stature, and 
suggests that he has the strength and gravitas to be president, as Sigel (1966) argued was 
important.  With the image of the White House as a backdrop, and Bush’s firm 
handshake and serious look, this ad makes Bush appear presidential.  In doing so, this ad 
helps Bush shed the “lapdog” and “wimp” image.  This ad was also thematically 
consistent with a point Bush made in his nomination acceptance address when he said our 
nation was at a “watershed” moment in our relations with the Soviet Union, and posed 
the question, “when you have to change horses in midstream, doesn't it make sense to 
switch to the one who's going the same way?” (1988, Annenberg CD-ROM).  The 
thematic consistency supports the notion that Bush has integrity, an important image trait 
that Nimmo and Savage (1976), Nimmo and Mansfield (1985, cited in Hellweg, 2004) 
and Miller, Wattenberg and Malanchuk (1986, cited in Hellweg, 2004) argue were 
important. 
  
Finding #8: Gore broke strongly from Clinton/administration throughout his 
campaign, but reconnected himself in the final debate. 
 In 2000, Gore made no mention of Clinton/administration in his ads, and rarely 
did so in the speeches.  In the first and second debate, Gore never praised 
Clinton/administration, defended only once, and even minimized once.  In the first debate 
in 2000, George W. Bush used 9 of his speaking turns to criticize Clinton/administration.  
In every case, Gore did not respond with a comment about Clinton/administration, except 




Gore minimized Clinton/administration in one of his speaking turns.  In the second 
debate in 2000, George W. Bush praised Clinton/administration in 7 speaking turns, 
criticized Clinton/administration in 4 speaking turns, and used one of his speaking turns 
to make neutral comments about Clinton/administration.  In every case, except one where 
he defended Clinton/administration, Gore did not respond with a comment about 
Clinton/administration.  Gore also made the point of criticizing the Clinton administration 
in one of his speaking turns.  Also, Gore never mentioned Clinton’s name at any time 
during all three debates.   
 While it’s understandable that Gore would personally distance himself from 
Clinton because of the Lewinsky scandal, one might expect he would discuss the 
administration’s record more often, as Clinton’s job approval rating was high, and there 
were many achievements to cite such as the strong job growth, projected budget 
surpluses, welfare reform, crime reduction, and peace in Bosnia and Northern Ireland.  At 
a minimum, one might expect that Gore would defend the Clinton administration record 
from his opponent’s attacks, because he was a member of the administration.   
 Gore’s failure to praise or defend Clinton may have been an attempt on his part to 
distance himself from Clinton, and therefore, distance himself from the Clinton scandals.  
Additionally, however, Gore may have chosen a strategy of staying on the offensive and 
attacking Bush, rather than be on the defensive by rebutting attacks against 
Clinton/administration.  Also, this data reveals that Gore’s approach in his ads, speeches, 
and first two debates was in line with the strategy of focusing on the future, which his 




Gore failed to gain poll traction when he would cite the Clinton administration’s 
accomplishments.        
In the third debate however, Gore’s discussion of Clinton/administration shot up 
considerably.  He praised Clinton/administration in 17.24% of his speaking turns, 
discussed Clinton/administration neutrally in 3.45% of his speaking turns, and praised 
Clinton/administration in 25% of the speech units in his closing statement.  Also, in the 
third debate, Gore was most often the first one to bring up Clinton/administration within 
the prompt-response pair.  In the third debate, Gore began responding to a criticism by 
George W. Bush about Clinton/administration that he made been making since the first 
debate held two weeks earlier.  Bush repeatedly charged that Clinton and Gore had failed 
to keep promises made on issues like prescription drugs for seniors, Social Security, 
Medicare, and promoting a bipartisan climate in Washington.  In the first debate, Gore 
chose not to rebut these charges.  But when Bush made the same charge in the third 
debate, Gore jumped at the opportunity to respond, saying: “Hey, I've got to answer that, 
Jim.  Medicare -- I cast the tie-breaking vote to add 26 years to the life of Medicare. It 
was due to go bankrupt in 1999…” (2000, Commission on Presidential Debates). 
 Later in the debate: Gore made a similar response saying that:  
I am a person who keeps promises.  And, you know, we've heard a lot about -- 
from the governor about not much being done in the last eight years, as if the 
promises that I made eight years ago have not been kept.  I think the record shows 
otherwise.  We have gone from the biggest deficits eight years ago to the biggest 
surpluses in history today.  Instead of high unemployment, we now have the 




measured. 22 million new jobs, very low unemployment nationally.  Instead of 
ballooning the debt and multiplying it four times over, we have seen the debt 
actually begun to be paid down. (2000, Commission on Presidential Debates)   
 While Gore is citing the Clinton administration’s record, it’s interesting to note 
that in both of these two examples, Gore discusses it in terms of what he did – the vote he 
cast, and the promises he made, rather than discuss Clinton’s role in it.  This tactic may 
be an attempt to get credit for Clinton administration accomplishments, but also strike an 
independent chord in order to craft the image of a leader.  In this way, Gore is attempting 
to solve the challenges that Kincade noted earlier – the need for a vice president to 
demonstrate independence, claim credit for administration achievements (but avoid the 
taint of scandals), and also demonstrate their independence.  These are also image traits 
that several scholars including Sigel (1966), Nimmo and Mansfield (1985) and 
McCroskey, Jensen and Todd (1972) noted are important ones for presidential candidates 
to possess.  Also, by stressing that “I am a person who keeps promises,” Gore is 
attempting to establish his integrity, another candidate image trait that Nimmo and 
Savage (1976) found to be an important one.  This effort may have been especially 
important for Gore, because of Bush’s attack that Gore was prone to reinventing himself. 
 Gore’s greater praising of Clinton/administration in the third debate, and the fact 
that he brought up Clinton/administration more often on his own without being prompted, 
and brought this topic up more than the questioner or his opponent, was in marked 
contrast to the first two debates, where he rarely discussed Clinton/administration, even 
when he was prompted numerous times by the questioner or his opponent.  These 




because, as previously discussed in the historical/contextual review, his first two debate 
performances were viewed poorly, and he was losing ground in the polls so late in the 
election cycle. 
 Gore’s choice to almost never discuss Clinton/administration in his ads, speeches 
and debates (except for the final debate) may have been viewed as incongruent with the 
role Gore played as vice president for eight years, when he often praised and defended 
Clinton, even during the controversial impeachment process.  Gore’s fluctuations, 
affirming, disavowing, and then reaffirming Clinton/administration may have bolstered a 
negative characterization of him by the media and his opponent George W. Bush – that 
he was somebody who was prone to reinventing himself, and would say or do anything to 
become president.  This perception of Gore implied that he not only lacked integrity, but 
also strength, two important candidate image traits.    
 Concerns about Gore’s authenticity and honesty may have affected his ability to 
cultivate a positive public image.  These problems partly stemmed from his association 
with the truth-challenged Clinton administration.  Recall that Trent, Short-Thompson, 
Mongeau, Nusz, and Trent (2001) found that honesty, talking about the nation’s 
problems, and having high moral character were highly ranked categories by the public 
across the presidential elections of 1988 through 2000, and that the image categories of 
having high moral character and faithfulness to one’s spouse were found to be 
increasingly important across these elections.  This finding may be a result of contextual 
factors such as the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, and Clinton’s impeachment during the 
1990’s.  Thus, Clinton’s scandals may have primed the public to focus more heavily on 




the campaign may have been viewed more negatively in this election climate, than they 
otherwise might have been had Gore not been Clinton’s vice president, or had he run for 
president in a different election year.  
 
Finding #9: Vice presidents generally use the nomination acceptance speech to 
break from the president/administration.   
Each vice president discussed their president/administration in differing amounts 
across the speeches, ads and debates studied here.  The nomination speech was one 
constant in which it was observed that vice presidents make a point of praising their 
president, and signaling some kind of break with them, in which they establish their 
independence and state their own vision for the country.  This becomes a way to balance 
loyalty to the president with being “their own man.”  This section provides a look at how 
each vice president balanced their loyalty with their need to establish independence.  This 
analysis can point us to a way to apply genre analysis to understand how well future vice 
presidents are able to conduct this rhetorical move in their presidential nomination 
acceptance. 
While all vice presidents made a point of paying tribute to their 
president/administration, Nixon (1960), Mondale, Bush, and Gore were more explicit in 
signaling a break.  Humphrey was much more subtle and implicit.  In contrast, Nixon 
(1968) didn’t directly signal a break from Eisenhower.  Instead he mentioned Eisenhower 







Nixon said,  
It was only eight years ago that I stood in this very place after you had nominated 
as our candidate for the president, one of the great men of our century, and I say 
to you tonight that for generations to come Americans, regardless of party, will 
gratefully remember Dwight Eisenhower as the man who brought peace to 
America, as the man under whose leadership Americans enjoyed the greatest 
progress and prosperity in history, but above all they will remember him as the 
man who restored honesty, integrity and dignity to the conduct of government in 
the highest office of this land. (1960, Annenberg CD-ROM) 
 
Then Nixon cautiously starts to signal his independence from Eisenhower/administration.  
He says:  
 
My fellow Americans, I know now that you will understand what I next say 
because the next president of the United States will have his great example to 
follow; because the next president will have new and challenging problems in the 
world of utmost gravity.  This truly is the time for greatness in America's 
leadership.  First, we are proud to offer the best eight-year record of any 
administration in the history of this country.  But, my fellow Americans, that isn't 
all, and that isn't enough, because we happen to believe that a record is not 
something to stand on but something to build on, and building on the great record 
of this administration we shall build a better America.  We shall build an America 
in which we shall see the realization of the dreams, the dreams of millions of 
people not only in America but throughout the world for a fuller, freer, richer life 





While Nixon praises Eisenhower’s character and accomplishments, Nixon 
suggests that it “isn’t enough,” and that his presidency would do better.  In doing 
so, Nixon tries to establish himself as an independent figure, and one who has his 
own ideas, two image traits that Sigel (1966) found the public values in a 
president.    
 
Humphrey (1968) 
 In his convention speech, Humphrey’s break from Johnson was more implicit and 
subtle than the other vice presidents.  Like the others, Humphrey began by paying tribute 
to Johnson.  He said: 
And what we are doing is in the tradition of Lyndon B. Johnson, who rallied a 
grief-stricken nation when our leader was stricken by the assassin's bullet and said 
to you and said to me, and said to all the world, "Let us continue."  And in the 
space, and in the space of five years since that tragic moment, President Johnson 
has accomplished more of the unfinished business of America than any of his 
modern predecessors.  And I truly believe that history will surely record the 
greatness of his contribution to the people of this land.  And tonight to you, Mr. 
President, I say thank you.  Thank you, Mr. President. (1968, Annenberg CD-
ROM) 
Given Johnson’s unpopularity, Humphrey’s praise of Johnson was perhaps a bit too 
effusive.  Recall Goldstein’s (1982) observation that vice presidents often hurt their 




president.  Humphrey went on to cite three particular accomplishments of the Johnson 
administration: negotiating the nuclear test ban treaty and working toward a nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty; reaching an agreement to prevent the use of weapons in outer 
space; and getting America moving again by improving the standard of living (1968, 
Annenberg CD-ROM). 
  Humphrey then went on the make not-so-explicit statements to suggest that he 
would represent a break from Lyndon Johnson.  He said that this was “the end of an era 
and the beginning of a new day” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  About Vietnam, he said, 
“if there is any one lesson that we should have learned, it is that the policies of tomorrow 
need not be limited by the policies of yesterday (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  These 
statements may have been too weak and subtle for him to establish his independence 
from Johnson, and thus be “his own man.”  Not only did Humphrey fail to fulfill this 
expectation, but he also may have failed to use his convention speech to “get the party 
faithful to envision a broader, brighter, grander set of possibilities” (Hart 2000, p. 104).  
Hart (2000) noted that this is one of the purposes of a presidential nomination acceptance 
speech.     
 Perhaps unconsciously, Humphrey was attempting to declare he was his own man 
when he quoted the poet Thomas Wolfe: “to every man his chance, to every man 
regardless of his birth his shining golden opportunity, to every man the right to live and 
to work and be himself, and to become whatever thing his manhood and his vision can 
combine to make him. This is the promise of America” (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM).  
Moments later, in speaking about freedom from dictatorship, he said, “’Let me live my 




ROM).  Perhaps Humphrey was expressing his unconscious desire to be free from the 
burden of loyalty to Johnson.   
Of all the vice presidents who had to break from their president, Humphrey 
arguably had the most difficult set of circumstances.  Johnson was unpopular, yet 
Humphrey also had an obligation to the troops and didn’t want to undermine Johnson’s 
peace negotiation efforts by speaking too forcefully on how his policies might differ if he 
became president.    
 
George. H. W. Bush (1988) 
George H. W. Bush said,    
 For seven and a half years I have helped a president conduct the most difficult job 
on earth.  Ronald Reagan asked for, and received, my candor.  He never asked for, 
but he did receive, my loyalty.  Those of you who saw the president's speech this 
week, and listened to the simple truth of his words, will understand my loyalty all 
these years.  But now you must see me for what I am: the Republican candidate 
for president of the United States.  And now I turn to the American people to 
share my hopes and intentions, and why--and where--I wish to lead. (1988, 
Annenberg CD-ROM) 
Bush goes on to state his vision (“thing”): “I seek the presidency for a single purpose, a 
purpose that has motivated millions of Americans across the years and the ocean 
voyages.  I seek the presidency to build a better America.  It is that simple--and that big” 
(1988, Annenberg CD-ROM).  Bush then connects back to his association with Reagan: 




life is to complete the mission we started in 1980.  How do we complete it?  We build it” 
(1988, Annenberg CD-ROM). 
Like other vice presidents, Bush praises Reagan, and then makes the proverbial 
“I’m my own man” statements.  And just like Nixon, Bush says he seeks to “build a 
better America.”  Unlike Nixon and Gore, however, Bush doesn’t suggest that his 
presidency would outdo or make up for the current administration’s shortcomings.  He 
discusses it as a continuation of the Reagan revolution that started in 1980.  
 
Al Gore (1988) 
Gore’s break from his president was perhaps the clearest and most direct of all the 
sitting vice presidents in their nomination speeches.  After his wife Tipper introduces 
him, Al Gore passionately kisses her, in what many saw as a moment where he not only 
shed a stiff wooden image, but also showed that he wasn’t Bill Clinton, and would 
represent a departure from Clinton’s sexual scandals.  As he opens his speech, Gore 
speaks about his love for his wife, another subtle way to break from Clinton.  Gore then 
says: 
For almost eight years now, I've been the partner of a leader who moved us out of 
the valley of recession and into the longest period of prosperity in American 
history.  I say to you tonight: millions of Americans will live better lives for a 
long time to come because of the job that's been done by President Bill Clinton.  
Instead of the biggest deficits in history, we now have the biggest surpluses.  The 




losing jobs, we have 22 million new jobs. . . . And our progress on the economy is 
a good chapter in our history. (2000, pg# 12-18)  
Then Gore starts to disassociate himself and establish his independence: 
But now we turn the page and write a new chapter.  And that's what I want to 
speak about tonight. This election is not an award for past performance.  I'm not 
asking you to vote for me on the basis of the economy we have.  Tonight, I ask for 
your support on the basis of the better, fairer, more prosperous America we can 
build together. (2000, pg# 19-22). 
 
Gore’s citing of the Clinton economic record is potentially beneficial, as it can help him 
establish the image of competence.  But in attributing the economic success to the “job 
that’s been done by President Clinton,” Gore excludes himself from the frame.  In doing 
so, Gore may be losing the political benefits of the Clinton administration’s record.  On 
the other hand, his strong break from Clinton could help him establish the image trait of 
independence, and distance himself from the Clinton scandals.  By using the metaphor of 
a book, and turning the page and starting a new chapter, Gore firmly severs his 




 Mondale first started his transition from subordinate to superior by reintroducing 
himself to the American people: “I'm Walter Mondale.  You may have heard of me--but 
you may not really know me” (1984, Annenberg CD-ROM).  He went on to discuss his 




establish the presidential image traits of independence and strength, attributes that Sigel 
(1966) and Nimmo and Savage (1976) argued were important. 
 Mondale then briefly references his association with Carter, and then tries to 
frame the election around the future, not the past.  He said,  
 In 1976, an honest, caring man--Jimmy Carter--picked me as his running 
mate, and I was elected vice president.  And in 1980, Ronald Reagan beat the 
pants off us.  So tonight, I want to say something to those of you across our 
country who voted for Mr. Reagan--to Republicans, to Independents, and yes, to 
some Democrats: I heard you.  And our party heard you.  After we lost, we didn't 
tell the American people that they were wrong.  Instead, we began asking you 
what our mistakes had been.  For four years, I listened to the American people--all 
of you.  I traveled what seemed like every acre of America.  We are wiser, 
stronger, and focused on the future.  If Mr. Reagan wants to rerun the 1980 
campaign, fine.  Let them fight over the past.  We're fighting for the American 
future--and that's why we're going to win. (1984, Annenberg CD-ROM) 
 
Mondale praises Carter’s character traits of honesty and caring, perhaps linking himself 
to these traits in the process.  Then he seeks to establish his independence.  By saying that 
he spent the last four years listening to America, he cultivates the image of someone who 
is in touch rather than out of touch.  Knowing that Reagan’s strategy would be to link him 
to Carter, Mondale attempts to frame the election around the future, not the past.  This 
framing helps create a space in which he can establish his vision for the country, and take 
the offensive against Reagan’s record, rather than defend his involvement with the Carter 




election as being about the future, as the discourse about his campaign would be about 
the prospect of opening doors of future opportunity for women.     
 
Nixon (1968) 
 In his second presidential bid, Nixon did not discuss Eisenhower at all in his ads, 
and far less in his speeches than he did in 1960.  In his nomination acceptance speech, 
Nixon’s reference to Eisenhower was noteworthy.  He took a moment to connect himself 
to Eisenhower, but did not have a moment where signaled a break from him.  This 
approach was in contrast to the other vice presidents who followed a fairly tight pattern 
of praising the president, then signaling a break from him. Nixon said:  
We’re going to win for a number of reasons: first a personal one.  General 
Eisenhower, as you know, lies critically ill in the Walter Reed Hospital tonight.  I 
have talked, however, with Mrs. Eisenhower on the telephone.  She tells me that 
his heart is with us.  And she says that there is nothing that he lives more for and 
there is nothing that would lift him more than for us to win in November and I say 
let's win this one for Ike!  We are going to win because this great convention has 
demonstrated to the nation that the Republican party has the leadership, the 
platform and the purpose that America needs. (1968, Annenberg CD-ROM) 
By referring to him as “General,” Nixon avoids appearing like the subordinate 
and loyal vice president.  He also invites voters to remember that the hero of the Second 
World War, and the one who brought the Korean War to a ceasefire, was supporting him 
for president.  In doing so, Nixon invites voters to believe that he would be better able to 




ailing Eisenhower helps him establish the image of someone who has empathy, a trait 
that Nimmo and Savage (1976) found to be important for candidates. 
Perhaps because Nixon was now a former vice president, he didn’t feel the need 
to establish a break from the president he served with.  His eight-year removal from the 
vice presidency, may have helped him sufficiently establish his independence, enough so 
that he could safely and selectively reestablish his association with Eisenhower in a 
useful way.   
 
Finding #10: Nixon and Gore used minimizing as a way to “be their own man.” 
 Minimizing is one method in which vice presidents can establish their 
independence or disassociate themselves from the president/administration.  This helps 
them to position themselves as superiors instead of subordinates.  Any time a vice 
president downplayed the record of the administration, suggested it was insufficient, or 
suggested that his own presidency would produce better results, coders determined it to 
be a case of minimizing.   
 Nixon and Gore made the most use of minimizing as a way to negotiate their 
relationship with the president.  Nixon often minimized in the following ways:     
In his convention speech, he said:  
But, my fellow Americans, that isn't all, and that isn't enough, because we happen 
to believe that a record is not something to stand on but something to build on, 
and building on the great record of this administration we shall build a better 




 In his opening statement of the first debate, Nixon cited numerous 
accomplishments of the Eisenhower years.  Then he minimized the record by saying,  
But, good as this record is, may I emphasize it isn't enough. A record is never 
something to stand on. It's something to build on. And in building on this record, I 
believe that we have the secret for progress, we know the way to progress. And I 
think, first of all, our own record proves that we know the way. (1960, Annenberg 
CD-ROM). 
 In the prompt-response pair #8 in the third debate, Nixon answered a question 
about union laws in the following way: 
The record in handling them has been very good during this administration. We 
have had less man-hours lost by strikes in these last seven years than we had in 
the previous seven years, by a great deal. And I only want to say that however 
good the record is, it's got to be better. Because in this critical year - period of the 
sixties we've got to move forward, all Americans must move forward together, 
and we have to get the greatest cooperation possible between labor and 
management. We cannot afford stoppages of massive effect on the economy when 
we're in the terrible competition we're in with the Soviets. (1960, Commission on 
Presidential Debates).  
In this statement, Nixon was accepting the premise of Kennedy’s argument, that we have 
to “get America moving again” as Barone (1988) observed. 




Now the second point we have to understand is this, however.  America has not 
been standing still.  But America cannot stand pat.  We can't stand pat for the 
reason that we're in a race, as I've indicated.  We can't stand pat because it is 
essential with the conflict that we have around the world that we not just hold our 
own, that we not keep just freedom for ourselves.  It is essential that we extend 
freedom, extend it to all the world.  And this means more than what we've been 
doing.  It means keeping America even stronger militarily than she is.  It means 
seeing that our economy moves forward even faster than it has.  It means making 
more progress in civil rights than we have so that we can be a splendid example 
for all the world to see - a democracy in action at its best. (1960, Commission on 
Presidential Debates) 
 
 Like Nixon, Gore often minimized Clinton accomplishments as a way to show 
that his presidency would offer something new and better.  Gore would briefly cite 
certain administration accomplishments, but then put greater emphasis on how it wasn’t 
enough and that he would do more.  For example, in discussing the great economy in his 
convention speech, Gore declared, “And for all of our good times, I am not satisfied” 
(2000, pg# 28).  He said, 
Together, let’s make sure that our prosperity enriches not just the few, but all 
working families.  Let’s invent in health care, education, a secure retirement, and 
middle class tax cuts.  I'm happy that the stock market has boomed and so many 
businesses and new enterprises have done well. This country is richer and 




payments and car payments, working overtime to save for college and do right by 
their kids. . . .So often, powerful forces and powerful interests stand in your way, 
and the odds seemed stacked against you -- even as you do what's right for you 
and your family. (pg# 23-26) 
 Gore’s implies that the Clinton economy only benefits “the few,” and that he 
would broaden it to include “all working employees.”  By minimizing Clinton’s 
economic accomplishments, Gore empathizes with the struggles of working families.  By 
showing empathy, Gore cultivates an important candidate image trait, as noted by Nimmo 
and Savage (1976).   
 Regarding the issue of crime, Gore said in his convention speech: 
To make families safer, we passed the toughest crime bill in history, and we're 
putting 100,000 new community police on our streets. Crime has fallen in every 
major category for seven years in a row. But there's still too much danger and 
there's still too much fear.  So tonight I want to set another new, specific goal: to 
cut the crime rate year after year -- every single year throughout this decade. 
(2000, pg# 124-125) 
Gore went on to say specifically that we would “fight to add another 50,000 new police 
… fight for a crime victims' bill of rights … [and] fight to toughen penalties on those who 
misuse the Internet to prey on our children and violate our privacy” (2000, pg# 126-128)     
 By citing administration accomplishments, then minimizing those achievements 
and suggesting that their presidency would perform better, vice presidents attempt to 
claim credit for achievements, but also demonstrate that they are “their own man” and 




rhetorical move is that it may serve to negate the record of the administration that the vice 
president was a member of.  If the record of the current administration wasn’t “good 
enough,” then it raises some doubt that a member of the current administration could 
make a difference if they are elected president.     
  
Finding #11: Gore criticizes the Clinton administration 
Gore is the only one of the six vice presidents to have leveled a criticism against 
his president/administration, albeit in only one instance.  In prompt-response pair #27 in 
the second debate, Gore was responding to whether the Clinton administration’s response 
to the Rwandan genocide was sufficient.  Gore said,  
Fine.  We did, actually, send troops into Rwanda to help with the humanitarian 
relief measures.  My wife Tipper, who is here, actually went on a military plane 
with General Sholicatchvieli [sic] on one of those flights.  But I think in retrospect 
we were too late getting in there.  We could have saved more lives if we had acted 
earlier.  But I do not think that it was an example of a conflict where we should 
have put our troops in to try to separate the parties for this reason, Jim.  One of the 
criteria that I think is important in deciding when and if we should ever get 
involved around the world is whether or not our national security interest is 
involved, if we can really make the difference with military forces.  We tried 
everything else.  If we have allies in the Balkans we have allies, NATO, ready, 
willing and able to go and carry a big part of the burden.  In Africa we did not.  
Now, we have tried -- our countries tried to create an Africa crisis response team 




in Sierra Leon, and now that Nigeria has become a democracy, and we hope it 
stays that way, then maybe we can build on that. But because we had no allies and 
because it was very unclear that we could actually accomplish what we would 
want to accomplish about putting military forces there, I think it was the right 
thing not to jump in, as heartbreaking as it was, but I think we should have come 
in much quicker with the humanitarian mission. (2000, Commission on 
Presidential Debates) 
Gore’s criticism was noteworthy because it’s the only instance in this study when coders 
noted that a vice president criticized his president/administration.  As scholars Goldstein 
(1997) and Natoli (1985) noted, vice presidents may incur a rebuke from the president if 
they veer too far toward independence.  But because this happened only once, and about 
a subject that was not one of the major campaign issues, Gore’s choice to criticize 
probably did not hurt him.  It may have served to establish some degree of independence 
from Clinton.   
 
Finding #12: George W. Bush praises the Clinton administration 
An interesting finding occurred in the coding of George W. Bush’s statements in 
the second debate.  Bush actually praised Clinton/administration often (12.07% of his 
debate turns), and certainly more than Gore had done.  This mostly occurred in the first 
half of the debate which focused on foreign policy.  This finding was surprising as it is 
uncommon for a nominee of one party to praise the incumbent president/administration 
who is a member of the other party.  A finding like this did not occur in the other 




 While Bush’s discourse toward Clinton/administration is not within the scope of 
this study (except to see how Gore responded to it), we can speculate on why this 
occurred.  Martel (1983) argues that in some instances, candidates will find it useful to 
“throw bouquets,” during presidential debates.  In other words, candidates find it useful 
to compliment their opponent’s handling of situations either in office or on the campaign.  
Martel says this tactic has several purposes including to “project the ‘tosser’ as fair-
minded” and to “diminish the object of the compliment as an issue for debate or as a 
criterion for the voter’s choice” (p.90).    
 Bush used a variation of this tactic.  He threw bouquets at the Clinton 
administration’s conduct in foreign policy, not Gore directly.  Bush’s use of this tactic 
may have been an effort to establish a more fair-minded, “above the trenches” image.  In 
doing so, Bush’s attacks on Clinton/administration in domestic policy and personal 
character seem more reasonable, because he doesn’t come off as an overly partisan attack 
dog.  By seeming more fair minded, Bush also enhances his likability, and serves to 
position himself as more moderate – something that a presidential candidate strives to 
achieve in the general election as part of an effort to win the middle of the electorate.  In 
throwing bouquets for foreign policy, Bush also reaffirms the sentiment that “politics 
stops at the water’s edge,” which helps him establish a leadership image and was 
consistent with his “uniter, not a divider” campaign theme.  Also, Bush may have wanted 
to diminish foreign policy as an issue in the election, because it was an area where his 
knowledge and experience was considered weak (and Gore’s was considered strong).  
Moreover, Flanigan and Zingale (2010) noted that in 2000, Republicans had lost the 




previous elections.  Instead of debating foreign affairs, Bush may have preferred to keep 
the debate focused on likability and character, areas where he felt he had an advantage 
over Gore.  Recall that likability was noted to be an important candidate image trait 
(Robert, 1981; and Smith, 1990), as was character (Aristotle; Trent, Short-Thompson, 
Mongeau, Nusz and Trent, 2001; Trent, Short-Thompson, Mongeau, Metzler and Trent, 
2005; and McCroskey, Jensen and Todd, 1972).   
 
Finding #13: The questions in the 2000 debates focused less on the 
president/administration than the questions in the 1960, 1984 and 1988 debates. 
While not within the scope of this study, it was interesting to note that the 
moderator in the 2000 debates prompted the topic of president/vice president far less 
frequently than the questioners in the 1960, 1984 and 1988 debates.  Of the 31 questions 
asked by the moderator across the three debates in 2000, only 2 (6.45%) were about 
Clinton/administration.  In contrast, the questioners in the 1960 debates brought up 
Eisenhower/administration in 23.46% of all questions asked; the questioners in the 1984 
debates brought up Carter/administration in 8.06% of all questions asked; and the 
questioners in the 1988 debates brought up Reagan/administration in 21.74% of all 
questions asked.   
This suggests that the moderator in 2000 was pursuing a set of questions that were 
more consistent with the approach that Gore wanted to take.  As Gore sought to avoid 
discussion of Clinton/administration and stay on the offensive against Bush (at least until 
the third debate), the moderator’s questions supported that effort.  One thing to point out 




all of the debates in 2000 were conducted with a single moderator, Jim Lehrer.  Even as 
the third debate was town-hall style where citizens asked the questions, the moderator 
determined who those questioners would be.  Also, the moderator asked all of the follow-
up questions, which made up half of all the questions asked in the debate.  He was in full 






Chapter 6: Conclusions 
This analysis has found that in some cases there are patterns in the way that vice 
presidents negotiate their relationship with the president.  In other cases there are not.  
Vice presidents use their nomination acceptance speech to honor their association with 
the president/administration, and then make statements to declare that they are their own 
man.  Nixon (1960), Mondale, Bush and Gore were more explicit in accomplishing both 
parts of this equation.  While Humphrey handled the first part well by praising Johnson 
effectively, he was arguably too subtle in declaring his independence.  Similar to 
Humphrey, Nixon (1968) was clear in his praising of Eisenhower, but did not signal any 
break from him, perhaps because after eight years out of office, the need for him to 
establish his independence from Eisenhower was already accomplished.  Thus he could 
safely praise Eisenhower without becoming “resubordinated” or “reinfantilized.”   
Another clear pattern was that vice presidents rarely use their ads to discuss their 
president/administration.  Because ads are more conducive to image making, as pictures 
carry more emotional weight, and because there is limited time (30 and 60 seconds 
usually), vice presidents may prefer to use their ads in simple ways to establish a positive 
image, including their independence and likability, and reserving discussion of the 
president/administration to formats where they have more time, such as speeches and 
debates.  Nixon (1960) was the only exception.  He discussed Eisenhower/administration 
in a majority of his television ads studied here.  This may be because ad production 
techniques were more limited in 1960, with the talking head style often being the method 
of choice.  Also, because Nixon was the first sitting vice president in a century to run for 




to establish an image of independence, and the ways in which television could help him 
do so.   
A third clear pattern that emerged was that neither sitting nor former vice 
presidents criticize their own administration.  Of the nearly 1500 individual items coded, 
the lone exception was Gore’s one instance of criticism against the Clinton administration 
in an answer he gave in the second debate.  While there is a need for vice presidents to 
establish their independence and distance themselves from any scandals of the 
administration, criticizing one’s own president/administration is not seen as a way to do 
it.  Criticism may bring about two significant costs.  First, it would likely turn off the 
party base, and the vice president needs their support.  Second, criticizing one’s own 
president may raise questions about the vice president’s integrity and judgment, because 
after all, the vice president chose to be the president’s running mate.  This may hurt the 
vice president’s ability to establish a presidential image.    
In some ways, there were inconsistent patterns in the way that vice presidents 
would negotiate their relationship with the president.  Unlike other vice presidents, Nixon 
defended his president/administration much more than others.  Nixon and Gore used 
minimizing more often than other vice presidents, by saying that as good as the 
president/administration’s record is, it’s not enough, and I can do better. 
Also, while most sitting vice presidents (e.g. Nixon, 1960, Humphrey and H.W. 
Bush) cited their administration’s accomplishments, Gore was a notable exception.  Even 
as he had many accomplishments to brag about, Gore almost completely avoided citing 




cite the administration’s record in the final debate, he emphasized his role individual and 
efforts, rather than credit Clinton, or himself and Clinton together.   
This analysis shows that when a vice president seeks election to the presidency, 
he has tended to negotiate his relationship with the president using one or more of the 
following approaches: 1.) either run on the administration’s record (e.g. Nixon, 1960; 
Humphrey, 1968; Bush 1988); 2.) argue that it was insufficient and if elected, they will 
produce better results (e.g. Nixon, 1960; Humphrey, 1968; Gore 2000); 3.) emphasize 
their own personal involvement and efforts in the administration, rather than the president 
(e.g. Gore, 2000); or 4.) mostly avoid discussing the president/administration (e.g. Nixon, 
1968; Mondale, 1984; Gore, 2000).           
Vice presidents face a complicated set of circumstances when they run for 
president.  Their campaign is affected by their relationship with the president and their 
role in the presidential administration.  Any member of the presidential administration 
will face a similar complicated path if they run for president.  Like vice presidents, 
secretaries of state and other cabinet officials are expected to be loyal to the president, 
and this loyalty may compromise their ability to establish themselves as independent 
figures.  Also, they may be forced to answer questions concerning scandals or unpopular 
policies resulting from that administration.   
Many observers believe that Hilary Clinton will run for president in 2016.  
Clinton is associated with two previous administrations, having served as Secretary of 
State in the Obama administration, and as First Lady in the Clinton administration.  These 
associations may complicate her bid in some similar ways as it would for a vice 




day politics, they may not suffer from the perception of being a “lap dog” in the same 
way that vice presidents might. 
Future studies should examine the presidential campaign communication of those 
who were nominees of the president’s party, but were not vice presidents.  These 
campaigns would include those run by Taft (1912), Hoover (1928), Stevenson (1952), 
McCain (2008), and possibly Clinton (2016).  This study would enable us to compare and 
contrast the way they negotiated their relationship with president/administration, with the 
way that vice presidents have done.  How is the rhetorical situation faced by these 
candidates similar or different from the rhetorical situation faced by vice presidents?      
Based on this study, which was limited to only six campaigns, it is difficult to 
suggest recommendations for how vice presidents who run for president should negotiate 
their relationship with the president/administration.  With that in mind, the study results 
point us to some tentative recommendations.  First, because of the emotional weight they 
carry, television ads that discuss or depict the president, could serve to subordinate the 
vice president.  Thus, vice presidents should not use their television ads to discuss or 
depict the president.  Instead, television ads offer a good opportunity to craft a more 
independent and likable personal image.  This image can be established with creative use 
of imagery, including American flags, family and other things to evoke positive emotion.   
Second, vice presidents should make a respectful, but explicit break from the 
president in their nomination acceptance speeches.  Humphrey failed to make an explicit 
break from Johnson and the administration’s Vietnam policy.  A month later, in his Salt 
Lake City address, he was more explicit in establishing his independence, albeit only 




Third, if the record is good, vice presidents should cite the administration’s 
accomplishments in speeches and debates.  Ultimately, I think that voters vote 
retrospectively.  They are more likely to accept a candidate who says we’ve made a 
certain amount of progress, and we need to take the same approach if we want it to 
continue.  The progress is not to be taken for granted, and can be undone if their 
opponent is elected.  In short, don’t change horses in midstream.  Or to evoke a different, 
and more cynical, metaphor – trust the devil you know, not the one you don’t.  Vice 
presidents should skillfully leverage the success of current accomplishments as proof that 
their approach works, and that their new proposals (which can be offered as a way to 
establish their independence) will work as well, because they are based on the same 
fundamental governing approach.  Vice presidents should, however, take into account the 
unique circumstances of each election, and adapt their strategies accordingly.     
Another suggestion to vice presidents is in regards to how they utilize the 
president in their campaign.  As Pomper (2001) noted, vice presidents labor under the 
burden of appearing less capable than the president.  Popular presidents can elevate their 
vice president’s stature by bringing themselves down a notch.       
For instance, a president could discuss ways in which the vice president played a 
leadership role behind the scenes, something that would be inappropriate for the vice 
president to discuss on his own.  If done successfully, discourse like this may serve to 
change the image of a vice president from being the lapdog, wimp, faithful co-pilot, son, 
or traditional wife, to one who was the “person behind the curtains.”  In other words, the 
vice president was in certain instances the true leader of the administration.  Doing this 




which many presidents might find difficult, if not impossible.  If the vice president is 
elected, however, it could help to solidify a positive legacy for the president, and allow 
him to cultivate the perception that he is secure with himself, and made the right 
judgment in selecting the vice president as his running mate.  Just as a president deems it 
worthwhile to spend their political capital to advocate for certain policies, they might also 
find it worthwhile to spend some “legacy capital” to support their vice president’s bid.   
  For example, in his Democratic convention address in 2004, Clinton elevated 
John Kerry’s stature by throwing himself, along with Kerry’s opponents Bush and 
Cheney, under the proverbial bus.  Clinton said, 
Now let me tell you what I know about John Kerry.  I've been seeing all the 
Republican ads about him.  Let me tell you what I know about him.  During the 
Vietnam War, many young men, including the current President, the Vice 
President and me, could have gone to Vietnam and didn't.  John Kerry came from 
a privileged background.  He could have avoided going, too.  But instead he said, 
“Send me.”  When -- when they sent those swift boats up the river in Vietnam, 
and they told them their job was to draw hostile fire, to wave the American flag 
and bait the enemy to come out and fight, John Kerry said, “Send me.” (pg#33) 
Here Clinton suggests that Kerry possessed, at least in one respect, a greater level of 
character than the current president, vice president, and himself, a former president.  This 
approach invites people to view Kerry as highly capable of being president.   
Similarly, in his 2012 convention speech, Clinton also brought himself down a 




President Obama started with a much weaker economy than I did.  Listen to me, 
now.  No President -- No president, not me, not any of my predecessors, no one 
could have fully repaired all the damage that he found in just four years.  Now -- 
But he has -- he has laid the foundation for a new, modern, successful economy of 
shared prosperity.  And if you will renew the President’s contract you will feel it.  
You will feel it. (pg# 36)  
Clinton, widely credited for presiding over the strong economy of the 1990’s, 
argues that President Obama has had a tougher economic challenge than he himself had.  
In doing so, he subtly suggests that Obama may be doing as good a job or better than he 
had done, even if people don’t realize it yet.  
In his 2000 convention speech, Clinton could have chosen to do something 
similar for Gore.  For instance, he could have provided examples of Gore’s behind the 
scenes leadership.  Maybe something like,  
When we were debating whether to commit troops in Bosnia as part of a 
peacekeeping force, I wasn’t sure what to do.  Al Gore pushed for it.  He made the 
case for why sending troops was a good idea.  And look at the result.  Not a single 
American life lost.  That’s the kind of leadership and judgment we need in a 
president.  
Statements like this one may have helped Gore to establish the image traits of leadership 
and strength, and show that he has the ability to take firm issue stands.  And because the 
president would be making these statements, and even doing so reluctantly, at some 
expense to his own ego, it might be seen as more persuasive than if the vice president 





Limitations of the Study   
Content analysis is a useful research tool in studying political discourse for a 
number of reasons.  It allows us to systematically study large amounts of text and it 
enables us to discover rhetorical trends.  Content analysis also provides a certain degree 
of objectivity, or intersubjectivity, which helps to mitigate the bias that results from the 
analyst’s own dispositions.  Content analysis can also be of assistance to the rhetorical 
critic, because it can reveal rhetorical trends that could be further illuminated through a 
rhetorical or historical-critical analysis.  For instance, this study found that vice 
presidents almost always use their presidential nomination acceptance speeches to 
demonstrate some sort of break from the president they served with.  This finding enables 
the rhetorical critical to focus on how vice presidents attempt to achieve this objective, 
and how each vice president’s rhetorical choices compares to that of other vice 
presidents.   
But content analysis reaches the limits of its usefulness because of the complexity 
in how the vice president discusses the president/administration in ads, speeches and 
debates.  Some rhetorical moves may be so subtle that coders don’t always pick them up.  
Also, coders may have had difficulty discerning between certain categories like praise vs. 
defense, praise vs. neutral, or minimize vs. criticize.  In the speeches and debates, there 
were some statements made by vice presidents that were considered “undeterminable,” 
meaning that at least three out of five coders didn’t render the same judgment.  If a 
statement was coded by the five coders as “praise, defense, neutral, neutral, and none,” 




and Bush (1988) each had a statement in one of their speeches that was 
“undeterminable.”  In the debates, Nixon (1960) had two debate turns that were 
“undeterminable,” Mondale had two, and Gore had three.   
The interrater percent agreement of all coded items was 86.698%, which is 
considered acceptable.  When coding just the latent content (which the findings are 
mostly drawn from), interrater agreement was 60.203%.  This number may be somewhat 
concerning.  On the other hand, because latent content involves making more interpretive 
judgments, the threshold of acceptability is lower than it would be for manifest content.   
While more time devoted to coder training may have increased the interrater 
agreement of the latent content, these interrater agreement results suggest that a vice 
president’s negotiation of his relationship with the president/administration may in some 
instances be a very creative rhetorical act.  Content analysis can point us to general 
rhetorical tendencies, but is limited in its ability to identify creative rhetorical nuances 
that may be taking place in a particular textual unit.  Rhetorical analysis would provide a 
more robust understanding of these texts, but may be less reliable than content analysis.  
There is a tradeoff between reliability and analytical robustness.  Holsti (1969) noted that 
“as categories and units of analysis become more complex, they may yield results that are 
both more useful and less reliable” (p. 142).   
Reducing the number of categories by, for instance, combining praise and defense 
into one category such as “praise or defend,” and combining minimize and criticize into 
“minimize or criticize,” may have resulted in higher rates of interrater agreement, 
because coders don’t have to make fine distinctions.  Doing so, however, would have 




employed defense when discussing Eisenhower in his 1960 campaign.  Holsti (1969) 
continues that, “[content analytic] reliability is a necessary condition for valid inquiry 
but, paradoxically, the cost of some steps taken to increase reliability may be a reduction 
in validity” (p. 142).  Holsti goes on to note that “…the analyst may be forced to strike 
some balance between reliability and relevance of categories and units; the coefficient of 
reliability cannot be the sole criterion for making such decisions” (p. 142).     
  
Closing Thought 
Most vice presidents who run for president have lost.  While it’s painful enough 
to lose the presidential election, the vice president, as president of the Senate, experiences 
the additional pain of being required to certify the election results in the Senate.  The vice 
president is also obligated to have a front row seat during the new president’s inaugural 
address.  This study has hopefully provided a better understanding of how these vice 
presidents have used communication to address the rhetorical situation that faces them 
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Appendix B: Data Tables 
 
Tables for Intercoder Reliability 
Table 1: Percent interrater agreement for manifest, latent and all coded items for ads, 




Manifest Content Latent Content All Coded Items 
(Manifest + 
Latent) 
Ads 97.255% 55.714% 92.241% 
Speeches 94.559% 65.402% 89.434% 
Debates 92.227% 58.119% 84.920% 
Total 93.233% 60.203% 86.698% 
 
Table 2: Fleiss’ kappa calculations for manifest, latent and all coded items for ads, 
speeches and debates. 
 



























































Table 3: Cohen’s kappa calculations for manifest, latent and all coded items for ads, 
speeches and debates. 
 
Cohen’s Kappa  Manifest Content Latent Content All Coded Items 
(Manifest + Latent) 
Ads Undefined .219 .657 
Speeches .072 .407 .673 
Debates .037 .464 .605 
Total .053 .482 .629 
 
 
Tables for Analysis of Ads 
Table 4. Percentage of Television Ads that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
1960. 
 
Praised = 62.50% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None = 37.50% 





Table 5. Percentage of Television Ads that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration 
in 1968.   
 
Praised =  10% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =   90% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
Table 6. Percentage of Television Ads that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
1968. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 












Table 7. Percentage of Television Ads that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in 
1984. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Table 8. Percentage of Television Ads that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
1988. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  90% 









Table 9. Percentage of Television Ads that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
2000. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 
Undeterminable =  0% 
 
 
Tables for Analysis of Speeches 
 
Table 10. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration 
across all five speeches.   
 
Praised =   18.18% 
Defended =   6.49% 
Minimized =   2.60% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   2.60% 
None =   68.83% 







Table 11. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 Nomination Acceptance Address. 
 
Praised =  22.22% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  5.56% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  66.67% 




Table 12. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 “The Need for Leadership” speech. 
 
Praised =  10.53% 
Defended =  5.26% 
Minimized =  5.26% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  5.26% 
None =  73.68% 










Table 13. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 “Saginaw, MI” speech.   
 
Praised =  9.09% 
Defended =  9.09% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  81.81% 




Table 14. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 Hartford, CT speech. 
 
Praised =  8.70% 
Defended =  13.04% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  78.26% 











Table 15. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1960 CBS TV Election Eve Broadcast. 
 
Praised =  83.33% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  16.67% 
None =  0% 





Table 16. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration 
across all five speeches. 
 
Praised =   20.29% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   1.45% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   5.80% 
None =   71.01% 







Table 17. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Announcement speech. 
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  60% 
Undeterminable =  10% 
 
 
Table 18. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Nomination acceptance address.   
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  76.92% 












Table 19. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Salt Lake City, UT Address.  
 
Praised =  8.33% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  8.33% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  16.67% 
None =  66.67% 








Table 20. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 NY Garment District speech.   
 
Praised =  16.67% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  83.33% 






Table 21. Percentage of speech units that Humphrey discussed Johnson/administration in 
his 1968 Houston Astrodome speech.  
 
Praised =  27.27% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  4.55% 
None =  68.18% 








Table 22. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration 
across all five speeches. 
 
Praised =   10.29% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   0% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   1.47% 
None =   86.76% 






Table 23. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Announcement speech.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 






Table 24. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Nomination Acceptance address. 
 
Praised =  10.34% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  86.21% 








Table 25. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, Radio address, September 19. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 









Table 26. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, CBS Radio address, October 24. 
 
Praised =  26.67% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  6.67% 
None =   66.67% 







Table 27. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his 1968 Washington DC, CBS Radio, October 30.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 








Table 28. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   3.23% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   0% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms  =   1.61% 
None =   95.16% 






Table 29. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Announcement address, February 21, 1983.   
 
Praised =  6.25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.75% 





Table 30. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Nomination Acceptance address, July 19. 
 
Praised = 7.69% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.31% 








Table 31. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Portland, OR speech, September 5. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 








Table 32. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Stanford University stump speech, October 17. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  6.25% 
None =  93.75% 






Table 33. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
1984 Pershing Square speech, November 5. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 








Table 34. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   16.67% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   1.85% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   3.70% 
None =   77.78% 






Table 35. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Announcement speech, October 12, 1987. 
  
Praised =  15.38% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 3.85% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  73.08% 






Table 36. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Nomination Acceptance address, August 18.  
 
Praised =  18.75% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  3.13% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  3.13% 
None =  75% 







Table 37. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Gaddi Vasquez Campaign Breakfast speech, September 14. 
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  69.23% 






Table 38. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Dearborn, MI speech, October 19. 
 
Praised = 8.70% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 0% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  91.30% 






Table 39. Percentage of speech units that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in his 
1988 Notre Dame speech, November 1. 
 
Praised =  21.43% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  78.57% 






Table 40. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration across 
all five speeches.  
 
Praised =   2.63% 
Defended =   0% 
Minimized =   3.51% 
Criticized =   0% 
Neutral terms =   0% 
None =   93.86 % 






Table 41. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Announcement speech, June 16, 1999. 
  
Praised =  3.70% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized = 3.70% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.59% 





Table 42. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Nomination Acceptance address, August 17. 
 
Praised = 5.71% 
Defended = 0% 
Minimized = 2.86% 
Criticized = 0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  91.43% 







Table 43. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Audobon Society speech, September 29. 
 
Praised = 0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 







Table 44. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Philadelphia, PA speech, October 24. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  6.67% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.33% 







Table 45. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his St. 
Louis, MO speech, November 6. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  5% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  95% 





Tables for Analysis of Debates 
Table 46. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #1 opening statement.  
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended =  20% 
Minimized =  10% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  50% 





Table 47. Percentage of his 10 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  20% 
Defended =  10% 
Minimized =  10% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  10% 
None =  40% 







Table 48. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement. 
   
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 






Table 49. Percentage of his 13 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #2. 
  
Praised =  30.77% 
Defended =  15.38% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  7.69% 
None =  46.15% 






Table 50. Percentage of his 13 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #3. 
 
Praised =  23.08% 
Defended =  7.69% 
Minimized =  15.38% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  15.38% 
None =  38.46% 






Table 51. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
his Debate #4 opening statement. 
 
Praised =  62.5% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  37.5% 






Table 52. Percentage of his 7 debate turns that Nixon discussed 
Eisenhower/administration in Debate #4. 
 
Praised =  42.86% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  14.29% 
None =  28.57% 







Table 53. Percentage of speech units that Nixon discussed Eisenhower/administration in 
Debate #4 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  16.67% 
Defended =  16.67% 
Minimized =  16.67% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  50% 









Table 54. Percentage of his 24 debate turns that Mondale discussed Carter/administration 
in Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  4.16% 
None =  87.5% 






Table 55. Percentage of his speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 






Table 56. Percentage of his 22 debate turns that Mondale discussed Carter/administration 
in Debate #2.  
  
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 






Table 57. Percentage of speech units that Mondale discussed Carter/administration in his 
Debate #2 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 





Table 58. Percentage of his 23 debate turns that H. W. Bush discussed 
Reagan/administration in Debate #1  
  
Praised =  21.74% 
Defended =  8.70% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  69.57% 






Table 59. Percentage of speech units that H. W. Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
his Debate #1 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  75% 





Table 60. Percentage of his 23 debate turns that Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
Debate #2. 
   
Praised =  34.78% 
Defended =  4.35% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  13.04% 
None =  47.83% 






Table 61. Percentage of speech units that H. W. Bush discussed Reagan/administration in 
his Debate #2 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  75% 





Table 62. Percentage of his 41 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #1. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  2.44% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  92.68% 






Table 63. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #1 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 





Table 64. Percentage of his 47 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #2.  
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  2.13% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  2.13% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  93.62% 






Table 65. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #2 closing statement. 
 
Praised =  0% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0% 
None =  100% 





Table 66. Percentage of his 29 debate turns that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in 
Debate #3. 
 
Praised =  17.24% 
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  3.45% 
None =  79.31% 






Table 67. Percentage of speech units that Gore discussed Clinton/administration in his 
Debate #3 closing statement.  
 
Praised =  25%     
Defended =  0% 
Minimized =  0% 
Criticized =  0% 
Neutral terms =  0%   
None =  75% 





Table 68a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #1.    
 
Questioner                       =  30.00% 
Kennedy(Opponent)        =  20.00% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  20.00% 














Table 68b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #1. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon Minimize 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Defend 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon Praise 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Undeterminable Kennedy None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
















Table 69a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #2. 
 
Questioner                       =  15.39% 
Kennedy (Opponent)       =  30.77% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  30.77% 




































Table 69b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Undeterminable Questioner Criticize 
Nixon Defend Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Neutral 
Nixon Defend Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 11 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Praise 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon None 
Nixon None Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Nixon Praise   







Table 70a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #3. 
 
Questioner                       =  23.08% 
Kennedy(Opponent)        =  23.08% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  23.08% 


































Table 70b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #3. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon Minimize 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 9 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy Criticize 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 10 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Kennedy Criticize Nixon Minimize 
Nixon Defend Kennedy Criticize 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 11 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Neutral Kennedy None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Nixon None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Nixon Praise Kennedy None 
Kennedy Neutral Nixon None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Kennedy None   





Table 71a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Nixon-Kennedy debate #4. 
 
Questioner                       =  28.57% 
Kennedy (Opponent)       =  28.57% 
Nixon (VP)                      =  42.86% 
No One Brought It Up     =  00.00% 
 
 
Table 71b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Nixon-Kennedy 
debate #4. 
 
 PR 1 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Nixon Undeterminable Nixon None 
Kennedy Criticize Kennedy Neutral 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Kennedy None Kennedy Criticize 
Nixon Praise Nixon None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner Neutral 
Nixon Praise Nixon Praise 
Kennedy Criticize Kennedy Praise 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Eisenhower/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Kennedy None   






Table 72a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Mondale-Reagan debate #1. 
 
Questioner                     =  25.00% 
Reagan (Opponent)       =  50.00% 
Mondale (VP)                =  25.00% 





































Table 72b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Mondale-
Reagan debate #1. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner Criticize Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal Criticize Reagan-rebuttal None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Undeterminable 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan Criticize 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Neutral 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Criticize 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 7 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan Criticize 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Undeterminable  
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 8 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 




Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal Undeterminable 
Reagan-rebuttal Criticize Reagan-rebuttal None 
 
 
Table 73a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Mondale-Reagan debate #2.   
 
Questioner                       =  37.50% 
Reagan (Opponent)         =  25.00% 
Mondale (VP)                  =  00.00% 
























Table 73b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of vice president’s response to 
the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Mondale-Reagan 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 5 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Criticize 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 6 Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan Criticize Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Reagan-rebuttal Undeterminable Reagan-rebuttal None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Carter/Admin. PR 7  Discussion of Carter/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Mondale None Mondale None 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Reagan None Reagan Criticize 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Mondale-rebuttal None Mondale-rebuttal None 
Reagan-rebuttal None Reagan-rebuttal Criticize 
  
  




Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Reagan None 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Reagan None Mondale None 
Questioner None   
Mondale None   
Questioner None   
Mondale None   
Reagan-rebuttal None   
Mondale-rebuttal None   
 
 
Table 74a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Bush-Dukakis debate #1. 
 
Questioner                       =  21.74% 
Dukakis (Opponent)        =  43.48% 
H. W. Bush (VP)             =  08.70% 
No One Brought It Up     =  26.09% 
 
 
Table 74b. The nature of the initial prompt and the vice president’s response to the initial 
prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Bush-Dukakis debate #1. 
    
PR 1 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 14 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis None 
Bush Defend Bush None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 15 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 




Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Neutral 
Bush None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush Praise Bush Praise 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 18 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Undeterminable Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush Defend 
  
  
PR 8  Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush None Bush  Praise 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 9  Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Dukakis None Dukakis None 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  




Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis Criticize 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 12 Discussion of Reagan/Admin.   
Questioner None   
Bush None   
Dukakis None   
 
 
Table 75a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Bush-Dukakis debate #2.   
 
Questioner                       =  21.74% 
Dukakis (Opponent)        =  17.39% 
H. W. Bush (VP)             =  26.09% 























Table 75b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Bush-Dukakis 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 12 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis Criticize Dukakis None 
Bush None Bush Neutral 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 13 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Dukakis None 
Dukakis None Bush None 
  
  
PR 3 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 14 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Criticize Questioner None 
Bush Defend Bush Praise 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 15 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Bush Praise 







PR 5 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Neutral Dukakis None 
Dukakis Neutral Bush None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 18 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Neutral 
Bush Praise Bush Praise 






PR 8 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Dukakis None Bush None 
Bush Praise Dukakis None 
  
  
PR 9 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Dukakis None Dukakis Criticize 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Dukakis Criticize 
Dukakis None Bush None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Reagan/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner Criticize 
Bush None Bush Neutral 







Table 76a. The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Gore-Bush debate #1. 
 
Questioner                       =  00.00% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  30.56% 
Gore (VP)                        =  02.78% 







Table 76b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #1. 
    
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Neutral 
Bush Neutral   
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Neutral 





PR 3 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Criticize Bush None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush 2 Criticize   
Gore 2 None PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Bush 3 None Questioner None 
Gore 3 None Bush Criticize 
Bush 4 None   
Gore 4 None   
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush None Bush None 
Gore 2 None Gore2 None 
Bush 2 Criticize   
Gore 3 None PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Bush 3 None Questioner None 
Gore 4 None Bush None 











PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush Criticize Gore None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush Criticize Gore None 
Gore 2 None Bush2 None 
Bush 2 None Gore2 None 
  
  
PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush Criticize 
Gore None Gore Undeterminable 
Bush 2 None Bush2 Criticize 
  
Gore 2 Undeterminable 
  
Bush 3 None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 31 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
Bush None 
PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. Gore2 None 
Questioner None Bush2 None 








PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 32 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 33 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 34 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 35 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 36 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 





PR 18 Discussion of Clinton/Admin.   
Questioner None   













Table 77a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in Gore-Bush debate #2. 
 
Questioner                       =  01.32% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  15.79% 
Gore (VP)                        =  01.32% 




Table 77b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #2. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 40 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 41 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 







PR 3 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 42 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 43 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
Bush Praise   
  
  




Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 45 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 46 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 47 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 48 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner Neutral Questioner None 
Bush Criticize Bush None 
Gore Defend   
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 49 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 50 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 51 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Gore None 
Gore None   
Bush2 None   
  
  
PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 52 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 




Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 53 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 54 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 55 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 56 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 18 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 57 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush Criticize 
  
  
PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 58 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 59 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 60 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 61 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 






PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 62 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 63 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush Praise 
  
  
PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 64 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
  
PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 65 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Gore None 
  
  
PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 66 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore Criticize Bush None 
  
  
PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 67 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 68 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 69 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 31 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 70 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 






PR 32 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 71 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Bush None 
  
  
PR 33 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 72 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 34 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 73 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
Bush None   
  
  
PR 35 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 74 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 36 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 75 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 37 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 76 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
  
Bush None 
PR 38 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. Gore2 None 
Questioner None Bush2 None 
Bush None Gore3 None 
  
  
PR 39 Discussion of Clinton/Admin.   
Questioner None   









Table 78a.  The percentage of prompt-response pairs in which the questioner, the 
opponent and the vice president respectively was the initial prompter of the 
president/administration as a topic in the Gore-Bush debate #3. 
 
Questioner                       =  00.00% 
W. Bush (Opponent)       =  13.33% 
Gore (VP)                        =  16.67% 




Table 78b. The nature of the initial prompt and the nature of the vice president’s response 
to the initial prompt (praise, defend, minimize, criticize, neutral, none) in Gore-Bush 
debate #3. 
 
PR 1 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 16 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore Praise 
Bush None Bush None 
  
  
PR 2 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 17 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 3 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 18 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None Bush Criticism 
Bush 2 None   
  
  
PR 4 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 19 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore None 
Gore None   
  
  
PR 5 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 20 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 




Bush Criticize   
  
  
PR 6 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 21 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Bush None 
Gore None Gore None 
  
  
PR 7 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 22 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 







PR 8 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 23 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 9 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 24 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Bush None 
  
  
PR 10 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 25 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Gore None Gore None 







PR 11 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 26 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 12 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 27 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Neutral Bush None 
Questioner2 Neutral Gore None 
Gore None   






PR 13 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 28 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 





PR 14 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 29 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush None Gore Praise 
Gore Praise Bush Criticism 
Bush2 None   
Gore2 None   
Bush3 Criticism   
Gore3 None   
  
  
PR 15 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. PR 30 Discussion of Clinton/Admin. 
Questioner None Questioner None 
Bush Praise Gore None 
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